Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-235 *7 December 1994*

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CSCE Budapest Conference Concluded 6 Dec

Croatia's Tudjman Interviewed

LD0612182094 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0953 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by unidentified correspondent at the CSCE conference in Budapest on 6 December; interview conducted in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed Hungarian translation—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Mr. President, first of all I would like to quote from Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic's address to the CSCE conference last night [5 Dec]. He said that it was an irony that he had to speak about uncertainty and the lack of security at a conference that was organized for security and cooperation. The president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has equally condemned the policy of Paris, London, and Russia, and he was speaking about an overall helplessness, which concerns your republic as well. Do you agree with President Izetbegovic?

[Tudjman] President Izetbegovic has obviously had good reason for such a sharp speech. By saying this he condemned the Serbs aggression and actions. Now the main question for us is to put an end to the occupation of certain Croatian territories. It is also a question of how we can get to the end of the Bosnian crisis. In this case, we cannot attack the entire Europe and NATO, or the United Nations either We have to make practical steps to put an end to the war and to prevent the further perishing of our nations, to establish a common peace for the states that are just being established on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

[Correspondent] Since the beginning of the war you also criticized the United Nations and the peacekeepers several times.

[Tudjman] It is true that I have also criticized UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], but I have never forgotten that the problem primarily is that the Serbs prevent them from carrying out their task. The United Nations has really done a lot for putting an end to the war in Croatia. They were also successful in imposing sanctions on Serbia and by doing this they have forced the Serbs to implement, more or less, the complete blockade against the Bosnian Serbs.

On the other hand, they have also put pressure on the so-called Krajina Serbs, who were forced to go into peace talks with us, and through this they have to recognize their territorial and political reintegration into Croatia. After all, this war is a war of different civilizations, regarding the fact that, for example, Russian volunteers are fighting on the Serb side and mojahedin—that is Islamic holy fighters from various Islamic countries—are fighting on the Muslim side. Through this it is absolutely clear that certain Islamic fundamentalists would like it if tension was growing, because, as we know, according to certain—I am stressing that not official Islamic but certain fundamentalist—opinions, the coexistence with Christians is impossible.

[Correspondent] What do you expect from Budapest? Has there been any development?

[Tudjman] Unfortunately, no kind of development has taken place at this Budapest summit. This emerged, for example, from the Russian speech and their documents. Furthermore, it is shocking that, according to certain notes, they would have liked to achieve an increase in tension, by which the settlement of the crisis could have been prevented. This is frightening, unfortunately.

[Correspondent] Zagreb has officially repeated that if UNPROFOR remained helpless, it would terminate the peace treaty on the peacekeepers' role concluded with the United Nations. In this case the peacekeepers should leave Croatia. Are you planning a step of this kind?

[Tudjman] If the agreements that have been signed by the Croatian leadership and the local Serb leaders of the so-called Krajina are not observed, if this is not implemented, then Croatia will terminate the UNPROFOR mandate.

[Correspondent] I have been in a few Croatian crisis zones, where the local leaders unanimously said that if this—that is the agreement mentioned by you—failed, Croatia would defend and regain its territories by military force. Do you think the war can again escalate in Croatia?

[Tudjman] Naturally, it is understandable that the violation of this agreement—and by this the termination of the UNPROFOR mandate—would mean that after this Croatia would resort to steps that are at its disposal for the reestablishment of its full independence. An independent country, like Croatia, is entitled to these steps. However, I think that this does not necessarily lead to the restart of the war, because, at the present state of affairs the official Belgrade, that is Serbia, says that it has no territorial claims vis-a-vis us. I think, I cannot imagine, that they would restart a war against our republic. However, I also have to say that Croatia has the means to reoccupy—even by military force—its momentarily occupied territories.

The war can only have one outcome, that the occupied territories return to the authority of the Croatian Republic and that in Bosnia- Herzegovina a solution is found that satisfies the needs of all the three nations that live there, and, after all this, the states that emerge on the territory of the former Yugoslavia mutually recognize each other, and by this they establish the basis for a new international system.

Tudjman Message

LD0612165194 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1307 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Message from Croatian President Franjo Tudjman conveyed by unidentified Croatian representative to the

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CSCE meeting in Budapest on 6 Dec—live; in English with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. President, heads of state and government, ladies and gentlemen:

On behalf of the Croatian Government and on the basis of instructions from my head of state, I should like to appeal to our brothers of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they should accept the document presented to us here [by Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn]. At this moment—this is the message of my head of state—international relations have reached such a level that we can only hope that humanitarian aid will reach us without obstruction, and that every side will accept by consensus an immediate proclamation of a cease-fire. This, therefore, is the international situation.

But Mr. President, if this is the first sign of the growing awareness shown by the international community—that firstly they feed the victim before he is executed, that they freeze the results of the aggressor at the current level in the interest of lasting peace—then I believe we will have made a very important step.

The following step, in the opinion of my head of state, is that all our energy, all the energy of the international community, must be mobilized, and we must continue the diplomatic offensive so that a qualified meeting on the highest level is held, with the participation of the most important sides concerned, at which this pressing problem is resolved within Europe and the CSCE. If this appeal points in this direction, then it will have achieved, gained, support for Croatia.

UK's Major Comments

LD0612165894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The British prime minister has reaffirmed that London will order its troops home from Bosnia if it is only at the cost of unacceptable risk that they are able to perform their humanitarian tasks. At his news conference in Budapest, John Major also said that he hoped that a withdrawal would not be necessary, since the sides concerned in the Yugoslav crisis wanted the Blue Helmets to remain in the region. The British prime minister considered the reports of grave differences of view between Russia and NATO over the plans for the alliance's expansion to be over-exaggerated.

Shevardnadze Addresses Summit

LD0612160794 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1037 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze at the CSCE summit in Budapest—live; in Georgian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed Chairman, esteemed colleagues. Let me recall a classic quote: The war is over, now start fearing the peace. It was Bertold Brecht who said that. It is true that the Cold War is over, but the peace which is with us is no less alarming. The wars in the Balkans justify my declaring here that we live in just such an alarming peace, because the preceding Cold War did not eliminate the consequences. It is a very difficult admission for a man who was able to contribute to the establishment of the current state of affairs and to the demolishing of the old walls. In a country in which the overwhelming majority of the population have become the victims of ethnic cleansing, and live within closed borders, I am now forced to note that the international community has probably been unable to keep in step with the consequences and the rate of the speed of the rapid transformation. It is the experience of a man who was forced to defend his principles with weapons in his hands. I believe that my experience and practical knowledge entitle me to speak about a pre-crisis state of affairs, which characterizes our country right now.

In the interest of the cause, in the name of which we are now gathered here, let me speak about a few dangers. It is the totality of such events and moments which may threaten the entire region of Europe. These take place, in the current circumstances, not against the minority and the majority. [as heard] These are, in the second place, the conflicts of the new generation which are developing along the fault lines of the old residues carried over from history, whose point of departure is [words indistinct] of the old totalitarian regimes.

[Words indistinct] make use of these to gain power and to entice in various ways. Sometimes the problems are described as being of an ethnic nature, but these are incorrect approaches, sinful approaches. Conflicts of this type are being demoted to a kind of tribal level. These people either do not see or do not wish to admit to the kind of political background these events and phenomena have, the kind of force and political power behind them. Therefore, global cooperation, resistance to such enticements are very important in order that the threat of the Cold War should not be reproduced.

It is for this reason that we must support and rationally promote the process of democratic revival, to lay the just bases on the territories of the successor states to the former Soviet Union. This aim may be served by settling the conflict at an appropriate level, by a suitable reaction, and the acknowledgment of the fact that the centers of tension in the territories of the former Soviet Union have not yet been eliminated.

We must call a spade a spade. These arguments have become discredited in the eyes of hundreds of thousands, millions of my fellow men throughout the world, my fellow citizens and compatriots. Several decisions and resolutions skirted around the facts and reality. In Abkhazia, too, these pretend measures were implemented while ignoring the interests of the peaceful population, whereas genocide must be seen as genocide.

The neutral stand of international observers is not suitable for the demands of the given situation. It must not

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be ignored that we are only in a transient phase, moving from Cold War into a new European system. We must endeavor to elevate the CSCE into a regional organization of full value, one which ensures the possibility of fertile cooperation between all its members, providing a possibility for cooperation, naturally, between the CIS member states, the European countries, and all the powers of the world that have an interest in it.

If we accept all this in our documents, if these facts gain reflection in these documents, then we will be able to expect, to a large degree, that the support of peace will grow into (?a pillar] of real peace, and we will be able to eliminate the practical implemention of the principle of divide-and-rule, a principle which has stemmed from ancient times, and we will be able to delete from this process those who have neither legal nor legislative or moral rights to shape and direct these processes.

We will be able to exclude the possibility of the use of force. Therefore, it is necessary to define concretely, from a legal point of view, our relationship toward any kind of aggression, in a way which determines specifically and declares clearly the kind of legal frameworks which apply here, and the kind of things which must be considered as unlawful.

Georgia pays extraordinarily great attention to the changes and processes of the European security system, and wishes to make possible that the accumulated forces and possibilities will serve the defense of the new and old countries. In a number of former republics of the Soviet Union, in the CIS successor states, irreversible processes are taking place and reactions to them develop. We must ensure, without delay, the dissipation of these [as heard], the saving of people. Tomorrow will be too late. It is for this reason that we propose the creation of an international foundation for saving democracy, which would contribute to the fulfillment of economic tasks—something which is related to it—and to the provision of security.

The available frameworks must be filled with new contents, and the defense mechanisms that serve that purpose must be developed. We must also rule out mass settling of accounts, both from a physical and a psychological point of view, and we must view these as things to be ruled out, (?like) the inhuman methods. It is in this spirit that Georgia proposes that in the first phase we should create a system of regional agreements which could serve as a framework for that.

We plan that in 1995, at the CIS level and at the level of international organizations, we will review the possibilities that may contribute to the settling of the still raw conflicts. I must admit, despite all that, that I did not find easy to come to Budapest to this consultation, following the (?horrible and), sad events. However, irrespective of that, I believe that justice will triumph in the closing document of this consultation, which will serve the peace of our continent, which, through the cooperation of the United Nations, the CIS, and other organizations, can serve the easing of the situation of Georgia and the normal human living conditions of its citizens. I believe in that and endeavor to achieve it.

Thank you for your attention.

Czech President Speaks

LD0612191794 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0906 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by Czech President Vaclav Havel to the CSCE meeting in Budapest—live; broadcast in progress; in Czech with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's session coincides with the fifth anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It was that which ended the division of Europe into two parts. At the same time, I ask you to remember our successful acceptance of the (?Iraqi) challenge. As a result, we are able to say today that Europe has a real chance to build a new structure in which the individual states can live in constitutional states and take responsibility for everything that happens to mankind. [passage omitted]

Let me mention here that the new security system seems to be developing much slower and laboriously and with much greater difficulties than we would have believed five years ago. Despite the collapse of the totalitarian regimes, the international communities open their doors to us only reluctantly. We see that certain kinds of fears are developing, but still, the principles on the basis of which the new Europe can be built are beginning to take shape. It seems that the courage, the new kind of thinking which [words indistinct] is lacking.

We must note with disappointment that Europe has been unable to solve the problems and crisis in former Yugoslavia. We also see these crisis zones in the territory of the former Soviet Union too. These are all warning signs. Very serious tasks still wait for the democrats. We cannot sit back satisfied with the status quo in which the democrats have been unable to find a solution to these problems. They must not delay the construction of a new order of Europe.

However, it cannot be dictated by others. Those who dictate the shaping of this new order must not be nationalists, extremists. We cannot allow that the situation falls into the hands of others. Europe has always been a uniform political unity, its multicolored nature notwithstanding. However, its main parameters have always been determined by those who were stronger while the less powerful were forced into the background when these principles were being determined. The new Europe must be reformed on the bases of equality.

Among these I would mention, first of all, the understanding, the mutual acceptance of responsibility and the recognition of the identity of others. It is on the basis of this, on the basis of mutual respect, that the atmosphere in which countries respect the rights of other countries can develop. No one country can prevent another from

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seeking its place in an organization, joining an organization which stands close to its culture and political affinity.

We must avoid the kind of automatic reflexes, that certain countries automatically react with anxiety to the intention of a country to join an organization. This must be taken into account in respect of countries in the CSCE too. On the other hand, we must acknowledge and accept too that the CSCE countries should retain the multicolored nature which is claimed by the entire Europe as its own.

The various European organizations and groups have undertaken serious tasks. NATO, the North American Cooperation Council which links Europe and the states of North America, may also belong here. Secondly, I mention the EU which is a purely European body and which wishes to achieve a high degree of economic an political cooperation between European countries. [passage omitted] The Soviet Union is developing increasingly good relations with these organizations, and/or moving toward joining these, although the cultural differences must be taken into account.

It cannot be anyone's intention to slow down this reconciliation. Russia plays a very important role in Europe. It can undertake a very important European role despite the fact that most of its territory lies beyond Europe's eastern borders. The European order is inconceivable without Russia. This cooperation should also be based on mutual respect. We cannot reject anyone just because one is different, and it cannot happen that any side should want to dictate to another, neither side should make an attempt to do so.

Thus it is hugely important to form an institutional framework in which the two regions can cooperate more effectively. Western and eastern Europe must learn to coexist. The CSCE provides a good opportunity in this. In other words, the CSCE, in spite of the fact that it was formed in a completely different era, can play a vital role in shaping the new Europe. No other organization can play this role. It can guarantee a framework for permanent dialogue and cooperation with the European countries and countries which operate in similar cultural frameworks. East and the West are included in these frameworks and the CSCE can become the most appropriate institution to facilitate cooperation in all areas.

Mutual confidence is essential, the democratic and former communist states will now have to work in one framework, the CSCE is the organization in which dialogue can continue between the West and the East and I also list here the Mediterranean countries.

Let me speak about more concrete issues. Cooperation within the frameworks of the CSCE is extraordinarily important at the moment, and it is not by chance that these issues basically concern security. The CSCE can play an important role in the area of preventive diplomacy by sending representatives to potential conflict areas; it should not only mean monitoring conflict areas, but should also take important steps in connection with those.

However, the CSCE countries could achieve even more than this if the CSCE received a lot larger support from the member countries—not only theoretical, but practical support, too. The Czech Republic will support it.

I have to stress that in these areas the UN has not been effective enough. However, the CSCE could have closer cooperation with the UN, too. We can see possibility for sending multinational peacekeeping troops first of all to Nagorno-Karabakh. It would be fundamentally important not only from a practical viewpoint, but it would also facilitate finding a peaceful solution. It would have political significance, too, for we could clearly demonstrate joint responsibility for creating peace throughout the world. I can also envisage the CSCE undertaking monitoring activity on its own. After all, we cannot expect just one country to guarantee peace. This is our joint responsibility. It cannot lead to a new division of the world, what is more, it would serve the interests of the less strong countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen. I think that we can reach joint agreement in a series of concrete issues and facilitate the creation of a new world order in the framework of the CSCE. The CSCE must not be a [word indistinct] scene of European confrontations. The evolution of the roots of a conflict similar to the Second World War must be avoided at all costs.

The Czech Republic would like to thank Hungary for organizing this conference and contributing to its success. Thank you very much.

Slovakia's Kovac Speaks

LD0612125094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Slovak President Michal Kovac addressed the CSCE summit this morning. He said:

[Begin recording] I do not believe that the strengthening of the CSCE role in the European security architecture would end in the weakening of the already existing security structure. On the contrary, a clear definition of responsibilities and powers, as well as mutual links, will help to achieve the goal that we are working toward. We attribute a special importance to the continuation of our efforts related to the limitation and control of conventional forces. From this point of view, the integrity of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe should not be questioned. A code of the political and military aspects of security in the behavior of the member states should be considered an important step in the CSCE legislation.

We also believe that the CSCE will play a role, in a dignified way, as a key organization in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. It is, perhaps, not necessary

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to repeat how important is the role of the high commissioner for ethnic minorities. From the very beginning, we have considered his activity as being one of the important instruments of preventive diplomacy. We would welcome the opportunity for the high commissioner to more fully implement his mandate throughout the CSCE.

We support well-developed cooperation between the United Nations and the CSCE. In our opinion, the aim of this cooperation should be to reform the CSCE to a primary instrument. [sentence as heard] We follow with hope the implementation of the CSCE peace mission in Trans-Caucasus, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in other conflict areas in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. We believe that it is desirable to fully integrate the newly emerged states so that the implementation of the high standards of the CSCE is made possible in the whole area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The human dimension is an integral part of the overall CSCE security concept. My country believes that issues related to the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities form a part of this broader context. The Slovak Republic views minorities as an essential enrichment of our society, and so we perceive the minorities as an inseparable part of our state. We have actively contributed in the Council of Europe to the drafting of a framework agreement on the protection of ethnic minorities. We believe that if the CSCE member states decide to observe the principles of this convention, it would be an important contribution to the fulfillment of the human dimension of the CSCE.

The Slovak Republic is sincerely interested in the development of relations with all CSCE participant countries, especially with its immediate neighbors. In this context, allow me please to recall the importance of the stability factor, which we see as being a contribution to the strengthening of mutual relations and trust among European countries, present and future members of the European Union.

The Slovak Republic clearly declares as its priority its interest in becoming integrated into West European and transatlantic political, security and economic structures, primarily into the European Union, Western European Union, and NATO. This orientation, based on a broad consensus of key political entities and the general public is our contribution to, and our pledge in the construction of a stable and prosperous Europe. In this context, the economic dimension of the CSCE also merits our attention. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Bosnian Delegate Speaks

LD0612153894 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1245 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by the representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the CSCE summit in Budapest—live; in English with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mr. Chairman: Our republic's president made it clear yesterday just what a disappointment it is that international community has failed to solve the conflict imposed on us. (?Therefore) in our view, the international community is capitulating before the aggressor.

When examining the international peace plans, the great powers made a compromise, and in practice they are contradicting the CSCE's principles. As a consequence, they are actually encouraging the aggressor to acquire territories by force. In this process the Bosnian people have been betrayed. Deprived of our right to protect ourselves, we are necessarily in the hands of these nations. We are at the mercy of the help of the international community. However late this help comes, it will be vital.

We are the victims of aggression, we have fallen victim to genocide. The international community, the United Nations, had drawn up plans before we arrived at this sad opinion. With or without intention, they continue to reward the aggressor. Although so many discussions have been held in the CSCE, what we can actually see is that the establishment of a greater Serbia is being assisted.

But the reality is that they do not put their principles into practice in this process. They made it possible repeatedly for the Serbs to carry out aggression against our country, depriving us from the basic instruments of defense. We turned to the international community in vain.

We are not in a position to give our agreement to a document about which we do not approve. We could explain our veto in certain issues, for instance, in nuclear issues. But we would not like to blackmail the international community. The fundamental success of the process depends on what stance is taken in the matter of our country, in the matter of Bihac.

Before the summit it was agreed that the CSCE would adopt a stance regarding Bihac. Now we can see it failing to happen. We propose to you that you raise the issue one more time and adopt it with a consensus; and give another chance to the CSCE process to retain its credibility. I propose that you adopt this document with a consensus. In the case that this should fail to take place, we will know what conclusion to draw (?and the international community will know your stance on the matter).

Gligorov Speaks

LD0612221394 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1126 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov at the CSCE summit in Budapest—live; Gligorov speaks in Macedonian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is untenable again. There are very important issues. The

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issues concern the people of Macedonia, and their consequences are important for all of Europe. The events have turned into an open wound. At risk are the UN Declaration, the Paris Charter, the Helsinki Agreement—their validity is in question when we see the developments here.

Of special concern for us is the fact that all efforts to restore peace so far have failed in this war. We consider this generally to be the failure of the international forces—in both a political and military sense. The CSCE could be a [word indistinct] in preventing a further prolonging of the war, which is in harmony with the CSCE's aims—that it should protest, take action against the war and ethnic cleansing. Yet that is precisely what we see in the Bosnian war, and although the Bosnian war is considered to be a local conflict, from the local viewpoint it is of much greater impact.

We fear that if the current situation continues to worsen along the current lines, it will encourage many other aggressors.

The tensions in the Balkans have had several consequences: The violation of (?human rights), the violation of the minorities charter, and they prevent economic, (?political), and cultural cooperation among the countries.

The situation has greatly deteriorated in Bosnia-Herzegovina recently, which has resulted in an aggravation of the economic difficulties in the neighboring countries as a result of the sanctions. That is precisely why the CSCE must firm up its stand in the Balkan region, and the Bosnian war must not be allowed to become a complete fiasco for the CSCE and the United Nations. On the contrary: The sole solution in that region is for the European process to strengthen, and for it to act accordingly.

It must extend to economic, political, and cultural issues, too. To be brief: The war costs much more than resolving the economic, political, and cultural issues in a region such as the Balkans.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Macedonian Republic represents an independent position concerning the question of our country showing that it is possible to gain independence, to proclaim independent principles through peaceful means. In this sphere, we accept the international conventions, meaning the issue of minorities and human rights.

We also provide an example that economic and political cooperation is possible in the region. However, to this day Macedonia has been unable to become a full member of the CSCE process. One of our neighbors is preventing this with its veto, in spite of the good intentions of the other members. I believe that this is in deep contradiction with the conference's basic principles. At the same time, the Macedonian Republic came to this conference in its own interest and in the interest of the conference as well, and it gives its support for approval of the conference's resolutions. We provide our support to every participant in the process, and we enjoy your support in many respects.

Macedonia has submitted its application for membership in the CSCE. At present, we participate as observers in the CSCE process; owing to the Greek veto we have still been unable to become full members. This (?happened in November this year).

I should like to remind you of all this, as well as of the paradox that as a member of the UN it is willing to fulfill every condition for becoming a full member. In spite of this, it has been excluded from the CSCE to date.

Mr. President, the CSCE's institutions are focused on the development of democratic institutions, with special emphasis on the protection of the minorities, in the spirit of the UN Charter. All of these are questions of fundamental importance in this region. For precisely this reason it is very important for us to understand, after all this, what the obstacles are to our admission into the CSCE—whether there might perhaps be external reasons for this.

Let us note that Macedonia has suffered very serious economic losses owing to the international sanctions. The UN to date has not done anything to compensate Macedonia for these direct losses, not to mention the indirect losses, the losses stemming from the closure of the Greek and Macedonian border. The neighbors brought it into force nine months ago; the CSCE, however, tolerates such pressures exerted on a sovereign country. I am of the view that the CSCE must take corrective measures in this regard, and it must handle the countries on an equal basis.

With this, after having said all this, Mr. President, I should like to repeat our conviction that this summit will be successful and I emphasize our intention for Macedonia to be able to join the CSCE as a full member. I am certain that the member countries will support our fully justified application.

Allow me to thank Hungary for all it has done so excellently in the interest of the conference's success. Thank you.

Moldovan President's Address

LD0612125894 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0810 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by Moldovan President Mircea Snegur at the CSCE summit in Budapest—live; in Moldovan with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] (?Let me say thanks) for the excellent circumstances which the organizers have provided for the CSCE summit. The aim of our consultations is to look at the possibilities through which coordination may be strengthened in order for us to

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create a more stable Europe in which the Euro-Atlantic cultures can integrate fully. In this context the possibility which faces our country is clear. Moldova not only wishes to be a committed member of the European region but is also ready to cooperate with all states of the continent and to make better use of the possibilities and support which, amnong others, the CSCE provides for it in the interest of the consolidation, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country.

The CSCE has been conducting a good policy as regards the interests of Moldova and it is the continuation of this which is the political solution that our country has chosen in the course of its historical deveopment. I would like to emphasize that it had been possible to do this without bloodshed. However, currently the situation of conflict is a continuous state of affairs in our country in order for us to maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty. At the same time, this conflict in Moldova endangers European stability and integrity and represents another source of tension in an area which is already characterized by a high degree of political instability and military preparedness.

In this moment of history, on which the CSCE's attention focuses just now, the hope that we will find the solution for the problem sparkles brightly. I would like to repeat again the words of thanks which we must convey to the members of the Moldova mission of the CSCE for their indefatigable work.

I would like to stress that the conflict in Moldova is of a political nature. It has nothing to do whatsoever with ethnic or religious clashes. Those who are working to weaken the vitality of our country are the vehicles for the evil of separatism. We are able to observe this phenomemon in several countries of the world. The nations' right to self-determination is a right which the international basic treaties have laid down unambiguously and have done so more than once. However, certain organizations, certain separatist movements wish to use these human rights as a tool with which they can camouflage the aim of their activities.

Our task, within the CSCE as well as on an international level, is to elaborate the criteria through which we can distinguish betwen separatism and the right to self-determination. It is necessary to comdemn efforts aimed at separatism and all those who support [words indistinct] in an indirect way. The majority of the states of the globe are multi-ethnic states and the revival of and support for separatist endeavors would represent a very serious danger for the overwhelming majority of the countries in respect of peace and security. This is the reason why we must pay attention to this process.

For all these reasons, let me propose that my country—where such separatist endeavors may be observed—organize, within the CSCE freamework, a seminar or conference in order for us to find the appropriate solution for distinguishing between separatism and self-determination.

Mr. Chairman: The conflicts in the eastern regions of Europe draw attention to the important fact that the 14th Russian Army completely withdrew from the territory of Moldova this year. Thus there are no foreign troops on the teritory of our country and this is fully in accord with the tenets laid down in the Moldova Constitution which prescribes that we cannot allow foreign troops to be stationed on the territory of our country.

Concrete steps have already been taken. For example, on 1 October this year, Moldova and the Russian Federation signed an agreement which forbids Russian troops to enter Moldovan territory in any form in the next three years. This is fully in accord with the spirit and the letter of the relevant CSCE documents. This agreement, this accord strengthens the good-neighborly relations and confidence between Moldova and the Russian Federation.

We believe that the supervision of the withdrawal of the 14th Russian Army has contributed to the easing of the crisis situation in Moldova, although it took place not only in the interest of our country but that of the Russian Federation too. After all, it is their task and is in their interest, too, to promote relations which consolidate the region. Perhaps it would be useful if, in the future too, similar missions by the CSCE could be carried out.

Mr. Chairman: Moldova fully shares the views outlined by the majority of those speaking before me in respect of the role and situation of the CSCE in respect of the construction of Europe.

Thank you for your attention, Mr. Chairman.

Azerbaijani President's Speech

LD0612134994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0837 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev at the CSCE summit in Budapest—live; in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] I would like to express my deepest thanks to President Arpad Goncz and the Hungarian Government for the excellent working conditions which they created for us and for the hospitality they provided for us.

The Azerbaijani people were looking forward to the CSCE summit with great expectations. Much work preceded today's conference. The road which led here from the Helsinki closing document was very long. All of this had a positive effect on the peace processes. One of the most significant changes which took place on the European continent in the recent years was the re-drawing of maps of the countries. Azerbaijan was also affected by these changes.

In this context the role of the CSCE is growing day by day. New spheres of interest and zones of influence are emerging. There is a need for a new CSCE to safeguard

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stability. Therefore, it is necessary to turn the CSCE into an effective tool. And it is necessary for the CSCE to strengthen the process of democratization and the protection of human rights.

In order to protect states which are still relatively weak, young, democratic states we need to take resolute steps to abolish aggression. All of this should be done so that our continent can become a depository of the European security architecture.

Following the declaration of its independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan took resolute steps toward a multiparty market economy in which human and minority rights are guaranteed. Despite the difficulties of the transformation and six years of war we have already made significant progress on this way. I hope that we can resolutely accomplish our goals.

From this aspect NATO's Partnership for Peace program is important. We are completely dedicated to it. Arms control is very important, thus we welcome the disarmament treaty on conventional weapons.

We wish to act as an equal partner in the international community. We are cooperating both with our neighbors and with other states of the world. A clear example of this is the agreement signed on 20 September 1994. Under this agreement we will jointly exploit the oil reserves under the Caspian Sea. We signed this agreement with countries which are also members of the CSCE, for example, Russia, Norway, Greece, and the United States. This also strengthens relations between the nations participating in this consortium enterprise and European cooperation in general.

Ladies and gentlemen! This summit's participants are aware of the fact that Azerbaijan was afflicted by aggression six years ago on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Separatists from the Armenian Republic were engaged in active hostile aggression with the aim of occupying (?Tanjususha) in Azerbaijan. In the course of this they annexed the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 50 Azerbaijani [word indistinct] lived in this territory at the time. Using Nagorno-Karabakh as a springboard the Armenians occupied six Azerbaijani counties, four times more territory than previously. [sentence as heard]. As a consequence of the aggression, the aggressors occupied more than 20 percent of Azerbaijan territory and the number of victims was more than 20,000; 100,000 were injured; 6,000 were taken prisoner of war; 15 percent of the population of the republic were expelled from their homes and they are still living in tin camps which lack the basic means of life. In the occupied parts of the country residential buildings, monuments, the cultural heritage, hospitals, and factories were demolished.

The Azerbaijani nation had great hopes when the Minsk group was set up in 1992. Nine leading powers have been taking part in the work of the group. We appreciate the activity of the Minsk group which has made enormous efforts to resolve the conflict. The involvement of the Russian Federation in the mediation was also necessary since the cease-fire which was (?brokered with their help) has held for seven months.

However, a cease-fire is not peace. If we do not sign the political agreement with Armenia—and this agreement must be based on international standards laid down in international treaties—then the cease-fire cannot bring a lasting solution. I would like to ensure you that the Republic of Azerbaijan represents a peaceful and constructive stand.

In order to achieve this solution, we proposed to the Armenian side a just and acceptable peace treaty, which was based on the CSCE's principles and the UN Security Council's relevant resolution. We offered the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh that we would invite peacekeeping forces to this area until the peace treaty was signed.

Recognizing the interests of the Armenian ethnic minority, we wish to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem which is acceptable for both the Azeri and the Armenian population.

However, we will not give up Karabakh. We will protect our republic's territorial integrity. We want the foreign occupiers to return to their own country. We want our expelled population to be given the opportunity to come home.

The practical implementation of the UN Security Council's resolutions is only hindered by the behavior of the aggressor. According to this [set of resolutions], they should withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territories and a political settlement should be reached.

The differences between the members of the Minsk group seem to be resolved. They are resolutely making efforts to broker a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I think that the peacekeeping mission of the CSCE and the international forces is a necessity. Every [word indistinct] country which replies to the president's call joins this noble activity or task.

Mr. Chairman! Reacting to the words of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, I categorically reject charges that the Republic of Azerbaijan is involved in any subversive separatist activity manifested in the blowing up of a bridge. This happened on the territory of a third state, Georgia, several hundred kilometers away from the scene of the military activities.

We have nothing to do with the blowing up of this bridge, which would mean the violation of the cease-fire by Azerbaijan. As I said, we have nothing to do with it. The only aim of accusations like this is to increase tension in an already tense situation. This is my answer to Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosyan's words.

Let me warn him on this occasion that they should not conduct any activity which could endanger the peacekeepers' movements since our mission in Budapest must

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be to facilitate peace. This is proved by the fact that Azerbaijan readily accepted the cease-fire and continues to do so.

Ladies and gentlemen! In the interests of successful conflict management and the ending of the six-year war, which caused very much suffering to our nation, we have to help the complete and practical application of the Helsinki closing document. All of us must put our signatures to this document.

Thank you.

Kazakh President's Speech

LD0612233494 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1047 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Speech by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the CSCE summit in Budapest—live; in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] I give the floor to Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan.

[Nazarbayev] Esteemed Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: First of all let me express my sincere thanks to the Hungarian government and the CSCE secretariat for the warm welcome and the excellent organization of the work.

There is no doubt that the CSCE is a unique international forum with enormous possibilities regarding the issue of European security, not only in the discussion of constructive possibilities, but also in adopting constructive ideas. And exactly these considerations guided Kazakhstan when it passed a decision on joining the CSCE.

The wide range of competences makes it possible for the conference to carry out its mission very appropriately and firmly, to show its potential, which in our view has not yet been fully exploited. By the way, other regional organizations, which were formed in a large number in the era of confrontation and which are still struggling with problems in a renewing world, are in a similar situation.

First and foremost issues relating to the handling of European crises and conflicts are on the CSCE agenda. It is known that for the time being the CSCE has no mandate or resources for maintaining and deploying its own peacekeeping forces to ease conflicts, particularly armed conflicts. It is very hard for the CSCE to implement its principles under the present circumstances as the necessary mechanisms are missing.

At the same time the UN, which has a mandate and also the finances for maintaining peacekeeping forces, is currently operating in 17 conflict points of the world very effectively. From this point of view it becomes absolutely clear that on this continent it is very difficult to rely only on the UN in the management of conflicts. It is necessary to create an instrument which would make possible the guaranteeing of a complex security system and would be able to unify the efforts of all existing international and regional organizations.

Therefore it seems logical that such documents as a declaration and a code of conduct in conflict situations and armed conflicts are on the agenda of the Budapest summit. In the same context I fully support the EU initiative which would regulate the cooperation of the CSCE with the UN, the Council of Europe and other organizations.

We start from the fact that it is hugely significant to hold discussions on the implementation of cooperation between the above mentioned structures in an effective way.

From the viewpoint of further progress in the European process, we think that our Kazakh initiative for the setting up of a forum to handle conflicts in Asia deserves attention. Considering the basic mission of the CSCE, I think we can rightly count on this forum's participation in the settlement of the problems of the Asian continent, with special regard to Tajikistan.

It would greatly contribute to the effectiveness of the CSCE and also to the participation of the countries of the central Asian region in the CSCE forum. It would give these countries the opportunity to participate in this work and strengthen social structures in the field of human rights, for instance.

We, as the other participants, share the fundamental view that peace and security are inseparable. This applies to all participants of the CSCE. Kazakhstan will rely on the CSCE practice, including its [CSCE's] cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean region, in its effort to create a security structure for the Asian continent.

It is extremely important concerning the long-term consequences of the situation not only within Central Asia, but in other regions of Asia, in Afghanistan, that following the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Asian countries became fully fledged participants of European - and within this CSCE - activity. This has shown that European security depends not only on the European situation but on the situation around Europe, including the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Of great importance in this context, in our view, is the meeting of the responsible senior officials of the Asian countries held in Almaty this October, on the basis of which a working group was set up and is preparing a meeting of the Asian countries' foreign ministers.

The activity of Kazakhstan in this direction must not be seen as a lessening or cooling down of our interest in European issues. Participation in the forum is a new possibility for us to work out new approaches from the viewpoint of elaborating domestic and foreign policy initiatives aimed at creating peace and security. Of great

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importance in this regard are the joint efforts of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to create a joint economic region. Our conviction is that when handling the existing conflicts, there must be a reliance on basic CSCE principles such as territorial integrity, respect for human rights - and in the meantime it is necessary to consider the CSCE instruments that already exist or are to be elaborated. Concerning these I should like to point out that the CSCE has recently started to show serious interest in the human dimension.

A very important (?seed) of this was the human dimension seminar held in Almaty in April this year, attended by the CSCE commissioner for the minorities, Max van der Stoel. Compared to representatives of numerous non-governmental organizations we regard very highly the objective conclusions drawn by the commissioner concerning the situation, among other things concerning Kazakhstan. Respect for the principle of priority for human rights appears extremely important to us; by virtue of this we show great attention to respecting the principles of political consensus and inter-ethnic harmony in the region of the entire former Soviet Union, which in practice is now multi-national, and these problems affect Kazakhstan primarily.

Yet the issue of inter-ethnic reconciliation and mutual understanding, the realization and deepening thereof must become current requirements. All of the CIS states - therefore Kazakhstan - have come forth with the initiative that at the meeting of the CIS heads of state the initiatives on the peaceful harmony of the states in the CIS region should be approved. Inasmuch it gains the agreement of the heads of state of all of the CIS states, to be sure it will meet with approval on the part of the CSCE.

We consider to be of enormous significance the ceremony yesterday, the signing ceremony yesterday which is a new pledge of the region's security with the participation of Russia, the United States, Great Britain, as well as ourselves. This was a new gesture concerning the inviolability of Kazakhstan's current borders, Kazakhstan's territorial integrity and political independence - these guarantees were felt to be adequate reactions to Kazakhstan's policy of disarmament. With the treaty that has come into force, Kazakhstan has again pledged its firm faith in there being no further spread of its arms and the effects thereof. Kazakhstan thereby has undertaken a commitment to destroy 104 intercontinental ballistic SS-20 missile warheads.

Finally, I should like to say that Kazakhstan endeavors for close cooperation within the CSCE's frameworks, considering this forum to be a basic pledge for the security of the region and the entire world.

We consider this to be an important premise of this forum's effectiveness; first and foremost in preventing conflicts and in handling crisis situations - with special regard to the situation prevailing to this very day in the region encompassed by the CSCE. Thank you.

Goncz Closes Summit

LD0612164094 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1337 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Closing speech by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz at the CSCE summit in Budapest—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ladies and Gentlemen, when the summit meeting started we knew that we had come to a turning point in the history of the CSCE. And I think that we have met this expectation. For, in accordance with the expectations, the CSCE has been changhed to the OSCE [Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe]. That is to say, now we are really an organization and not just a conference. We have been put in an appropriate framework in respect of its content, too.

The political declaration carries very important messages. The first of these messages is that all of us confirm that we share our common values and that we consider it to be our task to strengthen and materialize these values throughout Europe and even beyond it.

In the light of this, we will form our future relations with a wish for a genuine partnership, and will not allow new dividing walls to be raised in the place of the old ones on our continent. Any attempt of this kind would undermine efforts aiming at the integration of the region of the CSCE, the OSCE.

On the dawn of the 21st century we are building a structure which reflects that we are aware of our obligation to contribute to the building of the free world.

The CSCE has taken its most important operative decision: That is the organization of a Nagorno-Karabakh peacekeeping mission. We fully undertake this operation, because we are convinced that the member states' participation is expressed in this mission. Our mission also reflects the Russian Federation's intention, according to which it wishes to fully integrate into the CSCE's organization, and that it owns our aims too.

The CSCE needs to take further steps toward institutionalization and confirm in its office the chairman-in-office, the high commissioner of national minorities, the office of the protection of human rights, and the secretary general.

Dear colleagues, we are very sorry that we have not been able to find a suitable formulation through which we could express our solidarity with the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the best way. We hope that a solution can be found for this terrible conflict.

However, we are still firmly convinced that a political resolution is necessary for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we assure Bosnia-Herzegovina of our full solidarity.

Dear Friends, we all know that the CSCE cannot offer military security guarantees for any country. However, we can offer several important things. Even if we cannot

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offer hard guarantees, we can still offer soft guarantees, and these are equally important in the human dimension in order to guarantee the security of people.

Let us work with commitment, being convinced that our intention will be turned into a tangible reality, so that all the tension which undermines societies will disappear. One of the best possible means of this is the OSCE. I want to assure you that we will focus on this during the entire period of our chairmanship in 1995.

Ladies and Gentlemen, dear friends, the first chapter of the CSCE is coming to its end. I hope that you have also spent a nice time with us in Hungary and consider our efforts useful. I hope that you will return home with the feeling that something has been completed and achieved, and we have moved a little bit forward.

Let me take the opportunity to wish all of you a merry Christmas and happy New Year. Thank you very much, and I hope to see you soon again in Hungary.

In accordance with the agenda, point number four, I officially close the 5-6 December 1994 Budapest summit of the heads of state and government of the CSCE.

Hurd, Major Comment

LD0612193794 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1727 GMT 6 Dec 94

[By Sarah Womack, Political Correspondent, PA News]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] John Major flew home from Budapest tonight after a summit of world leaders aimed at preventing more Yugoslav-style conflicts ended in discord.

Bosnia's ambassador to the 53-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe expressed fury after Russia, a traditional ally of the Serbs, vetoed a summit statement which would have condemned Bosnia Serb attacks on UN safe areas.

Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd told a close-of-summit news conference that Britain had tried to "reconcile different points of view" so a final CSCE document on Bosnia could be agreed.

Referring to the failure of consensus, he said: "Our guidance is therefore the five-nation Contact Group (which includes Russia) and the United Nations Security Council.

Mr. Major admitted the conference was unlikely to "produce anything that will definitely move the process forward (in Bosnia)".

Today's row came after a dramatic clash on Monday between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the West over plans for Nato's eastwards expansion. "Why sow the seeds of mistrust?" Mr Yeltsin demanded at the time.

Today, Bosnia's chief delegate to the CSCE, Mahir Hadziahmetovic, accused the Russians of "blocking everything". He added: "That means there will be nothing in the final document and the most burning crisis in Europe. I think it's a failure of the CSCE."

Addressing the closing session of the summit, he lambasted the great powers and the CSCE for what he termed a betrayal of the people of Bosnia. And he accused the West of allowing "strangulation and aggression of our people".

On Monday, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic told European and North American leaders they had done too little to stop the war in Bosnia that has left 200,000 dead or missing.

Mr Major—asked what message the disunified conference would send—said: "It would have been very agreeable if we had been able to have an agreement, but there are people with sharply differing views here."

Mr Hurd added pointedly: "I don't honestly think many people are sitting up looking at their watches and saying 'When is the CSCE going to produce its document on Bosnia?' " That drew an offside retort from Mr Major, who jokingly told his colleague: "Now don't be tactless Douglas."

But the CSCE did agree in principle to sent a multinational force to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian enclave in former Soviet Azerbaijan.

Leaders also agreed to change the name of the CSCE, to the Organisation on Security and Co-operation on Europe—in a clear bid to shed the body's old image and relaunch it as a more permanent structure on the world stage.

And the U.S.-Russia START 1 Treaty took effect on Monday, when one of Russia's former republics, Ukraine, agreed to comply with an international arms treaty. The move opened the way for deep cuts in superpower missiles stocks.

Horn Regrets Failure

LD0612190994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The two-day Budapest summit has ended with the adoption of closing documents. Eva Vertes reports on the news conference held after it was closed.

[Vertes] [Passage omitted] The meeting was officially closed by President Arpad Goncz, but de facto by the troika's international news conference—that is, it was given by a representative of Italy, the outgoing president of the security conference, or organization as from 1 January, a representative of Hungary, the current president, and a representative of Switzerland, the president to be. Prime Minister Gyula Horn assessed the one-and-a- half day's work as follows:

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[Begin Horn recording] In our assessment, there was a frank debate, even if it was hard-hitting on occasion. We consider it especially important that a substantive document came into being. We are of the view overall that an important step forward was taken in the interest of creating a European security structure.

I would like to call your attention to some elements of the political declaration adopted a few minutes ago. This document reaffirms the commitment of the participant states to democratic values, in both their domestic, internal policy, and in their foreign policy, as well as their willingness to cooperate for the sake of realizing these democratic values.

The political declaration advocates the realization of the system of values embodied in the CSCE's undertaking of obligations, and it designates the steps—including the transformation of the CSCE—which must be taken in this interest when shaping a European security system.

Finally, the declaration enables the formation of a community extending over all of Europe, to which the United States and Russia, Canada, and the Central Asian countries all belong.

Among our concrete results we list the following: The CSCE will function under a new name as of 1 January—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [Europai Biztonsagi es Egyuettmuekoedesi Szervezet].

The decisionmaking organizations and committees will be able to work more effectively, and not lastly, the current meeting strengthened the role of the CSCE's institutions—including that of the president, the secretary general, and the commissioner on minorities. [end recording]

[Vertes] The conference was unable to adopt the declarations relating to Bosnia. For this reason, the Hungarian prime minister made a bridging proposal—that an appeal should be issued on the Bosnian situation, an expressly unofficial document on European security, solely as the sovereign opinion of the participants. [passage omitted]

[Horn] We very much regret that the two documents in connection with the Bosnian situation were not approved. At a working lunch yesterday we said: Narrow national interests unfortunately appear sometimes in the work of the CSCE, in the work aimed at drafting CSCE documents and positions. These are overly narrow national interests, and these hamper the work. Well, it was not because of us, not because of those sitting here, that these documents were not approved—other interests played a role here. [end recording]

[Vertes] Russia's sensitivity to NATO was one of the most frequently mentioned topics at the summit. Gyula Horn was asked about the Hungarian position.

[Begin Horn recording] We, of course, are striving to avert the obstacles to our NATO entry. We welcomed the decision of the North Atlantic Assembly that would make joining possible at a greater pace. At the same time, it was also proved, and not only here at the summit, but in earlier statements too, that the Russian political leadership is firmly opposed to its neighbors' NATO entry.

The leaders of NATO and such member states as the United States are of the view that it is important for not only the NATO member states, but for the states that wish to join the organization, too, to hold consultations with the Russian leadership in order to change their position.

I would like to stress, and everyone underlines it, that Russia has no right to veto. However, it is obvious that Russia's approach to the issue does make a difference in the wake of international stability and the balance of power.

That is what our discussion with Mr. Yeltsin, which was held on Sunday evening at the Russian proposal, was focused on.

Our opinion differs from that of the Russian leadership in two basic areas. First, we are of the view, as opposed to the Russian position, that if Hungary and some other neighboring countries join NATO, it will not threaten Russia's security. On the contrary, it will make possible the creation of a stable zone around Russia. Therefore, our joining is in their interest, too, we would not threaten but strengthen their security.

The other point is, that it is not a good thing in international relations, in new international relations if a country, especially a great power, tries to restrict another state's sovereignty. Whether to apply for NATO entry or not is a sovereign decision of the Hungarian Republic. We fear that such protests as the one manifested by the Russian leadership may create a precedent that we cannot accept. Thus, it is not good and we reject any country's attempt to restrict our sovereignty.

In the end we agreed with the Russian president to continue consultation on this subject during my visit to Moscow scheduled for early next week, and I am of the view that all NATO member states support the continuation of this consultation, dialogue with the Russian leadership aimed at convincing them. [end recording]

[Vertes] And what about the opinion of the Western partners?

[Begin Horn recording] The Western states fully agreed with Hungary's endeavors. I think that our country can be among the first ones in this region to join NATO, I stress that among the first ones.

They especially welcomed the fact that we were consulting the Russian leadership. As I noted earlier, they consider it essential for joining NATO. [end recording]

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Finnish Commander Named

LD0612204994 Helsinki Radio Finland in English 1930 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has named a Finnish officer to command the CSCE's first peacekeeping operation. At the end of its Budapest summit meeting on Tuesday, the CSCE leaders named Major General Heikki Villern to head the forces that are to be sent to monitor the cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh, the ethnically Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan. Commenting on his appointment on Tuesday evening, Major General Villern said that it would take several months before the CSCE peacekeepers arrive on the spot.

Memorandum Signed on Ukraine Security Guarantees

LD0612232194 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The memorandum on security guarantees with regard to the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been made public. It, in particular, states, as follows:

Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a state that possesses no nuclear weapons; taking account of the obligations by Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons that are on its territory in the period of time determined; and acknowledging changes to the situation in the sphere of worldwide security, including the end of the Cold War that created conditions for global reductions in nuclear forces, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America confirm the following:

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America confirm to Ukraine their obligations under the principles of the CSCE Final Act to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine;

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America confirm that they undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that they shall never use any of their arms against Ukraine, except for the purposes of self-defense or otherwise under the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America confirm to Ukraine that they undertake in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act to refrain from economic pressure aimed to force Ukraine to exercise the rights inherent in its sovereignty in the interests of these states, and thus obtain any advantages.

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America confirm that they undertake to demand immediate action from the United Nations Organization Security Council with the aim of rendering assistance to Ukraine as a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty member state that possesses no nuclear weapons, if Ukraine falls victim to an act of aggression or becomes the object of a threat of aggression with the use of nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America confirm to Ukraine their obligation not to use nuclear weapons against any Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty member state that possesses no nuclear weapons, except for cases of an attack on themselves, their territory or their trust territories, their armed forces, or their allies by such a state jointly or in union with a state that possesses nuclear weapons.

Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall hold consultations if a situation emerges as the result of which a question arises with regard to these obligations.

This memorandum takes effect from the moment of signature.

Signed in four equally authentic copies in the Ukrainian, English, and Russian languages on behalf of Ukraine by Leonid Kuchma, on behalf of the Russian Federation by Boris Yeltsin, on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by John Major, and on behalf of the United States of America by Bill Clinton, in Budapest on 5 December 1994.

NATO, WEU Reach Accord on Arms Embargo

AU0612210694 Paris AFP in English 2022 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Dec 6 (AFP)—NATO ambassadors and their Western European Union [WEU] counterparts agreed here Tuesday to fine tune their joint Operation Sharp Guard on enforcing the Bosnian naval arms embargo in the Adriatic, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes said.

Washington last month said it would no longer deploy its three participating vessels in the 12-nation operation to monitor arms shipments destined for the Sarajevo government, but a diplomat said the U.S. ships were still actively involved in policing the main thrust of the embargo "against Serbia."

WEU spokesman Patrick Raes said the modifications would see the U.S. vessels "redeployed," while a diplomat said the U.S. role would change to the extent that it would scale down checks of civilian vessels headed for Bosnia, while concentrating on providing radar operations.

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Claes said the changes were agreed unanimously and would allow the operation to continue working "100 percent."

The U.S. decision to stop monitoring arms shipments specifically destined for Bosnian Government forces caused a row between Washington and its European allies, especially France, which asked for clarification of the U.S. ships' role as it now stands.

A WEU source said earlier that "the Americans have given us satisfactory explanations guaranteeing the effectiveness of the operation," adding Washington had made a "very big effort" to convince its European allies it would continue to supply information to other states involved in the mission.

The source explained the practical organisation of the operation was already such that it avoided double controls of suspect ships in the region.

In recent days, U.S. ships have been sent to check on possible arms embargo violations in areas where the Serbs would be the probable recipients, such as in waters around the Montenegrin coast, diplomatic and military sources revealed.

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Defense Cooperation Protocol Signed With PRC

AU0712111594 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Report by Nezihat Hoxha]

[FBIS Translated Text] At noon today, a protocol of cooperation in the field of defense was signed at the Defense Ministry between our country and the PRC. The protocol was signed for the Albanian side by Defense Minister Safet Zhulali and for the PRC by its ambassador to our country, Tao Miaofa. Some time ago, Defense Minister Zhulali made a visit to the PRC during which a long-term cooperation program was drafted.

In his speech, Minister Zhulali stressed that the signing of this protocol is to be followed by other exchanges of reciprocal interest.

PRC Ambassador Tao Miaofa said that the door is currently open to strengthening bilateral relations in the field of defense.

Deputy Defense Minister Alfred Moisiu also took part in the protocol-signing ceremony.

PSD Sees 'Provocation' in Cabinet Reshuffle

AU0712105394 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democratic Party [PSD] says in a statement that it believes it necessary to let the public know that it has neither been consulted nor has it taken part in the so-called reshuffle of the cabinet and appointment of ministers. The appointment of PSD deputy chairman Teodor Laco as minister of culture, youth, and sports is a personal choice by the president and Mr. Laco himself, without the knowledge and approval of leading PSD fora. Consequently, Mr. Laco does not represent the PSD in this cabinet.

The PSD sees this act as a political provocation that puts an end to the formal governmental coalition. Such an act shows that the Democratic Party and the president of the Republic of Albania, Sali Berisha, do not want a constructive coalition based on understanding and reciprocity but rather seek pseudo-coalitions based on personal policies not inspired by democratic principles.

Republican Party Leaves Government Coalition

LD0612220294 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1900 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Albanian Republican Party announced yesterday its renunciation from [as heard] the government coalition. Through a statement, the Republican Party of Albania makes known to the Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi that the Republican Party does not consider with its [as heard] further participation in the government coalition. The Republican Party attended the coalition so far, thinking that it observed the stability in the region, the emergence of the country from the crisis, and the progress of the country as well. The Republican Party has long since denounced the shortcomings of the coalition, and it said in Congress held on 19 October it reiterated them, awaiting a positive response [sentence as heard]. The restructuring of the government does not convince us that the coalition will function according to our request. In short, our further presence in the government becomes unproductive—says the statement. The Republican Party of Albania will maintain a constructive stand toward the government and will provide its assistance in the settlement of the (?current) problems of the country.

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U.S., Turkish Arms Embargo Attitude Examined

AU0712092094 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Dec 94 p 6

[Commentary by Plamen Kulinski: "Domino Effect"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The example Washington gave by lifting its controls on the arms embargo for Bosnia proved contagious. Turkey did not hesitate even for a moment, and followed the example of its NATO partner. Its people in the Adriatic received the order "take it easy, soldiers!" In other words: Do not facilitate the implementation but rather the violation of international bans.

Obviously, the order was superfluous, because it was being executed even before it was received. Furthermore, the weapons that passed through the "eye of the needle" had been of Turkish origin. Unfortunately the Croats, who were supposed to cooperate in delivering the weapons to those for whom they were intended, took the larger part of the weapons for themselves. Could you complain to somebody about this?...

The United Nations should have understood earlier that the Turkish vessel has no business in the Adriatic, and this applies to the Turkish "blue helmets" as well. The world organization was repeatedly warned that interested parties should be kept away from the Bosnian conflict. It should have grasped this truth even earlier—when already on 5 August, Turkey's former top diplomat said that if the United Nations did not recognize the absurdity of its own ban, it should not be surprised if others failed to observe it. Well, the United Nations refused to admit its "mistake," and what followed was the unique protest on the part of the United States and Turkey. Who knows, perhaps the West's inability to deal with the Bosnian conflict (i.e. support the Muslims against the Serbs), has already angered others.... This is something only Allah knows.

Zhelev Assesses CSCE Summit, Yeltsin Speech

AU0612174394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelyu Zhelev returned this afternoon from attending the CSCE summit meeting in Budapest. At Sofia Airport, he gave this first assessment of the forum that has just ended in the Hungarian capital.

[Begin Zhelev recording] I believe that at this forum, the CSCE better and more precisely defined its place, its own niche, in the political life of Europe and the whole of the region whence come its members. The participants in the summit adopted a document, a further document following the Paris Charter for Europe, that much more precisely and clearly defines the place of the CSCE and its relations with other European structures and organizations. Under this document, as of today the organization is no longer called the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. [end recording]

Asked to comment Russian President Yeltsin's position as regards the future of NATO, the president answered as follows:

[Begin Zhelev recording] In his speech, President Yeltsin stressed that Russia should not be isolated—something with which we were all in agreement. However, we do not agree that Russia should determine who should and who should not join NATO not. This is a matter of every country's sovereignty and national independence and its right to determine the path of its own development. As far as Russia is concerned, Russia should indeed not be isolated, because any isolation of such a vast state, and one with a nuclear potential at that, presents a danger not only for Russia itself but also for Europe and the entire world. [end recording]

Plovdiv Authorities Agree on Anti-Crime Action

AU0712080994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Report by Sonya Karlova of Radio Plovdiv]

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the municipal authorities and the regional directorate of internal affairs [police] in Plovdiv today held a joint meeting and adopted measures to restrict crime in the Plovdiv districts of Stolipinovo and Izgrev. The two bodies will demand that the Council of Ministers and the Interior Ministry open a new police station in Stolipinovo District. A proposal has been submitted for the Plovdiv Municipal Council to detail 25 municipal police officers to duties in this area.

One million leva of the revenues from the municipal privatization program will be allocated for the purchase of special police equipment. The measures to improve law and order in these districts envisaged include setting up additional guard posts, ensuring the protection of educational establishments, controlling the operating hours of public catering establishments, and restoring street lighting.

Discussions are planned on possible alternatives for providing employment for the residents of Stolipinovo District.

[Sofia BTA in English at 1939 GMT on 6 Dec in its "Tuesday News Briefs" roundup mentions, in its reports on the same meeting, that "the local police chief told reporters that 828 crimes have been committed in Stolipinovo, which has a population of 70,000, and the clearance rate is about 40 percent. The public was recently scandalized by the brutal murder of a 16-year-old girl by Gypsies who were caught on the spot in that part of Plovdiv."]

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Electronic Media Coverage of Elections Described

95BA0025A Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 27 Oct 94 p 11

[Article by Roslava Kumanova: "Politicians Will Pay More Than 3,000 Leva Per One-Minute Ad on Private Radio Stations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The efforts of the parliamentary Radio and Television Commission to regulate politicians' access to electronic media during electoral campaigns remains fruitless. Due to the changes in parliamentary air space, the deputies did not agree on how to allocate air time among parties represented in the National Assembly. The regulation on the media, which was to be accepted by the commission, was to be voted on along with changes in the electoral law. This was not accomplished, however, and, in practical terms, what remained in force was the regulation of the Grand National Assembly of 1991. According to that regulation, there are twice-weekly 90-minute-long debates on BNT [Bulgarian National Television], and a total of 120 minutes for both channels on the national radio. The parties and the coalitions also enjoyed the right to open and conclude debates on the BNT and BNR [Bulgarian National Radio], also 90 minutes long each. Participation in them depends on the representation of political forces in parliament.

The nonparliamentary forces, which have registered their tickets in at least one-third of the electoral districts, have the right to hold debates on television two times for the entire electoral campaign period. The heads of the two national electronic media last September suggested new options to the parliamentary television commission. The offer made by "San Stefano 29" for studios involved in the electoral campaign was half an hour on weekdays, at 2030 hours. The time stipulated for politicians by the "Khorizont" program was between 1500 and 1900 hours on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Additional hours for campaigning were to be allowed by the BNR as follows: Tuesdays and Thursdays for the "Khorizont" program and Wednesdays and Fridays for the "Khristo Botev" program. Both national media asked the campaign studios for payments based on the market principle and not from the state budget, as has been the case so far. In the last elections, radio and television did not earn a single lev from the campaign. By this calculation, the BNT would have lost between 15,000 and 18,000 dollars per evening from the 30-minute campaign studios; this would buy the most expensive advertising time.

Although the suggestions of the head of "San Stefano" and "Dragan Tsankov" failed to reach the plenary hall, they are hoping that the TsIK [Central Electoral Commission] will amend at least partially the rules set by the VNS [Grand National Assembly]. These rules do not regulate the participation of the privately-owned electronic media because they had not, at that time, taken over the airspace in a real sense. According to those in the know, it is unlikely that the TsIK will forbid the parties access to privately-owned media. It is certain, however, that the private owners will sell their time at the rates they demand. Most of them have already prepared their offers.

"Radio Express" will be charging the politicians 3,500 leva per minute. The periods between 1000 and 1130 and 1400-1500 will be set aside for electoral campaigning. "Ekspres" set a two-minute limit on advertising by parties and statements by their spokesmen. Announcements on meetings and encounters will not exceed one minute. The candidates will be able to contract for hour-long debates for Friday evenings.

"Radio Darik" was the most generous, in terms of time, to the candidate deputies. They will be allowed five-minutes advertising spots and two-minute announcements on electoral events from 0800 to 1000 hours. "Darik" will allow profiles of the individual candidates, not to exceed three minutes. During that time, as well as from 1400 to 1700, there may be reports on events related to the campaign. Radio debates between political leaders on stipulated topics will be granted one hour at lunchtime and two hours in the evening; "Darik" will be charging 3,000 leva per minute. The price will probably increase as of 1 November, for as of that date that station will broadcast in Dobrich as well.

On the "7 Dni Radio," parties and coalitions will be charged one dollar per second or about 3,600 leva per minute. Yavor Tsakov, the head of the radio station, will consider politicians potential advertisers and allow debates, addresses, and short statements, as long as they are paid for.

"FM Plus" radio will allow politicians one-minute statements for the electoral campaign. They will be within the framework of news broadcasts on the radio, which begin five minutes before the hour every hour. A one-minute address or a clip will cost 3,000 leva; for longer periods, a discount will be granted. We are obliged to inform the citizens of what is being offered to parties registered for the elections, although we are not a political radio station—Petur Punchev, the head of "FM Plus" said to TRUD. No radio debates are contemplated. There will be no restriction on access for any political party, as long as it is registered; clips and addresses must be recorded in order to control their length. "FM Plus" will not make electoral campaign clips.

"Radio Tangra" will not reflect the electoral struggle. Its policy does not meet the specific feature of the radio station—said Kiril Marichkov, its head.

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Report on Havel's Meetings With Kohl, Major

LD0612143894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Within his series of bilateral talks in Budapest, Czech President Vaclav Havel met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and British Prime Minister John Major. Our correspondent Martin Dorazin has more details:

[Dorazin] During his talks with Vaclav Havel, Helmut Kohl stated that Prague is among those that will go through the gates of the European Union [EU] first if it wants to. Subsequent dialogue concerned ideas on what the enlarged EU should look like. During this meeting, Havel again stated that the Czech Republic intends to join NATO first. According to the Czech president's spokesman Ladislav Spacek, Chancellor Kohl gave some support to this idea. However, it is necessary to rid Russia of the feeling that NATO expansion is directed against it, the German chancellor said.

At the end of their talks, Havel invited Kohl to visit Hradecek [Havel's country residence].

Similar issues were discussed at the meeting between the Czech president and British Prime Minister John Major. Major repeated that the fundamental decision on NATO's expansion has been made. According to Major, candidates will be accepted individually, not suddenly but slowly and carefully. Our membership in the EU is supported primarily by two countries—Germany and Britain.

NATO's General Joulwan Visits Prague

95CH0070B Prague PROGNOSIS WEEKLY in English 30 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Richard Byrne Reilly: "NATO Chief Leaves Czechs Hanging"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The much-heralded official visit of NATO's top soldier ended in disappointment for the Czech Republic last week when he departed after two days without offering the nation a definitive time frame for eventual membership in the Western military alliance.

Speaking at a Friday press conference and flanked by a stern-looking Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan, American four-star General George Joulwan said the timetable for new membership and the expansion of the Western European security structure was in the hands of the politicians.

"It is not a question of if...but when. Let's leave it (the decision) to the political folks of the North Atlantic Council and also the Czech Republic," said Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe.

He brushed aside reporters' attempts to press him any further on the issue.

Instead, Joulwan stressed the importance of the Czechs' continued involvement in the 24-member Partnership for Peace program, launched in Brussels last January. He also emphasized the need to develop firm communications between NATO members and their Partnership for Peace counterparts.

Before Joulwan's visit, the Czech press had been rife with speculation that he would take the opportunity to offer if not a timetable for membership then at least a guarantee that the Czech Republic stood at the fore of the Partnership for Peace members seeking to join the alliance. Joulwan offered neither.

Partnership for Peace was created with the intention of forging new security relationships between signatories of the program and NATO. A NATO press communique when the partnership was announced said active participation in the program would play a crucial role in the evolution of NATO's eastward expansion, but critics said it was a hollow effort because it failed to offer tangible security guarantees.

During his visit, Joulwan met with high-ranking Czech politicians and attended military exercises of the Czech Rapid Deployment Brigade at its base near Cesky Krumlov. He said he was impressed with the professionalism displayed by the soldiers he encountered, and he urged the Czech people to be supportive of their armed forces.

"You should be very proud of your soldiers," he said. "They are excellent representatives (of the Czech Republic) and they understand the role of the military in a democratic society."

Taking a more somber position, Joulwan alluded to the vast differences still existing between NATO members and their former Warsaw Pact adversaries. Referring to the Czech Armed Forces, Joulwan said: "What we really need to do is to harmonize our relations."

He did not mention that the Czech military has been beset with one controversy after another in the last year.

Joulwan skirted reporters' questions on the possible sale of either Belgian or American surplus F-16 fighter aircraft to the Czech Air Force, again adopting the stance that it was a political, rather than military, decision.

For his part, Czech Defense Minister Holan said that Joulwan's visit indicated the partial success of the Czech armed forces in eschewing the remnants of their Communist past and embracing the ideals of a democratic military. Holan added that his discussions with the American general, who assumed command of European NATO forces in October 1993, were positive and productive.

"The general stressed the importance of a small, effective and efficient military. And strength is what we're striving for," he said.

Col. Andre Sergejevic, the assistant Russian military attache to the Czech Republic, was present at the press

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conference but refused to address Russia's oft-stated position that the eastward expansion of NATO is unacceptable.

"I have nothing to say, nothing," Sergejevic told a reporter before storming from the building.

Prime Minister Views Government Progress

LD061221209 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1435 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed deputies, on the occasion of this year's last meeting of the Czech parliament and immediately after the recent local elections, which produced the most convincing and undoubtedly the most comprehensive expression of how the Czech public views the success of the current transformation process, and in connection with the debate on the government-sponsored draft of the state budget regarded by the government every year as the most comprehensive document on its activity, allow me to make an attempt at a broader assessment of the present situation and the tendencies in the Czech Republic. This will also be a report on the government's work and its role in these processes.

We are consciously carrying out this general assessment in order to contribute to finding greater harmony between the government and parliament or possibly, to be more precise, between the government and a section of this parliament.

Our intention is not at all aimed at confrontation. Attaining a formal unity of views at any cost is not our objective, either. Our objective is to strike harmony, to find at least a range of problems we can agree on, and to agree on the importance that is to be attached to these specific problems.

Exchanging fire by conducting monologues during parliamentary question time does not seem an optimal solution to us. We cannot regard as a victory for any party the opposition's new strategy of stretching question time until it becomes unbearable and so, by employing this petty tactic, to place a burden on the administration of government.

We hope that this address by the prime minister, who otherwise has few opportunities to address the parliament, will be accepted in precisely this way and that it will promote the improvement of mutual communications and mutual understanding.

The government is satisfied with the level of transformation achieved in Czech society, with the transformation that is running more or less parallel in all dimensions of the life of each of us and of the country as a whole.

This evaluation is based on chronological comparison or, in another way, on the assessment of the achievements over the relative short five-year period, of which half is the period when this government was in office. It is based on a comparison of the development in our country and other postcommunist countries, on our own analysis, both quantitative analysis based on statistics and qualitative analysis evaluating the changes in the institutions, regulations and behavior of individual people and entire social groups. This evaluation is based on the views of our fellow citizens as expressed in the local elections, in dozens of questionnaires and public-opinion surveys demonstrated by the absence of strikes, rallies, and other displays of civic dissatisfaction, in the confidence in our currency, in the growing savings, and in thousands of other similar matters.

Over the past two years, our country has completed the formation of a democratic pluralistic political system that ensures basic civic freedoms and enables each of us to execute these freedoms. This was strongly demonstrated by the recent local elections. A market-economy system with a small and continuously decreasing role of the state has been put into operation. This is a system that consciously and in a well-thought-out manner creates enough space for the market and renders state officials superfluous.

Sufficient space for free decisionmaking and initiative of each of us has been created in the political, economic, and general civic dimension of our lives. This is the basic objective we set ourselves, and I believe we had strong support from parliament in doing so. [passage omitted]

We are living in a totally different social system from what we had a short time ago. Our task, jointly with you, is to consolidate its legislative foundations and to harmonize the rules of its work.

The progress we have made so far in changing the system can undoubtedly fill us with optimism. At this moment, we can see other, new dangers that we want to face jointly with you because we must not allow new, differently labelled and less open and yet less effective forms to hamper and make difficult the initiative of individual people in their various roles because the result could be the stifling of the most valuable asset in our country. This asset is the citizens' interest in active and creative work that is satisfying for them and yielding effect for all of us. [passage omitted]

A large-scale decentralization of public decisionmaking took place over the past two and half a years. This resulted in the marked restriction of the government's powers. A mass-scale privatization and denationalization took place at the same time. This restricted the public domain in comparison with the private one. We believe that, in this respect, we have reached the level of a number of European countries that were lucky enough not to have to go through four decades of a communist regime. We believe it is precisely this success that opens up for us the path toward the deepening of our integration into Europe and the world. We have always been aware that our joining the European integrational processes depends most of all on us ourselves, and that is why we are not as impatient as some of our neighbors.

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At this moment, it should be recalled that, in the period I am talking about, the Czechoslovak federation ceased to exist and the Czech state was established. We managed this historical moment very well.

We are trying to anchor our new state not only in the present but also in the past. [passage omitted]

Our primary goal on the international scene is to consistently promote the interests of the Czech Republic. First and foremost, it is our interest to strengthen the position of the new Czech state worldwide, to become integrated in European and Euroatlantic structures and maintain friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the neighboring countries as well as strengthen the economic dimension of our foreign policy activities.

In particular, full EU [European Union] membership is our foremost strategic interest. We are today already engaged in a political dialogue with the EC on foreign and security policy, and individual ministers take part in the sessions of the extended European Council. [passage omitted]

Our participation in Partnership for Peace forms a preliminary stage to our clearly defined objective of full NATO membership. The concrete demonstration of this is our participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises with NATO troops.

The Czech Republic's position as an associated member of the European Union is reflected in the fact that it has been granted the status of a WEU [Western European Union] associated member.

We consider the CSCE an instrument of European security. At the same time, we are against efforts to attach to it a different content than the one it has today and to put it above the currently existing security institutions.

Having clarified some of the not-quite-clear aspects of the initial stage, we have also joined the drafting of the stability pact. We view this pact as a way to strengthen friendly, regional relations throughout the whole of Europe.

We are continuing our efforts to build good-neighborly relations, which represent one of the vital interests of our country.

Germany is our largest neighbor and one of our most important trade partners. We are also aware that Germany is a European superpower and that it is going to play an important role in the talks on our admission to the EU. As a result of all of these facts, our foreign policy is geared so as to maintain a high standard of relations with this country. [passage omitted]

Our relations with Austria are consistently good. We are good neighbors and reliable trade partners. We are also successful in bringing the traditional cultural dimension of our relations to the forefront.

As for relations with Slovakia, we are gradually succeeding in turning them into standard interstate relations, while exploiting some of the benefits of the particular character of these relations. We are certainly not giving these up. We wish Slovakia stabilization of its internal political situation and an early formation of a stable government capable of action with which we can discuss a number of open issues in a constructive way.

We are interested in cooperation with other countries of the so-called Visegrad Group. Within this cooperation, we lay stress on practical issues, especially trade within the Central European Free Trade Association and across-the-border cooperation.

At the same time, we keep reminding our eastern neighbors that this regional trade association cannot serve as an alternative to our EU and NATO membership, not even as a mediator of our admission to these institutions. [passage omitted]

We are careful about maintaining balanced relations with the CIS countries, we support their calm development, and we try to set mutually beneficial trade relations.

The traditionally good relations with the United States and the EU countries have a special place in our foreign policy.

Our foreign policy activity is not limited to Europe. [passage omitted]

Our own economic results are no doubt a point of departure not only for foreign political but, above all, to internal political activities. I should like to say that the aim of economic policy of the government in the past period was the completion of a systemic transformation of our economy while maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment and social peace and gradually starting an economic climb.

Priorities were the transformation of ownership relations as a basic condition in restructuralization of the economy performed for a longer period of time and completion of a systemic and institutional framework of a market economy. Success has been achieved in all these spheres. The result of the balanced state budget in the past five years and of a responsible and basically markedly conservative currency policy and a truly independent central bank was, between the transforming economies, a unique low rate of inflation that was successfully maintained despite the existence of a number of inflation impulses stemming from a principle change of the tax system, from the division of the state, and from uncompleted adjustment postliberalization price movements.

The rate of inflation that in 1993 was 20.8 percent, partly owing to the introduction of the value-added tax, will in 1994 reach roughly one-half of last year's figure.

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The government considers one of the successfully tackled reform steps the implementation of the tax reform, which fundamentally changed our tax system. In its budgetary policy and in further improving the tax system, the government stressed gradual reduction of the share of public budgets in the gross national product and in the reduction of the tax quota in safeguarding financing public services and all social expenditure. The share of public expenditure in the gross national product, which in 1990 constituted over 52 percent, will in 1995, according to the proposal of the state budget, be 10 points lower. We consider this an exceptional result. [passage omitted]

The government considers the process of privatization a decisive systemic step, and that is why it paid constant attention to its course. The stage of mass privatization that is coming to an end represented one of our main tasks, and we are convinced that it has been mastered well. Small-scale privatization ended in 1993 and it was because of it that over 22,000 units were sold, with a yield of over 30 million korunas [Kc]. About 100,000 units were returned to the original owners by means of restitution. Big privatization, affecting the decisive part of economic entities, represents by its extent and its speed a unique process whose dimensions are documented by the fact that, within its framework, almost 24,000 privatization projects were handed in for over 400 businesses. This is on average six projects for one business, and their evaluation was not easy or without contradictions.

According to the latest data at our disposal, 80 percent of businesses have been privatized, which represents the value of property exceeding Kc900 billion. This enormous task was accomplished with a minimum of problems. Of great significance in this process was, above all, the fast and transparent method of coupon privatization, whose second wave is virtually coming to an end at the moment. By this method, shares to the book value of Kc360 billion were privatized, and over 6,000,000 citizens of our country became shareholders. We consider fast privatization an initial prerequisite for a successful restructuralization of the microeconomic sphere. The government in its policy builds on the principle that private holders and not the state should decide on the further development of businesses and carry out the restructuring of businesses.

This year the renewal of economic growth is quite pronounced and is approximately 2.5-3 percent annually.

The development of external economic relations is even more pronounced confirmation of the gradual adaptation of the Czech economy to the changed external and internal conditions. The Czech Republic is one of the few transforming economies that demonstrates a growth of exports. Last year it was approximately 15 percent; this year, for the first 10 months, despite the pronounced fall of exports to Slovakia, overall exports rose by 5.3 percent, while our exports to advanced market economies are in double figures. [passage omitted]

The government, despite its care in interfering in the microsphere, adopted a number of difficult strategic decisions in the sphere of the power industry, such as the completion of the Temelin power station and the Ingolstadt oil pipeline in the oil industry, in some large metallurgical and engineering enterprises, in the aircraft industry, in coal ore and uranium mining, in the sphere of infrastructure, such as the building of road networks and the modernization of railways and telecommunications, and in the sphere of ecological investments. [passage omitted]

With the end of the second wave of coupon privatization, the process of transformation and privatization of road transport will be completed, while the main privatization steps in air and water transport had been made before. In essence, restructuralization and privatization of service activities in rail transport has been completed. The transformation of state organization of Czech railways will be started next year. At the same time, the legislative activity aimed at creating business conditions in transport in under way. It is accompanied by gradual deregulation of transport tariffs that has been completed in all of the spheres of goods transport and is also being verified in passenger bus transport. Our aim is that not only every taxpayer but also those who intensively use transport routes share in financing transport routes. After introducing road tax aimed at this end, road tax is going to be introduced as of 1995. At the same time, requirements for means of transport and transport from the ecological point of view are being made stricter. [passage omitted]

The sphere of communications was very neglected in the past from the technical point of view, with great preponderance of demand for basic telephone service, nontransparent financial and management relations inside the branch, and considerable demands for the state budget. The first necessary systemic step on the way to improvement, therefore, was the separation of the postal and telecommunications activities and the setting up of independent viable enterprises that are not subsidies from the state budget. That also required certain increase in long-term fixed tariffs for postal and telephone services. [passage omitted]

The expected net increase in telephone exchanges in the current year will approach the limit of 190,000, while the annual increments have been markedly increasing in the past few years. For the sake of comparison, the number of newly installed telephone lines for the past two years represents almost what had been achieved in our country in the entire 1980's. Despite these improvements, the waiting time for a telephone line remains too long, especially in some areas, and the quality of services rendered requires improvement, as do relations toward the users. [passage omitted]

In the interest of rapid transformation of our agriculture and forestry, the government consistently proceeded

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along the way of privatization and correcting past property wrongs and recently approved the main points of departure and the aims of its agricultural as well its forestry policy. Privatization of agriculture will be completed in its decisive part this year. [passage omitted] Agricultural cooperatives have been transformed, and members of the cooperatives, thanks to this, have the opportunity to act as authentic owners of their land shares.

There is also progress in economic transformation of cooperatives to the existing market conditions, to changed prices and the renewed size of demand. New private entities are now farming on more than 90 percent of the land. The majority of land has been rented, and private farmers are directly farming on 20 percent of agricultural land. The dynamism of results of their farming is encouraging. The most difficult, according to expectations, is the privatization of state farms.

At the moment of transformation and privatization in connection with the great fall of demand for foodstuffs and the fall of their export, the number of employees in agriculture was reduced from 531,000 in 1989 to 225,000 this year, which is approximately to two-fifths. This is a tremendous change, and the fact that it has not led to problems with the supply of agricultural produce or to the growth of village unemployment demonstrates that, despite the existing problems, a correct and the only possible path has been selected. The State Fund of Market Regulation of Agriculture was established in order to partially level the ups and downs in supply and demand in several selected commodities. This fund has partially, by intervention purchases and sales on the domestic market and subsidized exports, contributed toward stabilization of the market in some agricultural commodities, especially milk, wheat for food, and beef cattle. [passage omitted]

The agricultural produce market has been gradually opening to foreign competition, and the proexport exchange rate of the Czech koruna has been facilitating the export of our agricultural products. The influence of foreign competition on the quality of domestic production is unquestionable, and domestic foods can compete well as to their quality on our market. The competition ability of our products is growing; the balance of foreign trade is good. For example, in 1993, exports of agricultural produce and foods constituted Kc29.8 billion and imports constituted Kc29.9 billion. This means that the difference is only 0.1 billion, or Kc100 million. These figures demonstrate that some catastrophic prognoses are not based on the truth. [passage omitted]

For the purposes of support of businesses in agriculture and forestry, the government has established a support and guarantee fund for farmers and forest owners, the aim of which is to facilitate efficient allocation of subsidies for agriculture, particularly in the form of repaying part of the interest on loans. Thanks to this, granting subsidies is tied only to those projects that can recoup themselves. Direct subsidies are then granted to various programs for changing the structure of agriculture and such activities that can only with difficulty be secured by the initiative of private businesses only. [passage omitted]

Our special success is maintaining social peace. This indicates that the economic policy of the government is accepted and supported by the broad public. This gives our state high international credit. This is also connected with the fact that, on a long-term basis, we are demonstrating a very low level of unemployment: at the moment 3.1 percent, which is unique both among the transforming economies and the European [passage indistinct] [passage omitted]

Although privatization has progressed far, although our business sphere has been stabilizing and is beginning to consider long-term aims, and although the labor market is relatively flexible, we consider the struggle with inflation as decisive and not completed, and that is why the government has left in force wage regulation. That is being conceived by providing sufficient space for the growth of real wages and for their differentiation. [passage omitted]

Even with wage regulation, the average nominal and real wages have been growing in the past three years. Estimating the results for the past few months of 1994, we can say that, after a marked fall in 1991, average real wages for 1992-94 increased by approximately 22 percent. This naturally means they are still lower than in 1989, by approximately 13-14 percent. This loss, however, will be very quickly made up.

The government's main priority in the area of security and the protection of public order has been to slow down the growth in crime because the fast-growing rate of crime had become a serious negative corollary to the process of renewing democracy and civic freedoms and the opening up of our country to the world.

As regards legislation in the field of security, the main priority has been to empower the police of the Czech Republic or, rather, the local police in a way appropriately responding to the growing number of crime and misdemeanor cases. Amendments to the law on the police and to the criminal law have strengthened the powers of the police in dealing with illegal activity and simplified legal proceedings in the courts—and this, in turn, released police capacity for practical duties.

Legislation concerning immigration and appeal procedures has been amended, too, in order to respond to the threat of illegal migration, usually an economically motivated phenomenon, and to make possible the implementation of the readmission agreements concluded with neighboring states.

The government has paid great attention to the issue of organized crime and has also taken important steps regarding relevant legislation.

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In the past period, the government paid considerable attention to concluding the process of personnel transformation and stabilization in the ministry (of the interior), and to enhancing the trustworthiness and authority of the police corps. This has been reflected in the fact that, in preparing the 1994 state budget for the Ministry of Interior, the government applied the highest rate of growth in allocating financial means. By the end of last year, police staff levels had increased by 10 percent, and 50 primary police units, comprising 1013 posts, had been created. Following a government directive, there has been a significant improvement in remunerating members of the security corps and services.

As a result of these measures, we are now in a position to note that there has been a genuine reduction in the growth of crime and a gradual increase in the effectiveness of police work. In 1992-93, we managed merely to slow down the increase in reported crime and to improve slightly the number of resolved cases, but, between January and September of this year, for the first time since 1989, we noted an 8.5-percent drop in crime, while the number of solved cases went up by more than 2 percent. [passage omitted]

The Czech Republic Army came into being on 1 January 1993 as a result of the division of the former federal army. The first measures to transform it were launched immediately. Their basic objective was to provide the defense of our new state. This included a balanced deployment of troops on the whole territory of the state, the switch to a simpler command-and-management system, the creation of a brigade organizational structure, the marked reduction of the number of troops to 65,000 by the end of 1995, and the gradual switch to NATO standards.

On 1 January 1993, our Army had 113,000 soldiers. Of those, 49,500 were career soldiers. At the end of this year or, in other words, after two years, the planned number of Czech Republic troops will be 70,500. Of those, only 35,000 will be career soldiers.

Although the current troop numbers are getting nearer to our objective, their internal composition is not satisfactory. It is precisely this that remains our biggest future task.

The Army transformation process takes into account the conditions set out by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. A number of specifically military measures, which are gradually transforming our Army, have been introduced. The reduction of superfluous military equipment is also taking place.

The system of the Army's economic backup is undergoing a basic change, too. A system that will make possible transparent control of Army management by the state administration and parliament is being created.

In international cooperation, the main attention has been focused on intensifying the Czech Republic Army's readiness for future NATO membership by means of active participation in the PFP [Partnership for Peace] program. Measures aimed at gradual achievement of the Czech Republic armed forces' compatibility with NATO countries are planned within the PFP context.

This year, our Army units took part in five international exercises. Officers of our Army are studying in NATO schools, and courses for members of foreign armies took place in our Army's training facilities.

The participation of our Army in the UN peacekeeping forces represents an important role in our foreign activities. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, allow me to say that our country's current development is clearly positive and that the balance of the first 18 months of the existence and functioning of the first Czech Republic Government has been successful. The lasting high support of the population, which is unique in postcommunist countries, testifies to the success of this policy. It is heading toward exceptional political stability of our state. The government very much appreciates the support afforded to it by the parliament and is prepared to continue along the path upon which it embarked. Thank you for your attention. [Applause]

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Kukan: NATO To Take No Orders From Russia

AU0612184794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Dec 94 p 1

[CTK, TA SR report: "Eduard Kukan: NATO Will Not Let Russia Dictate What It Can Do"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels—A meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which is made up of NATO countries and their new partners from Central and East Europe, including Russia, took place at NATO's Brussels headquarters yesterday.

The Slovak Republic considers that it should be among the first to enter NATO, Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan said in Brussels yesterday, in reply to a TA SR question as to whether Slovakia welcomes the 1 December decision of the NATO Council that some countries can be admitted into the Alliance sooner than others. Kukan is convinced that NATO will very seriously and thoroughly consider the issue of its expansion and will not let Russia dictate what it can do. We agree that NATO should respect the interests of Russia as far as possible but definitely not to our detriment, the minister said in response to Thursday's criticism by Andrey Kozyrev, chief of Russian diplomacy, of the NATO Council's final communique on the expansion of the Alliance.

New Commander for UNPROFOR Battalion

AU0612151894 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 3 Dec 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "New Battalion Commander"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nitra—An official farewell ceremony for members of the Slovak engineering battalion with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] who will depart on 4 December for the Daruvar and Lipnik bases in Croatia was held at the training base for UN peacekeeping forces in Nitra yesterday.

Slovak Defense Minister Pavol Kanis thanked some 200 Slovak Army members for their discipline, effort, and fulfillment of training assignments. On the occasion of the official farewell, Colonel Tomas Svec, press spokesman of the Slovak Army General Staff, informed journalists that Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Kostra has replaced Colonel Lubomir Kolencik as commander of the Slovak Army's engineering battalion with UNPROFOR on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

TASR Chief Rejects HZDS Complaint About Agency

AU0612145594 Bratislava DENNIK in Slovak 30 Nov 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "TASR Reply to Letter From Olga Keltosova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The task as well as the endeavor of TASR is to reinforce the citizen's right to truthful and complete information. The text of the demarche is such a piece of information. It is the obligation of journalists to seek out information and convey it to the public, and it is up to politicians to prevent information leakage if required by protocol." This was stated by TASR Director General Ivan Melicharcik yesterday in his reply to the letter the day before yesterday from Olga Keltosova, deputy chairwoman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], in which she asked Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan to assume a stand on, in her opinion, the "unprecedented act" of TASR, which on 28 November published in its service the contents of the European Union [EU] demarche to the Slovak Republic. In this way, the agency supposedly seriously compromised the Slovak Republic in relation to the European Union and the entire international community.

"When a journalist steps into international political relations in the country's official agency, which belongs among the official media of the state, he damages by his action the whole state—in this case, Slovakia," Olga Keltosova wrote. She also criticized the reference to a well-informed source in one part of the TASR report. Olga Keltosova sent a similar letter to TASR Secretary General Ivan Melicharcik and acquainted with its contents also the FRG and French ambassadors to Slovakia, Heike Zenker and Michel Perrin, who had delivered the EU demarche.

In his response, Ivan Melicharcik went on to draw attention to the fact that, already in its report on acting Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik's meeting with the FRG and French ambassadors (24 November), TASR published the virtually complete text of the demarche, with the exception of sentences pertaining to regional cooperation with Hungary and the further elimination of possible tension in connection with the Hungarian minority.

Both Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar publicly commented on the contents of the demarche. In an interview with journalists (on 28 November, the day TASR published the demarche), Vladimir Meciar said that "the EU's request that the text of the demarche not be made public gives rise to all kinds of speculation among the public. The bubble will burst the moment the text of the demarche is officially known." At the same time, he noted that "such a discrete leakage of information would perhaps do no harm." The same day, the demarche was also published by the daily SME.

Reacting to Olga Keltosova's protest against the publication of an excerpt of FRG Ambassador Heike Zenker's discussion with representatives of the Slovak Republic, Ivan Melicharcik explained that TASR had published this information as early as Friday, 25 November, and

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no one denied its contents. Essentially, TASR did not even have to refer to a well-informed source because Ivan Gasparovic had provided information on Heike Zenker's views in an identical manner as early as 24 November. According to Ivan Gasparovic, Heike Zenker told him that, "despite the fact that the Slovak Constitution or laws have not been violated, it is not usual for the supreme officials of the National Property Fund, the Supreme Inspection Office, the General Prosecutor's Office, and the director of Slovak Radio to be dismissed in the course of one night." As Ivan Gasparovic stated, the diplomats also mentioned the nomination and election of the supreme representatives of parliament and of parliamentary committees, gleaned exclusively from members of the parliamentary coalition.

In view of the above facts, Ivan Melicharcik understands the letter from HZDS Deputy Chairwoman Olga Keltosova as an expression of her personal view, to which she naturally has a right. "It would perhaps benefit the cause if leading HZDS representatives came to an agreement on issues of such importance as interference in the policy of the mass media and the right to provide information," the TASR director general added.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 30 November on page 2 carries a 400-word TASR report entitled "The Bubble Did Not Burst," on TASR Director General Ivan Melicharcik's response to HZDS Deputy Chairwoman Keltosova's complaint against the publication of the EU demarche. The report also includes the following passage on acting Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik's response to Keltosova's protest: "'It is a fact that the EU demarche was addressed to state bodies and was of a confidential nature. If, however, an information leak occurred and the text was made public, one definitely cannot blame journalists for it. The mass media was only fulfilling its duties in this case,' acting Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik said."]

SDL Chairman Peter Weiss on Talks With HZDS

LD0612221094 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] During the weekend talks of the Executive Committee of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], its representatives voiced concern about the growth of social and economic problems in our country and the threatening international isolation of Slovakia. The SDL, therefore, decided to hold talks about these questions with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. They will have talks about other problems at tomorrow's meeting as well.

[Begin recording] [Peter Weiss, SDL chairman] We are particularly interested, naturally, in the budget of the Slovak Republic because we have our own approach toward it. We have certain points in that we do not want people to pay the price for the change of the economic situation. Finally, there is the law on the conflict of interests, so we would welcome it if a joint proposal were tabled, let us say for both the HZDS and the SDL so that this law may be passable in parliament. If the HZDS proposes its own draft bill, without accepting any criticism that existed in the previous election period, it may happen, and it is more than likely, that no law in parliament will be passed, which is harmful. We would like to agree on things and cooperate if possible.

[Unidentified correspondent] During the weekend talks of the Executive Committee of the SDL, you noted that you will not talk with the HZDS about the coalition. Despite this, do you allow for this alternative for the solution of the internal political situation?

[Weiss] We cannot exclude that we will be given some offer for entering the government, but, unfortunately, I must note that the situation that was noted by the republican council of the SDL still prevails. We are of the view that the way of executing power that is presented by the HZDS is unacceptable to the SDL. There are no indications of the HZDS's reassessing its policy.

For this reason, the delegation that will meet the delegation of the HZDS will not talk about the entry of the SDL into the government coalition.

[Correspondent] Will you try to persuade your partner tomorrow to support, albeit with reservations, the draft state budget?

[Weiss] The question of the state budget is a complex question. I said that we have our own ideas as a left-wing party on what should and should not be in the budget. In any case, we are interested in not starting the year 1995 with some sort of makeshift budget, which is very dangerous. The SDL is very interested in a law being passed, and in the economy and in the running of this state based on a properly approved budget. This is our approach to this question. [end recording]

ZRS Sees No Alternative To Entering Government

LD0612224494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we have just heard, the Slovak Government [words indistinct] will seek the support of, among others, the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] for its draft budget for 1995. Jarmila Tosecka's interview with the association's chairman, Jan Luptak, should give us some idea of what its reaction is likely to be.

[Begin recording] [Tosecka] [passage omitted] The formation of the government is now the main focus of attention. It would seem by all accounts that it will be made up of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers' Party of Slovakia [HZDS-RSS] coalition, the Slovak National Party [SNS], and your own ZRS.

There is a problem, however. On 5 December, HZDS Deputy Chairman Sergej Kozlik announced that the

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government was to be formed between 10 and 15 December. However, the republican council of the ZRS will not meet until 17 December, and it alone can approve ZRS entry into the government and set the conditions. How are we to explain this?

[Luptak] Following my return from France, there was a change of plan, [words indistinct] and the republican council will now not meet on 17 December but, rather, on the 10th, in Banska Bystrica. It will discuss participation in the government coalition, there will be a vote, and a decision will be made. However, I think there is now no other way. Really there is not. When those parties that have made a mess here (?do not want to go into) coalition, I ask myself what we are to do. Should we go on having anarchy? So we will go into the government, we will trouble ourselves, we will have to try and let the people [words indistinct]. We want to do something practical for these people. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Meciar Criticizes President's Law Changes

LD0612145494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Shortly before noon today, the National Council's Constitutional Committee began discussing the two laws [on privatization] that the president returned to parliament. [passage omitted]

Jarmila Tosecka reports on other topics discussed by the committee: [passage omitted] Because I was pressed for time and could not wait for the committee's debate, I earlier asked Vladimir Meciar, a member of the Constitutional Committee, to answer these questions: What arguments can be used to convince people that the laws that parliament has already passed are legally unassailable, and what is the chance that the National Council will reaffirm their validity?

[Begin Meciar recording] The president must properly substantiate the laws returned by himself and the Slovak Government to the National Council. It is sufficient if the parliament discusses them, but, if it does not approve the proposed changes, the initial wording is valid.

The first law is the law on powers [zakon kompetencni], which transfers powers from the government to the National Property Fund in the process of direct sales approval.

This law is not valid for just the Moravcik government. It is valid also for the new, for the incoming government. This means that its purpose is to accelerate and simplify the whole process of approving [privatization] projects and to exclude the government from matters where there is a permanent suspicion of corruption or of influencing government decisions and of other dubious practices. That is what we do not want in the new government.

The second law was adopted with the premise that the government decisions approving 38 projects were either not approved or were abolished by the law. (?Various) pronouncements made about nationalization are unprofessional and misleading. [passage omitted]

The other correct understanding of this law should be that the law did not abolish projects. It abolished the government's decisions approving the projects. These projects are now being passed to the National Property Fund, which will reassess them and will have to produce a solution. That is why some of them are going at token prices, almost free of charge.

Why is it that some people are getting preferential treatment to the detriment of others? Why is it that the state's interests are impaired? All these are the questions to which we should find an answer, and, when an answer is found, we shall proceed further.

Although there was more fuss than necessary around these laws, nothing true was said about their content and about other things. The president's view is different. That is his right and his matter. I personally will recommend that we reject the president's and the government's proposals as irrelevant proposals that do not legally apply to what has been said here. [end recording]

FNM Starting To Make Changes in Key Companies

AU0612142194 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by "si": "National Property Fund Replaced Slovnaft Supervisory Board"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic [FNM SR] yesterday replaced, for the third time this year, the supervisory board of Slovnaft Bratislava a.s., in which the FNM SR has a stake of over 80 percent. [passage omitted]

Slovnaft is the first shareholding company in which significant personnel changes have been carried out after the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Slovak National Party-Association of Workers of Slovakia [[HZDS-SNS-ZRS] parliamentary coalition replaced FNM SR members in the evening meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Two-thirds of the nine-member Slovnaft Supervisory Board have been replaced. Three of the six new members are directors of FNM SR sections—Dr. Kato, SNS Deputy Chairman Engineer Molnar, and Engineer Bilek. Other new members are Engineer Siroky, from the Harvard Investment Company, Engineer Vojcik, economic deputy director of the Vodohospodarske Stavby [Hydraulic Engineering Works] Bratislava state enterprise, and Engineer Vlachovsky, economic policy adviser at the Slovak Government Office. Slovnaft a.s. is the largest oil refinery in Central Europe. It exports one-half of its output and, by the end of October, had generated a profit of 2.7 billion korunas this year. [passage omitted]

We approached Peter Krajcir, chairman of the trade union organization in Slovnaft and a member of the

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Supervisory Board, regarding the personnel changes. He said that the FNM SR did not give any reasons for its decision to replace two-thirds of the Supervisory Board members at yesterday's general shareholders' meeting. In the February replacement, however, when Jan Kato was chairman of the FNM SR Executive Committee, he said in reply to a question about reasons for changes in the Supervisory Board that this was the FNM SR's right, and it had decided to exercise it. Peter Krajcir added that, together with the other two members of the Supervisory Board who have not been recalled, he would try to maintain continuity in its work. At the same time, however, he conveyed to SME fears about the company's maintaining credibility with its trading partners. As Peter Krajcir said, it will be very difficult to explain, especially to foreign partners, that the three changes in the composition of the Supervisory Board in the course of a single year were not caused by the company's economic problems but were politically motivated. In the case of Slovnaft, the changes are all the more serious because Slovnaft's securities are among the most heavily traded on the capital market.

[Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 2 December on page 4 carries a 700-word Alena Fronkova commentary entitled "The Supervisory Board Is 'Filling Up.'" The commentator wonders whether the frequent changes in Slovnaft management bodies will benefit the company's economic performance, all the more so because none of the six newly appointed members of the Supervisory Board, which is to play an important role in running the company, has ever had anything to do with the oil industry. As the commentator observes, when the candidates for membership on the Supervisory Board were introduced, someone remarked that their only link to Slovnaft was that "they are going to fill up their cars." Fronkova also points out that, under the company statutes, the Supervisory Board has the right to replace the seven-member Board of Directors and the Slovnaft director general, which supposedly creates an "atmosphere of uncertainty" in the company and forces the management to think about "saving its own skin" instead of attending to the company's prosperity.]

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Goncz, Iliescu Discuss Relations, Minorities

LD0612151594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian President Ion Iliescu is urging real reconciliation between Hungary and Romania, while Hungarian President Arpad Goncz proposes a joint position at international forums on the protection of minority rights.

Ion Iliescu, during Budapest talks with Arpad Goncz, stressed that Hungarian-Romanian relations should be determined by common interests instead of just repeatedly raising the differences of views.

The Hungarian president warned that the situation of the minorities in Romania represents a domestic political problem in Hungary.

Iliescu confirmed Arpad Goncz's invitiation to Romania, but the Hungarian president said he would only travel to Bucharest if a summit meeting could achieve concrete results.

Iliescu, Melescanu Comment on Talks With Horn

AU0612160994 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Dec 94 pp 1,3

[Report on interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu and Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by unidentified correspondent in Budapest; date not given: "This Was Only the Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ion Iliescu called his talks with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn useful, positive, and constructive. In an interview with MAGYAR NEMZET, Iliescu stressed that he considered the talks to be useful primarily because they were held at all. He said that he and Gyula Horn agreed that it was unnatural that they had not met as of yet and that this meeting could only take place on the occasion of the CSCE summit. "I think," Iliescu added, "that meetings at such levels should be regular between two neighboring countries such as Hungary and Romania, which have so many common interests."

According to Iliescu, at such meetings they could discuss all the existing problems, including the most sensitive ones. "Both of us concluded that we are talking about a beginning here"—he said. At the same time, he added that the talks were held in a very calm and friendly atmosphere.

On bilateral relations, he expressed his conviction that Budapest and Bucharest would finalize the bilateral basic treaty during the course of 1995. "This will be a positive political signal"—the Romanian president stressed, adding that "problems will always emerge, because there are no neighboring countries without problems." However, it is always possible to find solutions to such problems on the basis of the democratic principles of relations between countries, through rationale, dialogue, and negotiations, he said.

Although the talks were mostly general in nature, nevertheless several concrete issues were tackled. "We started from the premise that there is no conflict situation between our two countries, " Iliescu said, and added that, in his opinion, the press sometimes suggests the existence of such a conflict situation. He regarded as particularly important the military, economic, and human relations between Bucharest and Budapest. He also stressed that, among the neighboring countries, Hungary is Romania's biggest economic partner.

Speaking about the Horn-Iliescu meeting, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu regarded it as positive that both leaders repeatedly expressed the political will to improve bilateral relations soon. In connection with this, he pointed out that both Horn and Iliescu urged an acceleration of the negotiations between the two foreign ministries on the basic agreement and other issues.

Iliescu Comments Further

LD0612205594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian President Iliescu told our colleague Levente Suekoesd that he had a constructive and useful discussion with Gyula Horn yesterday.

[Begin recording] [Iliescu, in Romanian, fading into Hungarian report] We regard the expansion of NATO as the creation of a unified European security system; therefore, we support and urge this process, Romanian President Iliescu told Hungarian Radio. In his view, the expansion of NATO is not aimed against Russia. [end recording]

[Suekoesd] The fact that you met Prime Minister Gyula Horn indicates a step forward in Romanian-Hungarian ties, I noted. Have we got closer to signing a bilateral treaty, I asked.

[Begin recording] [Iliescu in Romanian, fading into Hungarian report] I held a constructive, good discussion with Prime Minister Gyula Horn here in Budapest, Iliescu answered. First of all, I appreciated the fact that this meeting had come about, for I was always ready for any meeting, any dialogue. It was not my fault that no meeting had taken place before, Iliescu said. It is a good thing that at least the CSCE provided an opportunity for this bilateral discussion.

The Hungarian position that they kept delaying a meeting referring to previous unsuccessful high level talks reflected the old party-state approach. They wanted to resolve every disputed issue at one meeting, otherwise there was no point in any meeting. This is an old, wrong, and outdated view, Iliescu said. Today summits cannot be expected to solve every problem. Several high level

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meetings are necessary. We agreed with Prime Minister Gyula Horn that dialogue must be continued. [end recording]

Bishop Tokes Sends Letter to Prime Minister

AU0712092494 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Dec 94 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Laszlo Tokes' Letters to Hungarian Leaders—The Situation of Ethnic Hungarians in Romania Continues To Deteriorate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ethnic Hungarian Presbyterian Bishop of Transylvania Laszlo Tokes, honorary chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian], sent a letter to Prime Minister Gyula Horn on 5 December.

Laszlo Tokes writes that he learned too late about Horn's separate meeting of one hour with Romanian President Ion Iliescu on the eve of the CSCE summit. However, Tokes wants to draw Horn's attention to the fact that, despite the Hungarian-Romanian interstate relations, the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania continues to deteriorate and, in domestic policy, there are no signs whatsoever of any real intention of the Romanian side to sign the basic treaty and to settle the fate of the Hungarian national minority as a basic condition for this treaty.

As an example, Laszlo Tokes mentions the appeal made by Oliviu German, chairman of the Senate and of the governing party, an appeal urging all the political parties in Romania to take a common stand against the RMDSZ; the recent ban on foreign symbols and anthems stipulated by the Romanian Chamber of Deputies; and the specific anti-Hungarian nature of the parliamentary report on this year's Romanian intelligence activities, particularly regarding autonomy efforts. Laszlo Tokes says it would be harmful for the Hungarian government to show tolerance in this issue upon pressure from the CSCE or other bodies.

Laszlo Tokes also sent a similar letter to President Arpad Goncz.

Foreign Minister Kovacs on CSCE Summit

LD0612211694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 6 Dec 94

["Exclusive interview" with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Anna Gulyas following the CSCE summit in Budapest on 6 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Kovacs] All in all, we are pleased with the results of the summit. For, there has been a very substantive debate—which reflected the various positions very well—from which it could be assessed how much the 52 states of the CSCE process are ready to do for the CSCE in the future, how much they are ready to do for the reform of the CSCE and to meet new challenges. On the other hand, substantive documents have been prepared and agreements have been reached on a series of matters.

And, naturally, or perhaps not so naturally at all, there has been some failure too. I consider it to be a failure that, after all, we have not managed to approve any kind of document on the matter of the crises on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, not even on the Bihac matter, and even the Hungarian initiative has not acquired full agreement, according to which the participating heads of state and government should appeal to the warring, confronting sides in Bosnia, asking them to put an end to hostilities and, by the approach of winter, to make sure that at least the humanitarian aid can get through without problems. I consider this fact—that it has not succeeded—a failure.

In order that we do not end this assessment with mentioning a failure, we can consider a positive development that there have been meetings with the participation of the CSCE Troika—that is the Italian, the Swiss, and the Hungarian foreign ministers—and with the representatives of the neighboring regions, such as the foreign ministers of the five Mediterranean countries, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Israel, as well as representatives of Asian countries. For the CSCE is interested in peace and stability in the neighboring regions too.

As far as the Hungarian aspects are concerned, the president of the republic, the prime minister, and I as the foreign minister, have held all together 60 bilateral meetings over the two and a half days. It usually takes several years to have so many bilateral meetings, but it was natural that we have tried to take the opportunity for meeting the leaders of as many countries as possible.

And finally, one more point of view. A lot of my foreign minister counterparts have come to me at the end and congratulated very warmly for the organization, the execution of the meeting. I think that the fact that an event of this scale, which have never taken place in the history of the Hungarian foreign policy, has been organized without any trouble also can be considered an achievement.

I would like to take the opportunity to say thank you for the understanding of the residents of Budapest. [passage omitted]

[Gulyas] During the preparations and the review conference you said that, according to the intention of the Hungarian hosts, the Budapest summit would be a kind of turning point in the life of the CSCE. What do you say about this now?

[Kovacs] A kind of turning point has really taken place. It is indicated by the change in its name, which is more than a matter of formality. That is to say, the fact that the CSCE will be called OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] in the future, indicates that there have been agreement among the participating

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countries, that this process should be institutionalized and, in accordance with this, in line with this, a united position has been formed, that its institutions—that is the chairman, the general secretary, the permanent committee and the committee of the leading officials, or the minority high commissioner—should be made more effective. And everybody has agreed with this.

Let me, as the chairman-in-office now, add that I have indicated my intention that the chairman-in-office, presently me, would like to establish closer cooperation with the Troika, that is the former chairman-in-office, the Italian foreign minister, and the following chairman-in-office, Switzerland's foreign minister.

[Gulyas] As the prime minister of Hungary, you are the chairman-in-office. What does it mean in practice? What kind of tasks does it involve, what are the costs—in terms of energy, time and work—and benefits of it?

[Kovacs] What I can already see, that the chairman-in-office has to mobilize the institutional system and come up with initiatives in order to run the institutional system. For example, immediately on the first evening, on Sunday evening, in the framework of a working luncheon we have agreed with the other two members of the Troika and the general secretary of the CSCE—now OSCE—on a schedule, a timetable on how frequently we will hold the meetings of the Troika. Regarding the fact that they are foreign ministers who have a lot of other duties as well, there is a need for fixing, determining the date of our meetings. We have agreed on this now. We have also agreed on meetings with international organizations, with the United Nations, the EU [European Union], NATO, and the Council of Europe. We have also agreed that we will be in regular contact with international organizations which fall into different categories, that is into the category of regional organizations dealing with security matters, humanitarian organizations, and international organizations dealing with economic cooperation. We have already held a meeting in Budapest. The Troika held a meeting for international organizations where the leaders of the ten or so international organizations—the UN Secretary General, the NATO Secretary General, and many others—were present. The organization of it is also the task of the chairman-in-office.

In addition to this, the chairman-in-office's task is to determine, or initiate, the mandate and supervise the operation of the CSCE's missions. Such a permanent mission is functioning now in two countries, in Estonia and Latvia.

And finally, the chairman-in-office will have the task to monitor the developments—with the assistance of the Troika and other organizations—in this enormous region, which stretches from the West Canadian Vancouver to the East Russian Vladivostok, to see where the development of a crisis center can be expected, where the signs of a possible future crisis can be seen. And the operation of the OSCE... [pauses]

[Gulyas] After all, the change of name is only valid from 1 January.

[Kovacs] Yes, it is still difficult to say it. We have to get used to it. [passage omitted] All this is the duty of the chairman-in-office. As the chairman-in-office will also have the duty of playing a role of mediator in certain crisis situations, in certain crisis zones.

The benefit is that when I act as the chairman-in-office of the CSCE, everybody will know that I am the foreign minister of Hungary. If, over the next year, I do my job well, then the conclusion will not be that Laszlo Kovacs has done his job well, but that the Hungarian foreign minister, the foreign minister of the Hungarian Republic, has met the requirements, that is, Hungary is suitable for this kind of task.

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Commentator Lauds West's 'Firm Stance' in Hungary

WS0612154894 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Dec 94 p 5

[Editorial by Jan Skorzynski: "Security, but What Type?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Efforts made by diplomats over the past few months did not bear much fruit. A confrontation in Budapest was inevitable. That is very good. The differences in positions between the West and Russia on the issue of European security are far too serious to obscure them with routine diplomatic formulas.

The most important of those differences pertains to NATO. The West is defending the hitherto scheme of the pact and has announced extending its guarantees to include Central and East Europe. Moscow is obstinately refusing to accept this, suggesting "cross guarantees of security" as an alternative. Poland and other countries of the region have learned on several occasions, in a painful lesson, what such guarantees are worth. The way out of the gray security zone between NATO and the CIS leads in one direction only—Westward. The Polish president said so loud and clear in Budapest.

Maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty as the mainstay of a safe Europe and opening it to the East was announced by Bill Clinton. The U.S. President stated that no country from beyond the alliance has the right to veto these projects. If there were any doubts as to which state Clinton was referring, they were dispelled after the president of Russia delivered his speech. Boris Yeltsin pointed to NATO's Cold War heritage and warned that Europe was threatened by a state of "cold peace."

More important than those strident statements is probably the announcement of an agreement to send joint CSCE armed forces to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russians, who have thus far insisted that these forces are made up exclusively of the CIS Armed Forces, are on the verge of admitting other states to participate. Does this mean that Moscow is willing to give up its strictly protected monopoly on the territory of the former Soviet Union? Of course not. But the evolution of its position on the issue proves that a firm stance of the West produces positive effects. This lesson may already be listed as an achievement of the Budapest summit.

Minister of Defense Still Not Named

WS0612150494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by "E.K." and "Z.L.": "Walesa Will Not Accept Pastusiak; Positional Wars"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before leaving for Budapest, President Lech Walesa said yesterday that he would not accept the candidacy of Longin Pastusiak for the post of head of the National Defense Ministry [MON] "for any amount of money." Asked whether Pastusiak's candidacy was submitted to him, the president replied that "it actually was not," unless one decides that such a submission is its presentation in the mass media. The government's press office was not able to tell us whether this statement by the president will in any way affect further developments in the process of appointing a MON head.

Coalition Does Not Have To Make Concessions

According to Tadeusz Iwinski, of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], the coalition will continue to support this candidacy because there is no reason that it should be changed. Indeed, the president has the right to say whether or not he likes Pastusiak's candidacy. However, one cannot draw too far-reaching conclusions from this rather modest sounding article of the Small Constitution. The article determines that a motion requesting the appointment of a national defense minister is submitted by the prime minister, who consults with the president before that.

"A year ago, while it was forming the government, the coalition made a mistake and allowed for broader interpretations. As a result, the president decided that he should have presidential ministries and special powers that he does not have," says Iwinski. "Now, it should be like it was when the president dissolved the parliament, which he was entitled to do. He complied with the provision that says that he can do it after consulting the speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, and so he sent letters to both of them. The answer of one of them was negative, whereas the other did not answer at all because he did not have the time to do so—and the president looked upon that as a form of consultation."

According to Iwinski, this time the prime minister has many more possibilities than he had during the conflict over the appointment of Dariusz Rosati to the post of deputy prime minister and minister of finance. At that time, a full member of the Council of Ministers was to be appointed—a member who would have had the right to vote. Now Pastusiak, as a ministry director, can guarantee normal work in the ministry, even though Minister Lech Falandysz warns that "tampering with the National Defense Ministry" and the appointment of the ministry's director may have dramatic consequences.

"Because the Belweder is controlling the General Staff, it may that Mr. Wilecki, who has gone to Japan with the president, will say that the General Staff will not obey and take orders from such a head of the ministry. This, however, would be an evident violation of constitutional and internal regulations, and, in addition, it would be comparable to an internal coup. Nevertheless, if someone wanted to put this into effect, MON would be merely a collection of buildings. However, it would not exert any influence over the Army in military units, at training fields, and at dozens of other places."

Prime Minister Gets To Know MON

Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak took part in three consecutive sessions of the MON team, which consists of

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the highest leadership of the ministry as well as the leadership of the General Staff, headed by General Tadeusz Wilecki. "At the beginning, the prime minister looked upon these meetings as informative meetings. He wanted to become familiar with the ongoing defense affairs. There was also a division of work as a result of official meetings and ceremonies. During one of the last meetings, the participants discussed 'the needs and prospects of restructuring,'" said Grzegorz Schmidt, director of the MON Press and Information Office. Near completion is the work that is being done by a special commission set up by former Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk, headed by Jerzy Milewski, which was to propose organizational changes in the ministry. Members of the Sejm National Defense Committee expect that concrete proposals concerning the ordering and the future shape of MON should be submitted by the end of the year.

Is Waldemar Pawlak going to strengthen his influence, by taking part in decisionmaking processes in MON, in one of the strategic ministries, considered by Lech Walesa to be a presidential bulwark?

"The prime minister is not trying to give publicity to his interest in defense affairs," we learned in the Government's Press Office.

SLD Presidium member Tadeusz Iwinski understands this sudden interest in MON displayed by Pawlak, all the more so because so far the access of the government's head to MON affairs has been very limited due to the fact that the it was the area of the president's influence.

"However, there is something I do not understand," Iwinski says. "The situation in MON is still unclear, and there is no director of the ministry. Why has Gen. Wilecki, the highest-ranking military officer, decided to pay a visit to a foreign country, then, in such a situation?"

PENTOR Poll on Popularity of Politicians

WS0612151594 Poznan WPROST in Polish 4 Dec 94 pp 16-18

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur: "PENTOR for WPROST on Politician's Popularity: Blame and Justice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Prime Minister Jan Olszewski has reached an unprecedented high in popularity polls," we wrote in a report on polls conducted in February 1992. The former head of government, who had the trust of 65 percent of respondents, has not had a chance to make it to the list of the top 20 politicians for a long time. He is now joined by Lech Walesa, who has the support of a mere 18 percent of those polled, and the disapproval of 79 percent.*

The two are followed by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak. In polls carried out by the PENTOR Institute for Market Research and Public Opinion Polls before WPROST published the article "The Prime Minister's Femme Fatale," the number of the prime minister's supporters fell to a new low. The result is confirmed by the fact that the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has lost the support of one-fifth of the potential voters. Also in the ranking of presidential candidates, Pawlak has lost his strong second position and is now ranked fourth. Perhaps the times when the style and trends of policies do not influence opinions about the head of government are coming to an end.

The PENTOR poll once again shows the leader to be Jacek Kuron, one of the informal leaders of the Freedom Union [UW], formerly the minister of labor and social policy. He is also becoming an increasingly serious candidate for president. Former Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka has not done so well in this poll. To make up for the loss, she will probably have to be more dynamic than last year. Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, recently criticized by the president, was very successful. A relatively good result was obtained by Jozef Zych, deputy speaker of the Sejm, head of the Chief Council of the PSL, representing a completely different style than Waldemar Pawlak.

All records of growth in popularity have this time been broken by Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski, who has gained points as both a politician and a presidential candidate. His success may be attributed to his outrage and demonstrative resignation after he was accused of breaking the law on state employee salaries in the "clean hands campaign." His reaction was all the more striking because he was the only one from among a group of nearly 100 officials and politicians who behaved with dignity. Perhaps that is why Olechowski gained more acclaim from public opinion than the initiator of the campaign, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy prime minister and minister of justice.

The examples of Kuron and Olechowski show that Poles expect politicians primarily to be honest and to vehemently defend their reputations. The "demand for honesty" thesis is supported by the fact that, although Olechowski has not been cleared of the allegations, his firm stand caused a growth in popularity. If morals in politics are measured as a need to trust those who are bestowed with the task of running this country, it turns out that Poles consider politicians to be highly immoral.

In developed democracies, the ethics of customs that evolved over the centuries have in-built mechanisms that cause parties to cast out activists who are even suspected of dishonesty. In reality, politicians do not behave much more differently from the rest of society. "Everyone gets what he deserves," says Andrzej Szczypiorski [Polish writer]. However, different criteria are applied to politicians than to "ordinary" people. Just as in monarchies of old those "anointed by God" were to act as models of conduct, in a democracy, a similar role is played by politicians. Moreover, because they are elected by the nation, they must appeal to the goodwill of the constituency, which wants to be supported in its belief that it is capable of making the right decisions and

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expects its representatives to reflect the better part of the nation. Therefore, not only are the views of candidates for deputies evaluated, but also their private lives, which represent cultural models of conduct. The values represented by the professional career, style of work, leisure activities, and family life were different for former President George Bush than they are for Bill Clinton.

Those who strive for power in Western countries learned long ago that they have to pay for morally dubious behavior in elections. The price, a high one at that, is the demoralization of society, which often claims: "If the guys up there can do it, so can we." It is much easier to govern a nation with a low level of legal and political awareness, but then one may lose power more quickly.

Politics is ruled by the same laws as banking, where voters are the "bank" granting a "credit." Banks defying the principle that credits should not be granted to individuals who give the impression that they are capable of fraud are doomed to failure and bankruptcy. Nations that endow politicians with trust, using the "cute eyes" criterion, also suffer crises, but they continue to exist. Meanwhile, the prime minister is asking society to grant a credit of trust to the head of police, who has still not been cleared of charges made by the prosecutor general's office.

Poles are learning "accountancy" very slowly and still tend to support economic or politic sorcerers. This is largely due to the fact that the majority of politicians are even slower to learn, regardless of the color of party flags. A misinterpretation of the self-preservation instinct demands that they believe that, if you do not talk about something, it does not exist. Hence, the hostility toward the mass media, which is manifested the more violently the more one has to hide. A deputy voivodship head can insult a woman journalist, using extreme chauvinist arguments. When dismissing an official, the administrative and political authorities express their heartfelt sorrow at parting with such a highly qualified professional. The fish always spoils from the head—mechanisms clearing the state administration or parties of individuals who dishonor them are still not in place.

As a result, scandals of various weight usually go unnoticed: a drunkard's brawl in a night club, battering neighbors, fighting with the police, extramarital affairs, allocating state billions to a company owned by one's son-in-law or trillions to a bank affiliated with one's political party, securing a lucrative contract for a friend, not accounting for election campaign funds, accepting invitations to attractive trips organized by companies doing business in Poland, or the prime minister breaking the ombudsman law. "Oh, that is not very nice of you," say politicians with distaste when they are publicly accused of nepotism or asked about their personal life. Who cares, anyway?

Perhaps citizens who do not want to put their fate in the hands of suspicious individuals care. Could you trust a head of police under whose eye subordinates committed crimes? Moreover, politicians are even held responsible for the crimes of their own families—children or parents—as Jimmy Carter came to learn when his brother was involved in shady dealings.

The growth of a trust crisis is kindled, in addition, by an intricate legal system. Did the officials listed on the "Cimoszewicz list" abuse their powers, or was it Cimoszewicz who was overzealous in interpreting the law, politicians wonder. The citizens, meanwhile, are learning from Professor Lech Falandysz how to interpret the law and are listening to the president, the "warden of law," when he appeals to judges for tolerance if he happens to teeter on the edge of that law from time to time.

An "inflation" of political, economic, and moral scandals causes one to become indifferent to them. Impunity, however, is illusionary because quantity has to become quality, which is verified either at the voting booths or, which is worse, on the streets. Thus, the road is paved for the "clean" forces resembling those that have recently come to power in Italy. Frequent disregard for public opinion must lead to a decline in popularity for all politicians, not only those on the poll lists.

Most Popular Politicians

	Yes	No	Do Not Who He/ She Is	Change
	Percent			
Jacek Kuron	63	32	3	Up 5
Aleksander Kwasniewski	51	38	11	Up 2
Andrzej Olechowski	51	37	12	Up 12
Waldemar Pawlak	46	50	4	Down 6
Jozef Oleksy	45	42	13	Up 8
Zbigniew Religa	41	46	13	Up 3
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz	37	53	10	Up 4
Tadeusz Mazowiecki	32	63	5	Up 3
Krzysztof Skubiszewski	32	52	16	Down 3
Leszek Balcerowicz	31	62	7	Down 2
Hanna Suchocka	31	64	5	Down 1
Bronislaw Geremek	29	60	11	Up 6

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Most Popular Politicians

	Yes	No	Do Not Who He/ She Is	Change
	Percent			
Barbara Labuda	27	46	27	Down 3
Marian Krzaklewski	25	59	16	Down 3
Jozef Zych	25	46	29	No change
Ryszard Bugaj	23	50	27	Up 1
Grzegorz Kolodko	22	51	27	Up 1
Leszek Miller	22	61	17	Down 1
Leszek Moczulski	21	71	8	Down 1
Ewa Spychalska	21	54	25	Down 1

Ranking of Presidential Candidates

	Percent
Aleksander Kwasniewski	21
Andrzej Olechowski	14
Jacek Kuron	14
Waldemar Pawlak	11
Lech Walesa	8
Leszek Balcerowicz	6
Zbigniew Brzezinski	6
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz	6
Hanna Suchocka	4
Jozef Zych	2
Other	8

Ranking of Political Parties

	Percent	Percent Change
Democratic Left Alliance	25	Down 2
Polish Peasant Party	20	Down 7
Freedom Union	15	Up 1
Union of Labor	11	Down 1
Confederation for an Independent Poland	6	Up 2
Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms	5	Down 1
Solidarity	5	Down 2
Center Accord	4	
Union for Real Politics	3	
Christian National Union	2	
Other	4	

Poll: Majority Pessimistic Over Army, Security

WS0612142594 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by "LUZ": "OBOP: Disputes Among Politicians Harmful to Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Army is not in a position to guarantee security for us, believe most respondents (64 percent) to a poll conducted by the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP].

This opinion is shared by people with secondary education and supporters of the right wing and center right. Every fourth Pole voices an opposite opinion: The condition of the Polish Army is sufficient to guarantee us peace. This opinion is expressed first of all by women, especially housewives.

Most of the respondents can see the future of the Armed Forces in dark colors. The scheduled changes do not give any hope that, in the next few years, anything will change in the Polish Army.

Why do we have such a poor opinion about the condition of our Army? As many as 83 percent of respondents believe that the Army has poor equipment, and 56 percent believe it is weakened by disputes among politicians over control over it. Some respondents (27 percent) believe that the Army cannot guarantee security for us because we do not belong to any military alliances. Almost 20 percent of Poles say that the Army cannot guarantee security to us because the soldiers are not trained well enough. Only 12 percent of respondents say that too few soldiers are serving in the Army, and this might make it difficult to defend the country.

Both men and women, primarily with center-leftist views, draw attention to the poor equipment of the Polish Army. Disputes over the Army are criticized first of all by people over age 40, inhabitants of cities and big towns, and people with center-leftist views. However, most of the respondents (59 percent) believe that the situation will improve and that politicians will stop quarreling over influence in the Army.

Coalition Leaders Invite Walesa to Meeting

LD0612222894 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Krystyna Czubowna] The leaders of the governing coalition, Aleksander Kwasniewski and Waldemar Pawlak, have invited President Lech Walesa to a joint meeting of the presidium of their parliamentary floor groups. The decision was made at the weekly meeting of politicians of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. They also agreed that, should the president

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fail to agree that Longin Pastusiak become the minister of national defense, Pastusiak will become the director of the ministry.

Longin Pastusiak does not belong to the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], so, in the view of Minister Lech Falandysz of the Presidential Chancellery, he cannot become director of the ministry.

[Falandysz] "We treat this as a fairly brutal and primitive attempt to circumvent the constitutional prerogatives of the president. This may easily be demonstrated, and every tribunal will admit that we are correct. But I gently warned the coalition not to do this because it would have unpleasant consequences. What it will do I cannot say, but I asked for reconsideration of this."

[Jerzy Szmajdzinski, SLD] "Only the prime minister is the prime minister, and, in association with this, as we judge, the prime minister is also, when there is no minister, able to appoint both under secretaries of state and secretaries of state. The Small Constitution does not envisage such a situation, one in which there is no minister."

[Falandysz] "I warned that this is not so straightforward, you know, and that the law cannot just be waved around like this, to the left and to the right, as someone happens to fancy. This must, nonetheless, fit within certain bounds. I do not claim that I am the only one who is privy to this art. Well, I do happen to have greater experience than others, and that is why I warn those who are only now getting down to this that it is not so straightforward."

[Szmajdzinski] "We do not preclude, of course, that Mr. Falandysz will enunciate all kinds of tirades here that bear little relation to the law and that are closer to politics. It is not precluded that he will turn with formal questions to various institutions, but there will be a director in the ministry during this time, and he will be directing it."

[Correspondent] The coalition wants to meet with the president because such a conversation, in the view of its leaders, may shed light on many misunderstandings.

[Szmajdzinski] "I judge that the sphere of speculation will be limited to a remarkable degree, that we will quite simply know more: what the president wants, what his hinterland wants, and what is, in association with this, possible, what the coalition will realistically be able to do next year."

[Falandysz] "The president surely has had this experience, that the coalition has invited him to a meeting or a specified parliamentary floor group invited him to a meeting when the floor group was up against the wall, when it no longer could see any other way out and wanted to come to terms. This is a good signal, very democratic, very parliamentary."

[Correspondent] Minister Falandysz added that the president is a man who in general agrees to things and accepts invitations to meetings.

Right-Wing RdR To Hold Programmatic Conference

WS0712124494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by "IGO": "UPR-ZChN Axis Will Materialize on 16 December"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Movement for the Republic [RdR] is organizing a programmatic conference. Invitations have been sent out to all parties making up the Covenant for Poland [PdP] and the 11 November Accord. The conference will definitely be attended by the Union for Real Politics [UPR], the Christian-National Union [ZChN], the National Democratic Party, the Party of Christian Democrats, and Peasant Accord. Representatives of the Center Accord [PC], the Conservative Coalition [KK], the Conservative Party, and the Christian Peasant Party will probably not participate.

For the first time, a line clearly showing the informal split between the ZChN-UPR axis and its opponents has become evident.

This conference could become a sort of catalyst that will speed up the transformation of the political spectrum's right wing.

"There is something in it," admits RdR Chairman Romuald Szeremietiew (at present on vacation; he is writing his thesis at the National Military Academy). He declares, however, that his party does not want to push the PC outside the right wing. "I think the right wing should have three legs: ZChN, UPR, and PC," he admits.

Szeremietiew himself and his aspirations to take over the Ministry of National Defense in the postcommunist government were the reasons for the crisis in the PdP. The coalition is not currently functioning because the PC and KK politicians do not want to sit down at the same table with Szeremietiew. On the other hand, UPR contacts with the Democratic Left Alliance during the election of Mieczyslaw Bareja as mayor of Warsaw pushed the PdP away from them.

PC Leader Withdraws Signature From Communique

WS0612150694 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by "M.D.Z.": "PC Questions Communique Issued After Meeting at the Reverend Maj's; Kaczynski Withdraws His Signature"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jaroslaw Kaczynski has withdrawn his signature from the communique issued by the leaders of rightist groupings after the meeting at Father

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Jozef Maj's on 3 December. "The text of the statement differs from the one I approved. I look upon this as a serious transgression," RZECZPOSPOLITA learned from the Center Accord [PC] chairman.

The communique, which was released to the press, states that a candidate of the right should, among other things, "ensure that the Constitution be strictly observed." "I proposed that the communique specify that this candidate should not be Lech Walesa. Because two or three parties that took part in the meeting did not agree to this, I proposed wording it differently—that the candidate must 'ensure that the Constitution and laws are strictly observed.' This excluded Walesa, even though not directly; not only in deeds but also in declarations is the current president announcing violations of the law," Kaczynski claims.

The PC leader also told us that, at the meeting on 3 December, the Arbitrating Commission of the right was not actually set up but merely a decision was made about the establishment of such a commission in the future.

"Jaroslaw Kaczynski left the meeting earlier, before the final version of the communique was agreed upon. All of the other people decided that it would be enough to quote the Constitution and that it would be unnecessary to mention any other laws," we were told by Teresa Skupien, who took part in the editing of the communique.

Ryszard Czarnecki, acting chairman of the Christian-National Union, cautioned against unnecessary emotions over this issue. "I do not think the stand taken by Mr. Kaczynski will have any repercussions here," he said.

Problems of Opole Ethnic Germans Discussed

MM0612165894 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 29 Nov 94 p 4

[Article by Zbigniew Gorniak: "Fears Are Not Quite The Same as Conflicts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "In the previous Sejm we tipped the scales, while, at the moment, our group is described as a solitary flower in a green-and-red meadow," Henryk Kroll said, referring to the parliamentary deputies representing the German minority, during the last of a cycle of meetings at the Warsaw Bureau for Polish-German Youth Cooperation.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Culture and the Arts, the German Minority Youth Union of the Polish Republic, and Warsaw school, college, and university students. A prominent guest of the meeting was Dr. Danuta Berlinska, who still holds the office of the Opole Voivoda's plenipotentiary for contacts with the German minority group. It was Dr. Berlinska who gave an introductory speech before a discussion of the situation of the German minority in the Opole Silesia. As she stressed, tremendous progress has been made in relations between the German minority and the Government of the Polish Republic. This has been confirmed by both the German and the Polish sides and also by international observers. In 26 parishes of the Opole region, ethnic Germans command an overwhelming majority on parish councils, and it is similar in the Self-Government Assembly, where the German minority shares control with the center-right group. The total number of seats commanded by the German minority in local self-government structures is 500.

"It is true that the minority bears a certain grudge over the fact that its representatives do not hold leading positions in voivodship administration, but Voivoda Zembaczynski is not guided in this particular matter by any political likes or dislikes. He tries to be nonpolitical, which is attested to by the fact that the currently ruling left-wing orientation does not command any positions in the Voivodship Office, either," said Berlinska.

On the other hand, the voivodship administration gives active support to the teaching of the German language in Silesian schools. "I even met with accusations that I aim to Germanize the 'Wasser-Poles' ['watered-down Poles']," the plenipotentiary remarked.

German children are taught their native language three hours a week. In addition, the availability of German-language literature is now much more extensive than previously. Before 1989, there were, at most, a few hundred German books in Opole; today, there are as many as 30,000 volumes. In addition, the Austrian Library is active in the city. Unfortunately, contrary to their express declarations, members of the German minority are not particularly eager to read books in their native tongue. So far, only 130 persons have joined the library.

Work aimed at helping local teachers develop an awareness of nationality questions is an important task for the voivodship administration.

"Forty-five years of communism were not conducive to shaping this awareness. We must now do a lot of hard and persistent work to change this," Danuta Berlinska told her audience.

Teachers' awareness is to be changed by a new program entitled "Civic Education in a Culturally Diverse Region." Students participate in role-play games based on U.S. models. The role-play element consists of trying to assume the identity of a member of a minority group and thus become familiar with his problems and even his fears.

The minority group's fears about its future were described at great length, in German, by one of the activists of the German Minority Youth Union of the Polish Republic, who is, incidentally, at present doing his alternative military service in the Union. "A fear of declaring that one is a German still persists throughout

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our minority. We know of many cases of Germans living in Poland being afraid to admit to their ethnic identity. And we want to give them their identity," he said.

Danuta Berlinska engaged in a polemic with that particular speaker, insisting that, while it is true that some such fears exist, they are not nearly as widespread as he claimed because very large groups of people in Silesia as well as in Mazury openly admit to their ethnic German identity. Danuta Berlinska also spoke of the fears of the immigrant population that arrived in Silesia in consequence of the Yalta Conference decisions. Those expatriate people, who had been incorrectly called "repatriates," also had many reasons to fear for their future for many years while they lived in Silesia. Hence, the tensions existing among the local population; nevertheless, the tensions still did not amount to open hostility.

"There are fears, yes, but there are no conflicts here," Berlinska stressed firmly, adding at the same time that it was, among others, for these sensitive reasons that there could be no talk for the time being of introducing bilingual place-names in Silesia. "It would be like planting a barrel full of dynamite there," Berlinska said.

Henryk Kroll acquainted the audience with the numerical strength of the German minority in Poland. "Everyone paints a different picture," he laughed. "As far as Primate Glemp is concerned, we do not exist at all, while Czaja [German expellees' union activist] believes that there are 2 million of us here. I would estimate our number at 70,000-80,000."

An impassioned discussion developed concerning the problems of national loyalty ensuing from possession of dual citizenship by members of the ethnic German minority. This allows young men to evade service in the Polish Armed Forces: When the conscription date comes up, they simply leave the country. Recently, a case was noted in the Opole region whereby a young man of dual citizenship who returned to Poland after spending several years in Germany was called up for military service here. He appealed, producing documents that proved he had already done his military service in the Bundeswehr. However, that was not an argument for the Polish authorities. "It is unfair to expect a person with dual citizenship to do his military service twice over," Henryk Kroll opined, although his interlocutors were not unanimous on this question.

Regret was also expressed over some ill-considered decisions concerning personnel changes at the Ethnic Minorities Bureau of the Ministry of Culture and the Arts. As Henryk Kroll emphasized, matters of such complexity should be handled by people who know what is involved and who, furthermore, have enough goodwill to see to it that problems are sorted out to applicants' satisfaction. Apparently these preconditions are not being met under the present bureau management. The situation has been highlighted by Danuta Berlinska's voluntary resignation from the office of the Opole Voivoda's plenipotentiary for German minority affairs.

Government Proposes Changes to Military Service

LD0612220094 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The government has proposed changes to the law on professional military service, strengthening the role of the president in directing the Army. According to the changed law, the minister of national defense will have to consult with the chief of the General Staff on the most important decisions.

In the view of the Defense Ministry, the aim of the changes is the creation of a strong cadre of professional soldiers and the clear specification of what constitutes the introduction of martial law and what is a state of war. The authority to nominate soldiers to all military ranks up to colonel, inclusive, would pass to the supreme commander, who is the president. At present, he confirms the ranks of only generals.

In the course of the deliberations of the government, as we have unofficially discovered, the suggestion of the Defense Ministry, which was supported by the prime minister, that only unmarried men be accepted into officer and professional military training schools because the Defense Ministry cannot afford to pay for the families of the future military was rejected.

The law abolishes the ban on the soldiers standing for and being members of local government bodies. After election, a soldier will pass onto the so-called inactive list.

The Defense Ministry has presented the government with what is the 22d, since 1967, revision of the law on the universal defense obligation of the Republic. It proposes, among other things, a departure from the concept of sole provider for a family. In the course of his fulfillment of military service, the people dependent upon him will be financially supported by the Ministry of Labor. It is planned to gradually shorten military service from one and a half years to a year, and alternative service from two years to 21 months. This revision will be considered by the government at the beginning of next year.

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Iliescu Returns From, Praises CSCE Summit

AU0612191394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] This evening Romanian President Ion Iliescu returned home from Budapest, where he attended the CSCE summit conference.

In a statement to the media at Otopeni airport, President Iliescu said he felt the conference was one of the major political events of the end of this year, and that it managed to define more precisely the role, place, and functions of CSCE within the context of its universal nature.

The conference examined the ways in which the CSCE can contribute to the establishment of equal security throughout our continent in the new context of the basic changes that have taken place in Europe and the world: namely, that the bipolar world has been turned into one in which international relations are based on democratic relations of equality and partnership among all states.

The CSCE also aims to become a stimulative factor for the furthering of constructive cooperation among all European states, added President Iliescu—after which he noted that, on that occasion, he had also held bilateral talks with high-ranking officials of the participant states, especially those of neighboring and Black Sea countries.

Speaking of his meetings with Hungary's president and prime minister, Iliescu emphasized the positive role of talks held at such levels and called those talks open, amiable, and constructive. Our correspondent Sorin Croitorescu reports that the issues they broached also included aspects related to the negotiations on the basic treaty to be concluded between Hungary and Romania.

Report Examines Fuel Smuggling to Serbia

AU0612183294 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 1 Dec 94 pp 1, 10

[Report by Marius Nitu: "The River of Gasoline at Our Border With Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Thousands of People Daily Use Dozens of Vessels To Transport Fuel Across the Danube to the Serbian Bank in Violation of the UN Embargo

The embargo imposed by the UN on Yugoslavia has caused Romania losses worth billions of dollars. For a few villages situated on the banks of the Danube in Caras-Severin County, however, the embargo—or rather, violating it by smuggling—has become more than just a fantastic business. It has become a way of life.

With Their Huge Boats the "Sharks" Have Beaten the "Rabbits"

Earlier, most of the smuggled gasoline reached Yugoslavia more or less legally: namely, via car gasoline tanks. A smaller amount used to be carried there by people crossing the border on foot. As if observing a tacit agreement, the border guards used to look the other way when they saw people carrying five-liter containers, "forgetting" to ask about their contents. They did so because that area is very poor and unemployment is extremely high. In Oravita, for instance, there are 6,600 employed people and 1,200 looking for work. Since 1989, 1,800 employees have lost their jobs at the uranium mine alone. Later on, however, the new 15,000-lei exit tax to be paid for each border crossing reduced the profit of the pedestrian carriers to zero. That is when the "rabbits" appeared: namely, people carrying small gasoline containers on their backs who during the night illegally crossed over to Yugoslavia circumventing the Naides checkpoint, and who always ran as fast as they could while crossing the no-man's-land separating the two countries. Later, however, the number of "rabbits" decreased considerably—not because of increased vigilance by the border guards, but rather owing to the "sharks": that is, those who smuggle fuel to Serbia in boats large enough to transport 1.5 metric tons of gasoline and who make two or three such trips per day. In order to achieve such performances, the "gasoline fishermen" of the villages of Divici, Berzeasca, and Liubovca need a well-organized association. But, after all, they have had four years to set one up. In their early days they used to go to the gas stations in their tankers and buy a few metric tons of gasoline. Later on, however, a gasoline shortage arose in Caras-Severin County, as well as in all the neighboring counties, so that a new intermediary link appeared: the carriers. One sees smugglers along the entire road from Moravita to Moldova Noua, sitting in their cars and signalling with their headlights in their search for people ready to act as carriers for them. Last week they offered 820 lei per liter plus a 12-percent bonus in German marks [DM] of the profits made after selling the gasoline on the other bank. As a special service they are prepared to pay any fines that the carriers might get from the traffic police on their way to Serbia. As soon as one agrees to become a carrier, one is immediately included in a convoy of seven to eight cars—most of which have Timisoara license plates, although we also saw Tulcea and Brasov plates as well—a convoy that is always escorted by a carload of repairmen. The first destination is one of the secret fuel reservoirs in the area, some of which are located in the town of Moldova Noua. Just one example: The police found Doru Capatana and Traian Dorin hoarding two metric tons of gasoline.

The Right of Way Through Gardens Costs DM50

The smugglers' expenses are not related to the purchase of the merchandise. In order to make an arrest for smuggling, the border guards have to catch someone with gasoline right on the border. According to the current laws, a 20-meter strip along the banks of the Danube is considered the national border and falls under the jurisdiction of the border guards. Nevertheless, whoever applied the land law and gave such property to the

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citizens in the villages of Liubcovo and Pescari and in the town of Moldova Veche has purely and simply forgotten about this, and thus the people's gardens run right up to the Danube. The border guards cannot patrol such gardens, as this would be trespassing on private property. That is why the lucky owners of such gardens, also equipped with their own piers, do not need to engage in smuggling themselves, as it is much simpler to ask for DM50 each time smuggled merchandise transits through their gardens. In the villages of Divici, Popojene, and Berzeasca the 20-meter strip still exists, which lowers the transit fee to DM30. Such fees are affordable for the smugglers, as the Serbs currently pay DM1.4 per liter of fuel.

The Smugglers Have Hundreds of Boats, While the Border Guards Have Just a Broken-Down Speedboat

The exchange of full and empty barrels between the Serbs and the Romanians occurs in the middle of the Danube, precisely where the border runs. However, sometimes the Serbs come over to the people's gardens. There was an incident in the Pescari area of the Danube when our reporters counted no fewer than 10 boats engaged in such transactions. None had a license number or flew the flag of its country of origin as required by border regulations. It is only natural that they dare do such things, as the border guards lack the necessary means to enforce the law. The unit that guards an 80-km stretch of the Danube (from Bazias to Zimnicea) is equipped with a single SPI-type speedboat, which currently cannot be used anyway because of lack of lubricants. At the same time the smugglers own boats equipped with powerful, 10-, 18-, and even 60- horsepower Johnson motors. To increase their speed further, some of the boats are even equipped with two such motors. Despite this situation, since the beginning of this year, the border guards have managed to confiscate 70 motor boats, as well as dozens of metric tons of gasoline, and they have taken legal steps in 206 cases against 800 people, a third of whom are Serbs. However, half of the documents containing the charges have been lost along the way, so they have never come to court.

In these villages, intruders, be they border guards or simple visitors, are not welcome. This is only normal, as by their presence there, they disturb a flourishing business that is bringing each smuggler a profit of 3-4 million lei per day. In March, the border guards found a secret fuel reservoir on one of the small uninhabited island in the Danube. Trying to drive them away, the smugglers spilled gasoline over two of the non-commissioned officers, while one officer was hit on the head with a hook so hard that he had to be hospitalized for two months. Similarly, near the village of Berzeasca, they attacked a military patrol. In both cases the aggressors are still at large. If on the Romanian bank things are still quiet, on the Serbian bank there is a genuine war (with dead and wounded people) going on between armed local smugglers and newcomers from Belgrade.

After four years of the embargo's being observed in this way, the village of Pescari is full of two-story villas, satellite dishes, Western cars (three or four in each garage) and mountains of empty canisters and drums stinking of gasoline. They claim that they have obtained this wealth from fishing in the Danube, which they are authorized to do and for which they "have paid all their taxes to the state."

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Butrus-Ghali 'Satisfied' With Karadzic Letter

LD0612004794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0008 GMT 6 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Dec. 5 (TANJUG)—U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali is satisfied with the letter of Bosnia Serb republic President Radovan Karadzic.

Butrus-Ghali's spokesman Joe Sills said Monday Karadzic expressed regret of the two not having met in Sarajevo last week. Butrus-Ghali hoped, as suggested by Karadzic, they would meet within a foreseeable time, but that no dates were fixed thus far, said Stills.

Karadzic sent a letter Saturday to Butrus-Ghali stressing the U.N. should treat equally all the parties to the Bosnian conflict, and that, if it had already made the mistake in recognizing Bosnia, then it should have no illusions that it indeed existed.

Karadzic said the Sarajevo Muslim government represented only the Muslim community and had no right to speak on behalf of other nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Butrus-Ghali last Wednesday met in Sarajevo Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic in the building of the Muslim presidency, and failed to meet Karadzic because the latter asked the meeting take place on Bosnian Serb territory and not, as Butrus-Ghali requested at Sarajevo airport.

Such attitude on the part of the U.N. secretary-general was taken by the Bosnian Serbs as failure to treat equally the parties to the conflict and as ignoring the reality of the existence of the Bosnian Serb republic.

Asked by newsmen whether the U.N. Secretary-General supported the possibility of confederal association between Bosnian Serbs and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Sills replied that Butrus-Ghali supported the 'Contact Group' for Bosnia plan, and that the warring sides should mutually each accord on constitutional arrangements. [sentence as received]

Serbs Present Conditions on NATO Flights

AU0612122894 Paris AFP in English 1136 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 6 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs have asked NATO for a written guarantee that its warplanes will not attack Serb gunners, in exchange for allowing Sarajevo airport to reopen, a UN source said Tuesday.

The Serbs also demanded an undertaking from NATO that its planes would not fly below 5,000 feet (1,500 metres), the sources said.

The conditions for the reopening of Sarajevo airport were presented late Monday by Serb deputy army commander General Milan Gvero at a meeting with the commander of UN forces in Bosnia, General Michael Rose, the source said.

Among the conditions imposed, the source added, was a guarantee that warplanes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation should not attack Serb missile batteries not engaged in fighting. NATO warplanes struck at three missile sites in northwestern Bosnia last month during a Serb offensive against the Bihac pocket.

In an official statement Rose said the five hours of talks at Jahorina, just south of Sarajevo, had been "useful." He said he had stressed NATO role as an impartial "re-active organisation" operating in support of the UN's peacekeeping mission, with flights undertaken only to implement UN resolutions on the Deny Flight mandate, total exclusion zone agreements or UN-mandated safe areas.

The UN officials in Jahorina were seeking assurances for the safety of incoming aircraft at Sarajevo airport which has been closed for more than two weeks following several incidents involving the activation of Serb missile systems.

Serbs Holding 5 UN Observers as 'Human Shields'

AU0612124094 Paris AFP in English 1230 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 6 (AFP)—Five UN military observers are being used as "human shields" by Bosnian Serbs near the airport of the Serb-held town of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia, a UN spokesman said Tuesday.

Hold Spanish UN Observer

LD0612165694 Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 6 Dec 904

[FBIS Translated Text] Since yesterday afternoon/evening, the Bosnian Serbs have been holding a Spanish Marine captain, it was learned today. The officer is working as a UN military observer in northern Bosnia. The Spanish officer, whose identity is not yet known, was captured together with four other UN observers near Banja Luka airport and could be used as a human shield to prevent NATO aircraft from bombing the airport. The Spanish captain reportedly put himself forward to be exchanged for another UN observer, a Jordanian officer who is suffering from a heart problem, but who is still being held by the Serbs. Over 300 UN representatives are hostages of the Bosnian Serbs as a precaution against possible air strikes by the Atlantic Alliance.

British Troops Want To Continue Bosnia Mission

LD0612155194 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1402 GMT 6 Dec 94

[By Charles Miller, Defense Correspondent, PA News in Bugojno]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] British peacekeeping troops in Bosnia today gave Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind the unequivocal message: "We don't want to leave."

They told him they were doing a good job restoring a normal way of life to large areas of the strife-torn country.

Cabinet ministers are meeting for crucial talks on Thursday on the future of the peacekeeping operation after Mr Rifkind returns.

But during a whistle-stop tour of British units close to the Bosnian-Serb front line, he stressed today a final judgement would have to look at the entire operation across Bosnia.

"What we see is serious harassment in some areas which is very bad news," he said. "There is significant deterioration in Bihac and, to some extent, in Sarajevo, and we have to decide whether this is a trend or something that will ease." More than 2,000 of the 3,500-strong British force is working in central Bosnia without harassment and performing "very valuable work", he said.

Mr Rifkind said it was quite understandable that the greatest public interest was currently focused on the horrors in Bihac. But he stressed: "I have been very impressed that there is no comparable deterioration elsewhere in Bosnia and the situation has indeed improved because of the work of the British and other UN troops."

Mr Rifkind travelled to Maglaj in the north of Bosnia and saw for himself the confrontation line between the Croat-Muslim forces and the Bosnian Serbs from the British observation post just 600 yards away. He later flew by helicopter to the western Bosnian town of Bugojno which has been repeatedly shelled by the Bosnian Serbs.

He toured a school severely damaged in the fighting but which is now being restored by British troops. It is the third school they have successfully restored and for the first time in Bosnia since the outbreak of fighting two years ago, children from Serb, Muslim and Croat families are studying together.

One officer from the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment said: "The general feeling is that we want to stay because we are doing a good job. "There was a feeling a couple of weeks ago that we might have to pull out and that affected the men. But the commanders and officers got together and the decision was to get on with the job and that is what we are doing."

Mr Rifkind said he had reached "some very important conclusions" during his visit which he will put to Thursday's key meeting of the Cabinet Overseas Policy and Defence Committee.

Although Mr Rifkind has been in a sombre mood about the possibility of continuing the operation, it is clear that British and UN commanders want to continue to try to spread the peace.

Mr Rifkind was due later to fly to Zagreb to meet the UN envoy Yasushi Akashi and the overall UN commander French General Bertrand de Lapresle.

Shadow foreign secretary Robin Cook said: "It is very important that, for as long as we can, we do maintain the humanitarian aid in Bosnia.

"That is what the troops went in to protect in the first place," he told BBC Radio 4's The World At One programme.

Troop withdrawal would mean an end to the aid convoys and could also lead to the reopening of heavy shelling of Sarajevo. The conflict could also spread throughout the Balkans.

Serbs Destroy UN Observation Post Near Tuzla

AU0712090994 Paris AFP in English 0843 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 7 (AFP)— Bosnian Serbs destroyed a UN observation post near Kalesija, 15 kilometres (10 miles) east of Tuzla in northeast Bosnia, in an attack using mortar and antitank fire, a UN spokesman said Tuesday.

Five mortar shells fell near the post to within a distance of only 10 metres (yards) and were followed by two rounds of antitank fire, one of which destroyed the building late Monday, Major Herve Gourmelon said. The post was empty.

A UN truck was also hit by antitank fire, the spokesman said. The UN sector commander delivered a strong protest to Serb military leaders.

Serbs returned five guns removed Monday from two weapons collection points inside the total exclusion zone after the commander of UN forces in Bosnia, General Michael Rose, protested to the political authorities in Pale, spokesman Lt.-Col. Patrick Declety said.

Two antitank guns removed from Krivo-Gravici in the morning, and three guns removed from the Polinje collection point in the evening, were later returned.

Bosnian Serb forces attacking government-held positions in the northwestern Bihac pocket overnight, though confrontation lines remained stable, Gourmelon said.

Ninety rounds of heavy and light machine-gun fire were recorded at the northern town of Velika Kladusa, where Moslem rebels have virtually encircled the town from which they were expelled by government forces over the summer.

The besiegers were probably hindered by the bad weather, the spokesman said.

Activity eased slightly around Bihac town, the centre of a UN-declared safe haven, apart from incidents in the eastern suburbs of Vedre Polje and Klokot.

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There was an increase in activity late Monday in the areas of Doboj and the Posavina corridor, in the north of the country.

UN To Withdraw Part of Bangladeshi Peacekeepers

AU0712113394 Paris AFP in English 1105 GMT 7 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 7 (AFP)—The United Nations is to temporarily withdraw a third of 1,200 Bangladeshi peacekeepers currently deployed in the besieged Bihac safe area in northwestern Bosnia, a UN spokesman said Wednesday.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jan-Dirk von Merveldt said the partial withdrawal was due to difficulties in resupplying them and added that the Bangladeshi UN troops would be replaced as soon as the situation allowed it.

Izetbegovic on Conditions for 3-Month Cease-Fire

AU0612121594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] As Croatian radio reports, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, confirmed to U.S. President Clinton in Budapest that the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is prepared to accept a three-month cease-fire, provided that the attacks on Bihac immediately stop and that the Serb units withdraw from the protected area.

Alija Izetbegovic, president of the state presidency, is concerned about the (?stand) of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] that NATO aircraft should not attack the aggressor's positions.

Silajdzic: Peace Process 'Doomed to Failure'

AU0612151994 Paris AFP in English 1459 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 6 (AFP)—The current peace process is doomed to failure since the Bosnian Serbs will not be bought off until they have achieved the "Greater Serbia" that was their original war aim, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said Tuesday [6 December].

"Neither (Serbian President Slobodan) Milosevic nor anyone else can apply the pressure which will bring peace," Silajdzic said in an interview with the local BH PRESS agency published in the latest issue of the daily OSLOBODJENJE.

Commenting on a proposal to allow the Bosnian Serbs to confederate with Serbia, approved by Milosevic Sunday in talks with British and French foreign ministers Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe in Belgrade, Silajdzic said this was "only buying time for new killings and demolitions."

The Serb objective was "to create the atmosphere of helplessness which would carry a message: If we do not accept a Greater Serbia, war will reign here forever."

A delegation from the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb parliament, led by the "foreign minister" Aleksa Buha, told Milosevic during a visit to Belgrade Monday that the Serbs should "study the possibility of accepting the contact group plan."

The five-nation contact group, comprising Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, last Friday said it was prepared to consider a Pale-Belgrade confederation if Bosnia's territorial integrity were recognised.

The Serb leadership in Pale has insisted on international recognition of its sovereignty as a minimum condition, while the Bosnian Government has expressed strong opposition to the proposal.

"There cannot be any confederation, Greater Serbia cannot be introduced under this term," Silajdzic stressed Monday. "This is the message: There is no peace. The peace effort, in my view, will not bring peace. The Serbs will not stop, they will not accept the plan. ... The plan was presented to all of us on a take it or leave it basis. We took it, the Serbs didn't, but everyone has been talking about pressure on both parties."

Silajdzic strongly criticised European governments which have opposed the lifting of a UN-mandated arms embargo on former Yugoslavia seen here as favouring the Serb side which inherited the weapons of the Yugoslav army.

"The United States have had a more honourable approach," he said, referring to calls made until recently by Washington for a lifting of the embargo and the declared intention of the incoming Republican majority in Congress to vote for the embargo to be lifted. "Whether that will be enough is an entirely different issue. The problem we have with European governments is the following: We understand that Bosnia is not important to them, but what we cannot understand is why they think it's better for us not to defend ourselves."

He moreover accused Russia of interfering in the Bosnian conflict by deploying surface-to-air missiles within Bosnia, "even at some places close to the Adriatic sea," and said that a "large number of Russian mercenaries" were fighting with the Bosnian Serb forces.

Failure To Oppose 'Genocide'

AU0612193694 Paris AFP in English 1902 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Dec 6 (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic denounced Tuesday the failure of European governments to oppose the "genocide" inflicted on the Bosnian people in the conflict with Bosnia's warring Serbs.

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"We have been put in ghettos and starved while the world watches," Silajdzic said after a special government meeting called after the close of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Budapest.

"This is because of the unity of NATO, the European Union and the Western allies," he said. "We cannot believe that Western unity will be based on the blood of our innocent people. We shall ask for the people of Europe, of the United States and elsewhere, to rise in indignation."

"There is always the question," he continued: "Why do some European governments support something which is obviously a genocide?" [passage omitted]

Ganic: UN 'Failure' Causing 'Escalation'

AU0612211094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidency member Ejup Ganic this evening held talks with Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN secretary general. In a lengthy conversation, Ganic pointed out to Akashi that humanitarian aid has still not arrived in Bihac and that the lives of tens of thousands of people are in the hands of the UN administration. Ganic strongly protested that the world public has still not been informed about the real catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Bihac region. The failure to send humanitarian aid to Bihac and other besieged regions is leading to further escalation of the war in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and beyond, and the United Nations will be held responsible for this, Ganic pointed out.

UNHCR Says Aid Convoy Reaches Srebrenica

LD0612202394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1741 GMT 6 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 6 (TANJUG)—A U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees convoy with 96 tonnes of food arrived Tuesday in the Muslim-held town of Srebrenica, eastern Bosnia, UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said.

Janowski said Bosnian Serbs had secured unhindered passage to the convoy that also included a fuel tanker, and said this was an encouraging sign.

Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic on Friday agreed in the talks with U.N. special envoy Yasushi Akashi to secure unhindered passage to the UNHCR convoy across the territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic.

The talks between Karadzic and Akashi constituted a resumption of cooperation between the Bosnian Serb Republic and the U.N. Protection Force, severed last month after NATO warplanes launched several air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.

Karadzic: Belgrade Delegation Not 'Competant'

AU0612175094 Paris AFP in English 1659 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 6 (AFP)—The party of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said Tuesday a delegation of deputies visiting Belgrade to discuss acceptance of an international peace plan for Bosnia had no authority to do so.

Serbian Democratic Party deputies had earlier denied there was a "split" in their self-styled parliament over the peace plan saying the delegates, who Monday met Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, spoke "officially" in urging its consideration, the BETA news agency reported.

That meeting was the first official encounter between the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic in four months since Belgrade cut economic and political ties with the Pale Serbs to protest their rejection of the peace plan mediated by the five-nation Contact Group comprising Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

The group said last Friday it was prepared to consider a Pale-Belgrade confederation if Bosnia's territorial integrity were recognised, but Sarajevo rejects that idea.

Earlier reports said the Bosnian Serb delegates would "study the possibility of accepting" the peace plan proposed by the contact group, but silence from the Bosnian Serb leadership raised questions over who the group was representing.

The delegation head, Bosnian Serb "Foreign Minister" Aleksa Buha, a close aide to Karadzic, told BETA his group was "an official delegation" of the parliament and not some "dissident group."

But the official Bosnian Serb press agency SRNA later published a party statement contradicting that view saying Karadzic's party was angered by the Belgrade "initiative." It added the delegates were not "competent" to discuss the peace plan and said if such "initiatives" continued they would be regarded as "activities aimed at breaking up the (Bosnian Serb) Assembly."

The party added in its statement that it is "neither necessary nor possible to reconsider the decisions of the people who rejected (in a referendum) the maps" on the carve up of Bosnia as foreseen by the peace plan.

The peace plan would give 51 percent of Bosnian territory to the Moslem-Croat federation and 49 percent to Serbs—who now hold 70 percent of the territory and have demanded 65 percent under any peace settlement.

The Bosnian Serb delegation said after its meeting with Milosevic it should be given instructions to "immediately pursue negotiations" on "territorial boundaries" between Serbs and the Moslem-Croat federation and the "constitutional arrangement" of the future Bosnian state.

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SDS Censures MP's Meeting With Milosevic

LD0612200894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1940 GMT 6 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 6 (TANJUG)—The Serb Democratic Party (SDS), lead by Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, has censured Bosnian Serb M.P.s' [members of parliament] meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

A statement issued after an SDS central board and parliamentary group meeting, held late Monday, after a delegation of Bosnian Serb M.P.s met with President Milosevic, said 'Bosnian Serb M.P.s have recently been frequently summoned to the Serbian president's office.'

The statement said 'there was no need or possibility to reconsider the people's decision to reject the 'Contact Group' map for the division of Bosnia.

A statement released after the meeting of the Bosnian Serb delegation and President Milosevic said the Bosnian Serb M.P.s had asked to be received by the Serbian president to obtain information regarding the peace process for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The SDS statement said that 'all meetings should be arranged by institutions' and appointed an official delegation to meet with Milosevic and obtain information on current diplomatic initiatives for resolving the Bosnian crisis.

The Bosnian Serb News Agency SRNA on Tuesday quoted the SDS statement as saying that the Serbian president would be advised there was a possibility of causing a split within the Bosnian Serb national assembly if the M.P.s continued meeting with him separately.

The statement also said that it welcomed all initiatives for resuming cooperation with the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro, but that the M.P.s launching these initiatives should advise the assembly and the government of their activities.

The Bosnian Serbs at a referendum on Aug. 27-28 rejected the map for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina proposed by the Contact Group.

The Bosnian Serb government said the map was made to the detriment of the Bosnian Serbs, because the territory granted to them was scattered and because the Muslim-Croat Federation was given most natural resources and industrial facilities.

Deputies Expect 'Positive Answer' to Peace Plan

AU0612201394 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Interview with Milorad Dodik and Momcilo Micic, deputies of the Srpska republic assembly, by Zoran Zivkovic on 6 December; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zivkovic] You are members of a delegation of the Srpska republic peoples' deputies that was, at your request, received by President Slobodan Milosevic yesterday. Mr. Dodik, what are you impression?

[Dodik] As you have said, at our request, President Milosevic received a delegation of deputies of the Srpska republic yesterday so that we could learn directly about all the new elements connected with the peace process for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. We had a long conversation with Mr. President, during which he pointed out to us all the important and relevant facts and new elements that have emerged within the Contact Group regarding the peace plan for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The talks were correct, as I have already said, long, and did not prejudice any solution. President Milosevic merely presented us with the new findings and new facts regarding the peace process. In this sense, we have accomplished our goal, precisely because we have gained this new knowledge and because these new elements were presented to us.

[Zivkovic] Mr. Micic, in your assessment, are there any chances that the Srpska republic will embrace the Contact Group peace plan?

[Micic] I believe that the assembly should, and I hope it also will, reexamine its decision and present to the citizens some other solutions beside the earlier ones. Namely, I would like to say that, for the residents of the Srpska republic, the most important elements at the moment are the restoration of peace, the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, which would also mean the lifting of the sanctions against us, and the exercising of our rights in the way other ethnic groups in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina exercise them.

I personally believe that after the talks with Mr. President Milosevic there are plenty of elements that we can discuss, which we must discuss, and toward which we must take a stance. One of the most important elements was the obtaining of guarantees from the international public, the way Mr. Milosevic presented it to us, that is, to retain the existing positions that we currently hold until the moment of adoption of the constitutional principles and contact between the two warring sides about Bosnia's division, that is, the exchange of territories that would be in the interest of both sides.

All those who were present, I believe, share my opinion, and I believe that at the next assembly session we shall raise this issue. I personally expect that we will give a positive answer.

Serbs Claim Croats Using Aircraft in Attacks

LD0612175694 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The information service of the headquarters of the Srpska republic army [VRS] issued a public statement last night which says:

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The offensive by the army of the independent Republic of Croatia, aided and abetted by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], is continuing with undiminished intensity for the sixth day now from the direction of Livno and Sinj towards Grahovo, Glamoc, and Kupres.

During the day Glamoc, (?Celebici), Provo, (?Budine), (?Stajkovici), and other villages in the Livno and Glamoc valleys were exposed to powerful, uncontrolled, and random fire. Over 1,500 mortar and artillery shells of all calibers were fired at these villages. Particularly intensive fire was opened from multiple-rocket launchers and on several occasions Croatian aircraft were also in action.

The 126th Home Defense Regiment from Sinj, the 4th Guards' Brigade from Split, and parts of the 115th Brigade from Imotski and the 132d Brigade from [place indistinct] were engaged in the main attacks.

Great damage was inflicted on industrial and residential buildings, and there were also civilian casualties. In the fighting which is still going on, the VRS is trying to halt this aggression by the Croatian Army on the territory of the Srpska republic, the public statement of the information service of the VRS headquarters.

FRY Army Unit Said Operating on Kladusa Front

AU0612174194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The aggressor has continued attempts at armor and infantry attacks with strong artillery and tank support from the occupied regions of the Republic of Croatia, but, following failures, is now shelling the defense lines and villages in the Bihac, Velika Kladusa, Cazin, and Bosanska Krupa municipalities, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center reports.

The enemy's most intensive artillery attacks are being directed at the defense lines and the town centers of Bihac and Velika Kladusa. After artillery preparation using all kinds of artillery in the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia, the aggressor unsuccessfully attempted several infantry assaults with tank support on the roads leading into Bihac from the west along the Vedro Polje-Zegar and Zeljava-Klokot lines.

The aggressor has also attempted several infantry assaults on Velika Kladusa with tank support from the UN protected areas. On the (Alatsa)-Keserovica Brdo line, the attacks have been carried out by units of the 21st Kordun Corps from the occupied parts of Croatia with parts of the 63rd Parachute Brigade of the army of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia.

On the Novakovici-Elezovici line, units of the 39th Banija Corps are operating out of the occupied parts of Croatia and are being supported by tanks. All attacks have been repelled. On the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau and the Bosanska Krupa front, the aggressor has attempted armor and infantry assaults, but the defense lines have remained unchanged. The combat morale of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is stable, its positions are well established, there has been no change to the lines, and so the fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army are resolute in defending the Bihac district, the Press Center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army reports.

Islamic Decree Prohibits Mixed Marriages

95P20221A

[FBIS Media Note] Ismet Spahic, deputy to Mustafa Ceric, head (reis ul-ulema) of the Islamic community in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, declared that a recent decree of the Islamic community in Bosnia barring religiously mixed marriages for Muslim believers is a religious matter, outside the purview of the state. In an interview in the 11 November Zagreb GLOBUS, he explained: "We have indisputable religious axioms.... It is up to us, those who lead the Islamic community, to explain which regulation is God's, and it is up to the individual to decide whether he will accept it or not. The regulation of the Islamic community regarding mixed marriages is clear, and it... has been in existence for 14 centuries. A Muslim man may marry a Christian or a Jew, but he has a duty to raise his children according to Islamic regulations. However, a Muslim woman, through marriage to a non-Muslim, loses her Islamic faith, and there is no further discussion about her in Islam.... The Islamic community is not a state. It does not adopt laws but only interprets religious regulations."

The 22 August issue of the Split FERAL TRIBUNE reported that Reis ul-Ulema Ceric, in an interview, declared mixed marriages a "very sensitive social issue" with "great problems" and that the leadership (Rijaset) of the Islamic community had decided in July to form a committee of Islamic legal experts (ksehika) to study the issue of mixed marriages from all standpoints and to present a draft decree (fetva) to the reis ul-ulema.

According to the FERAL TRIBUNE, this move by the Rijaset came as a result of an article published in ZMAJ OD BOSNE, a newspaper published in Tuzla by the Party of Democratic Action. The article by Vedad Spahic provoked heated polemics in Bosnia by maintaining that children resulting from mixed marriages were "mediocrities, fools, and idiots." FERAL TRIBUNE remarked that while there was strong public criticism of the author, the Islamic community had defended him. In the meantime, FERAL TRIBUNE noted, Vedad Spahic was promoted to chief editor of ZMAJ OD BOSNE, and the topic has become a "hit" in Sarajevo. The Split publication cited Dzemaludin Latic, chief editor of the Bosnian weekly LJILJAN, writing in that publication's 10 June issue: "Mixed marriages are, for the most part, ruined marriages; grave conflicts appear in them and the children from these marriages are confused about their origin." Latic went on to say

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that differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are so great that only if Muslims "enter into matrimony with persons of the same kind" will they "arrive at a society without traumas." FERAL TRIBUNE pointed out that a commentator in the Sarajevo daily OSLOBODJENJE referred to Latic as "our little Zhirinovskiy" whose statements are "proof that racism and fascism already exist among us." Latic cited the Koran in his response, describing in further detail the alleged difficulties and "bitterness" of "impure" marriages.

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British Official Meets With Defense Minister

LD0612195094 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] During his stay in central Bosnia, British Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind expressed concern over, as he put it, the harassment of the blue helmets. He did not mention who harassed them or what the situation was like in Bihac. Upon his return to Zagreb, Rifkind met with Defense Minister Gojko Susak.

[Uidentified correspondent] During the talks with Minister Susak, they discussed the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate, and the implementation of the Washington agreement. Talking to journalists, Minister Susak resolutely denied the reports about the Croatian Army's involvement in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Rifkind said Great Britain would not make a unilateral decision on a possible withdrawal of its soldiers from Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the countries that have their troops in the area must decide on that—if the situation deteriorates over the next few weeks, of course.

[Begin Rifkind recording; in English with simultaneous translation into Serbo-Croatian] There is no doubt that the UN forces are facing many very serious problems in many parts of the country. We must ask ourselves whether it is possible to implement the mandate given to them, and whether this is possible without unnecessary risks. [end recording]

Mr. Rifkind also held talks with [UN] special envoy Yasushi Akashi. He told journalists that one of the most serious problems were the supplies for the blue helmets. If the obstruction of that continues, UNPROFOR would be unable to continue its mission.

Diplomatic Ties Established With Lebanon

LD0612103094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Foreign Ministries in Zagreb and Beirut announced simultaneously that Croatia and Lebanon established diplomatic relations yesterday. Diplomatic ties have been established at the embassy level and in the interests of both states and peoples. The statement concluded: Lebanon and Croatia have agreed to promote cooperation and friendly relations in accordance with the UN Charter.

Croatian, Pakistani Officials Discuss Peacekeepi[illegible]

BK0512141694 Islamabad PTV Television Network in English 1300 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pakistan and Croatia have agreed to intensify diplomatic efforts to speed up peacekeeping attempts by the international organizations.

This understanding was reached at an informal meeting between Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali and the Croatian prime minister, Mr. Nikica Valentic, held in Zagreb. The two sides expressed deep concern over the deteriorating situation in Bihac and said the Bosnian crisis could threaten peace in Europe.

Our representative, Azhar Masud, says Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, who is also chairman of the ICO's [Islamic Conference Organization] contact group on Bosnia, coordinated with the Croatian leaders about the meeting of the contact group scheduled in Geneva tomorrow.

Gen Bobetko: Army 'Ready' To Recover Krajina

AU0612200694 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 29 Nov 94 pp 6-10

[Interview with General Janko Bobetko, chief of the Croatian General Staff, by Hloverka Novak-Srzic and Boris Komadina in Zagreb on 25 November: "The Croatian Army Is Prepared for a Military Solution, Too"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Friday evening [25 November], as Army General Janko Bobetko was receiving us at Croatian Army Headquarters, the news was arriving of the NATO operation over Bihac, and a session of the Defense and National Security Council was held. In such circumstances we would probably not have had an interview had we not arranged it earlier, and were Gen. Bobetko not a man of his word. Although he did not want to speak of all the military and diplomatic activities in which he was actively participating at that time, he did not evade a single question in the interview.

[DANAS] How realistic is the option of Croatian Army intervention against the occupied territories from which Bihac is being attacked if NATO does not intervene, as Dr. Mate Granic has stated?

[Bobetko] The most important thing is that the international forces have finally admitted that the issue is the occupied Croatian territories. The latest statement by the U.S. Government and all the UN institutions has also confirmed that part of Croatia is occupied. Making this definition precise is very important not only in a legal but also in a political way. If something has been occupied, then it must be returned to whoever it belongs to. Therefore, in order to recover the occupied territories, it is necessary for the occupying forces to withdraw, or else we have to recover the land and the homes that have been occupied.

The assessment of when to do so is another matter, primarily of a political nature. Croatia's burning task, both for national unity and the situation in the country, is to recover the occupied part of its territory. Naturally, the question arises here whether or not Croatia is able to do this. Wishes are one thing; possibilities, another.

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[DANAS] In preparing for this military and political task, international relations should always be borne in mind. Why is this so?

[Bobetko] The international forces have interpreted individual operations to liberate our territory almost as aggression, or opposing the peaceful option of reintegrating these areas into the legal and political system of the Croatian state. This is no longer the case, however, and the Croatian parliament has made the decision on how long UNPROFOR's [United Nations Protection Force] mandate can last. After this expires, it is normal that part of the territory be recovered. It is up to me to say whether the Croatian Army is prepared for this task. It would be immodest for us to say in advance that it will be easy, that it is a piece of cake, and so on. The serious political and military answer would be: Croatia has prepared for this task.

This task will start when it is politically assessed that the situation both in the country and abroad is the most appropriate. The forces that have occupied this territory are no longer in a position to prevent us from carrying it out. I can say that this is quite certain, and I have all the arguments to support this statement. When this will be—a month earlier or two months later—is a question of tactical and other considerations. The most important thing is that there is no longer any question as to whether the Croatian Army can do it.

[DANAS] U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith used to say that the Croatian Army was not up to this task.

[Bobetko] I know Mr. Galbraith personally, and I think he is a wise man and a good diplomat, but in saying this he went a bit too far, since he is not familiar with the situation and cannot be considered competent to make such statements. I took this statement of his more like a little political venture by an otherwise model diplomat. Too much attention should not be paid it, because the most important thing is that it is not true. I believe that after the Croatian Army exercise "Poseidon '94," Mr. Galbraith also saw the real picture of the power of the Croatian Army. Whether Croatia will rush into war headlong, without considering the balance of powers, the political moment, or its allies, is another matter. However, I claim that the Croatian Army is capable of carrying out that task!

[DANAS] What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the NATO air strikes against the areas from which Bihac is being attacked?

[Bobetko] The most important thing is that they have started, that NATO did not stop at verbal threats. NATO's potential is huge. After all, they have not had a single military operation of this kind since World War II. It is only with this strike that they have justified their existence, since their main task is to prevent aggression, or, better, to punish aggressors wherever they appear. Since there is no longer a dilemma as to who the aggressor is and who the victim is, since the latest Serbian attacks have proved this diplomatic and political rhetoric to be false, it was up to NATO either to react or to show the world that its time has passed, and that, after the fall of socialism, it is not capable of passing its historical examination.

NATO is a powerful organization, and I think that with these strikes it has established itself as a world need, and as a force necessary to maintain world peace. NATO is not carrying out these tasks out of sentimentality, inclination, or anything like that; they are simply its organizational and political task. This is why NATO was created. How these operations are going to continue in the Bihac area remains to be seen, but it is very important in both the political and the military-strategic sense that they have finally struck the Serbs.

We have pointed out to the world that the borders should be controlled, that the aggressor should be punished, and that the sources from which they threaten and destroy material and spiritual goods should be destroyed. If NATO has taken on this obligation—which seems to be the case—then we are heading toward a solution to this problem. The way Karadzic and his lot reacted, in such an impudent way [passage incomplete as published] this all-out war between Croatia and Serbia without the intervention of international forces. Would that suit the Serbs?

[Bobetko] A rash act on the part of Croatia would suit the Serbs because they would again be able to justify two things in the same way: The first is that Croatia does not want a peaceful solution, because it made a peaceful solution impossible; and, second, that Croatia is the aggressor because it is readying its army and opposes peaceful solutions; and it should be to blame for everything—and in such a situation they could extend the war as the only way out of their situation, transfer the responsibility to Croatia, and thus politically compromise it.

[DANAS] Has the concept of the development of the Croatian Army been completely defined, and what is it based on?

[Bobetko] The concept of an army is always a process; it is not a static norm. The Croatian Army is in the process of construction. Technical equipment and weapons determine the degree and directions of its development and improvement. The latest exercise on Dugi Otok island showed that Croatia is at the level at which it is able to perform in joint exercises. Namely, it is believed that the navy and the air force are the more technical forms of the armed forces in any country, including the most developed. If you can hit the target at 40 kilometers, then it is quite an achievement. At any rate, whoever you hit knows very well what it means.

The Croatian Army is highly developed, though we are aware that we need many more things. However, we do have the most important element: the high morale of the people—and not only the troops but every Croatian

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person as well. Vukovar was defended with very poor means and much improvisation, which is what many people cannot understand. Each and every means is useful; it depends on who uses it. We have preserved national courage, unity, determination, self- confidence, and firmness. We know that other armies had all the technical equipment and yet could be destroyed in five days. Just remember World War II, in which armies with thousands of tanks were defeated. The issue is not only this weapons aspect; our homeland war has shown that another dimension is important, which saved Croatia: It is the national aspect, which was not only present among members of a certain party, but in the depths of the soul of the Croat. If it had not been present, we would not have been able to withstand all this.

[DANAS] You mentioned Vukovar. There has been much polemicizing in the newspapers as to why it fell.

[Bobetko] I think there was a group that, in a petty political way, broke the symbol of the Croatian resistance and the defense of its sovereignty, which is Vukovar. Every historical analysis will prove that the three months of fighting in Vukovar created the time and space for Croatia to organize, partially arm, and put up the resistance that was needed in other parts. If we had not had those three months, the front line would not have been where it is today but probably somewhere near Zagreb.

Vukovar has a place in history. I said in Djakovo at the ceremony marking the anniversary of Vukovar that Vukovar has to be the connecting tissue of our national being and that we must not allow any disunity, and that the position of each of the people of Vukovar would be precisely determined. The worst thing now is to make divisions according to who deserves more credit. Someone has skillfully tossed in this disunity to shatter our political unity, so that we become victims of ourselves. I think the people of Vukovar realized this, and recognized these political speculators.

Among the intriguers who tried to bring disunity among the people of Vukovar and throughout Croatia there was Labrador. However, it is more important that we deal with the people who were part of either Labrador or some other KOS [Yugoslav Counterintelligence Service] organization and are still among us—particularly in our secret police—than with the Labrador members who are already being tried. No one prevented us from selecting 1,000 experts and training them for our intelligence police. Instead, we assigned many key positions to former KOS members, who found their way around very soon, and were well aware of their main task. They did perform it—not against those who work against the interests of Croatia; instead, they were after the pillars of the new Croatian state: the true fighters of the homeland war.

[DANAS] What is your comment on Gen. Budimir's statement that the Croatian Army is headed by non-experts?

[Bobetko] This gentlemen should have been imprisoned a long time ago. It is strange that such adventurers can state such things, but it seems that times are good for those who fish in troubled waters to assemble to create an the atmosphere in which it would seem that everything is uncertain in Croatian society, everything is suspicious, and no one is right. This is the greatest danger. This is precisely where the forces that should have been held to account long ago come in.

As far as this man is concerned, I must say that it is a miracle that he can be a general. Through the area that he was defending, Glina-Vidosevac, five tanks entered, and he had received 760 anti-tank mines with fuses for educational purposes, although he is a former officer and engineer! The entire Pokuplje area fell and the gentleman has still not answered for it! He will, though. The action of the 102nd Brigade ended with seven people jumping into the Kupa River in order to save their lives. The operation for which this man was responsible was not prepared. On the contrary, there was a breakthrough. We lost men and 10 tanks, that fell into the hands of the Chetniks without a single shot being fired.

There were so many casualties that those in charge, who should have investigated it all, sent to Budimir's command a medical technician and a psychologist. Instead of performing expert analysis on the ground, they did not move from his command post, and their report—which, unfortunately, the TV also issued—said that all this was not a military failure!

Therefore, the Croatian people were lied to. However, there are documents covering all this, and although we do not now have the time to deal with such things—because we would also have to enter into the mutual settling of accounts—this gentleman will eventually have to go to court and be held criminally responsible for these dead people who had to jump into the cold Kupa, because he is the one who was responsible for the operation. He will also have to say what his statement to Gen. Tus meant, when he said he would pleasantly surprise them. He did surprise them, but at the expense of the Croatian people instead of his own. When the war is over, he and people like him will be asked what they were doing, because they were not working in the interest of Croatia. The easiest thing is to attack, but the time will come when they will be held to account.

[DANAS] During your stay in the United States, how did U.S. military experts assess the power of the Croatian Army? Were you welcomed, and what do you expect of the military agreement with the United States that [Defense] Minister Susak is to sign later in the month?

[Bobetko] This is great recognition for Croatia. America is a world power and a military power, and the education and expert training of military personnel is very important to us. Naturally, we do not think we can keep up with U.S. technological developments, nor is it necessary—but the Croatian Army cannot do without technical knowledge and broadly educated officers,

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particularly for certain command positions. Moreover, this agreement also means the recognition of the Croatian state, which the United States wishes to help both in a political and military way.

U.S. generals asked me, from the military point of view, how we managed to hold out in the homeland war, in which we defended the longest front line of democracy in this part of the world bare-handed, unarmed—and still managed to create our own army within such a short time. They have a complete picture of what our units look like and what we can do. The answer was: If we had not had a developed national consciousness and a sense of responsibility that said it was a matter of to be or not to be, then no military advantage or doctrine would have saved us.

Naturally, we also discussed the situation in Bihac. I pointed out that it will be precisely in Bihac that the Washington Agreement will either pass or fail, as well as the Security Council decision on a protected town and all the principles that the world has proclaimed. Asked how much time would be needed to resolve the situation around Bihac, I said about 10 days, and things are going precisely in that direction.

[DANAS] What consequences will the U.S. decision on the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina have? That is, their withdrawal from the international forces that monitor the embargo?

[Bobetko] First it should be said that the victim and the aggressor cannot be made equal. What international law, what document says that those attacked have no right to defend themselves? We have been exposed not only to occupation but also to genocide, for three and a half years now, just like the Muslim people. We have not even counted how many of our people were killed, and yet we are still discussing how many angels can dance on top of a needle.

The principle of self-defense and guarding one's territory are fundamental and inalienable rights, and imposing the embargo is a law invented to make that impossible. Naturally, if you are going into aggression, conquering, and destroying other people's property, it is another thing. However, self-defense is primarily a human right. No one is selling us weapons yet. We cannot import them And if the embargo had been lifted earlier, hundreds of lives would have been saved.

[DANAS] Since, like President Tudjman, you took part in the anti-fascist struggle, what is your comment on Mr. Tudjman's letter to the parliamentary chairman in which he tells him to organize a committee for celebrating the anti-fascist fighting?

[Bobetko] If the entire world, particularly the members of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II, commend us on our resistance to fascism, why would we be the ones to question this bright moment in our history? This is not a political position; it is a historical truth. What would have happened to Dalmatia and Istria if the Croats had not liberated their country by themselves? Who has the right to deny this at present? I therefore fully support President Tudjman's initiative.

[Box 1, p 8]

What Did Tus Do in 1992?

[DANAS] The increasingly frequent theses that the Croatian Army could have liberated the entire territory of Croatia as early as in 1992, as Gen. Tus claims, have caused dilemmas in the public. How realistic are they?

[Bobetko] There are some very irresponsible statements by certain people who have no right to cause the Croatian people doubt. We know exactly what our position was and what we were able to do. In 1992, Croatia could not have done that, not because it did not want to or because it was not necessary! It did not have the potential or the organization, and it had many people in the wrong places.

Such statements are merely a cover for those who did not do their part of the job the way they should have. Realistically speaking, the truth is different. I am a live witness, and I do not want to be personal, but I think that many of those who say it now bear a great responsibility for what could have been but was not done in Croatia. It was not possible to liberate Croatia, but it was possible to capture a couple of Chetnik caps. Therefore, many of these statements are irresponsible and unacceptable, and no one has the right to cause the Croatian people to doubt. We know precisely where we were, what we had, and what 1992 was like—as we do now. We must take everything into account. I do not support rash statements, least of all questions about someone's having been able but not wanting to do something—which is, in fact, playing with human lives. I would like to confront these people, and ask them what they were doing, what they had at their disposal, and what the situation was like in 1992.

[Box 2, p 10]

KOS Has Organized Three Attempts on My Life

[Bobetko] I realize only now where the three attempts on my life were organized. One was in Imotski, and the others in Gruda and at Orahov Dol. I now know who was providing the information on my movements, where an entire KOS network was. Their man was even appointed chief of the military police, and he was supposed to disable my car. If my little informant had not crawled to my command post and told me this, I would not be sitting here with you today. In the morning I had this military police chief arrested.

Therefore, there is a KOS network that has not been fully destroyed. As a man of responsibility, I would like to point out that Croatia must get rid of it. Croatia must have its own Croatian intelligence police. Since this was

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a very well-conducted organization, which acted precisely in accordance with the development of the political situation—and its main task was to shatter the unity of the Croatian people by defaming people and weakening the state from within—Croatia can only be defended by clean-handed people. I know this very well, and I know that those who defended it and who are still defending it did not count on any position or rank. With not many weapons, they defended Croatia with their hearts and their wills.

I want to say that in certain places we must be very strict, because Croatia's interests are at stake. I personally believe it is high time people who have proved their loyalty to Croatia and the Croatian people were promoted to certain positions. The intelligence police is too serious a matter for what was happening to be tolerated. Now, after three years of war, we discover that certain people were involved in torturing and harassing people, which is why we must throw them out of the army now. This is a major issue that needs to be cleared up completely, and it is most evident on the question of Vukovar.

It is now clear that the imputations to the people of Vukovar were very skilfully directed. It was known all too well that Vukovar was the symbol of something great, that it was synonymous with the resistance of the Croatian people. We should therefore not stop with Labrador and say we have resolved it. Labrador is a political warning that we did not do the job properly. The war will end. Thousands of people will return from the front lines and ask many unpleasant questions. I am prepared to answer all of them, but I am not sure whether others are prepared to do the same.

[DANAS] Why did Labrador happen to us?

[Bobetko] Labrador would not have happened to us if those who headed the police before Jarnjak had done their job properly. The man who planted bugging devices on me and President Tudjman in 1972 worked for SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs]. His name is Darko Starcevic. Bilic, a KOS member from Split who planted bugging devices on the door of my weekend house, was fired only recently. Until four months ago he worked for the intelligence service in Split.

'Hypocrisy' of Antifascist Initiative Noted

95BA0045A Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 14 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Viktor Ivancic: "Tudjman's Babies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *As long as he does not take a stand on the fascism that has sprung up from under his coattails, Franjo Tudjman, with his lavish ceremonial tendencies' will bear the fate of a grotesque Balkan "antifascist" who is racing after that distant "antifascist" Europe while trampling its "ideological principles" at every step.*

The daily papers noted Tudjman's latest domestic Croatian initiative with typical headlines in the imperative: "Celebrate the Victory Over Fascism!" This could only lead the cynics on duty to display typical naivete: Has fascism in Croatia really been defeated already!

The prominent historian, however, had the events of half a century ago in mind. The statesman in him thus added to the already abundant evidence of the *symbolic* nature of his rule—successfully, as in the past, after all: Prominent opposition leaders are already ripping each other apart over an antifascist bone that the hypocritical leader tossed onto the floor with practiced hypocrisy. They are doing this quite seriously and devotedly, growling and baring their neofascist/antifascist fangs at one another; and so, this will obviously be followed by an extensive parliamentary debate about a phenomenon that in the present circumstances already sounds disgusting enough as a neologism, i.e. "Tudjman's antifascism."

By a historical coincidence, on the same day that, in an open letter, the president of the Republic asked the head of the Assembly to appoint a "committee for commemorating the 50th anniversary of the victory of the antifascist coalition in Europe and the world," the Split city council issued a communique condemning the "provocative chanting of 'Tito, Tito'" at a meeting of the local branch of the Federation of Antifascist Fighters. The city council feels this action has insulted numerous families of victims of Bolshevik terror from 1941 to 1990, "and especially the victims of and participants in the Homeland War." Furthermore, "that kind of provocation is serving the Greater-Serbian aggressor and his assistants"!

The linkage between the figure and career of Josip Broz and the participants in the Homeland War, as a fundamental innovation in the authoritative condemnation by the Split city council, is debatable in at least one detail: It was precisely the "Greater-Serbian aggressors" and "their assistants" who, back in the late 1980's, made a pilgrimage en masse to Belgrade's House of Flowers with sharpened wooden stakes in their hands, and symbolically impaled the "vampire from Dedinje." Now, the confused City Council has reached for a cross and a stick of garlic at the very mention of the vampire's name, thus placing itself "at the service of the Greater-Serbian aggressor" four years later. The problem is that in settling scores with the vampire of antifascism, they have taken in such broad company as the "participants in the Homeland War...."

The fatal coincidence of the two written public statements—both from a position of authority, supreme and executive—and the fact that their mutual contradiction can no longer confuse anyone and is, furthermore, already quite expected and "normal," is actually the best testimony to the true aims of Tudjman's speaking out against fascism. His antifascist views, always and again, are directed only backwards.

This is not the first time the Croatian leader has advocated antifascism in ceremonial form. They say it does

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not hurt, but it is still written down. Even his apology to the Jews, at one point, for his own "scientific wanderings" had the persuasiveness of bad antifascist theater from a European province. However, Franjo Tudjman has never allowed himself to establish a public attitude toward the striking fascistoid excesses in the country that he rules and that is increasingly red with shame because of certain new "rules of conduct." No one even any longer expects to hear the president of this sad country speak out about the mass public destruction of monuments to the antifascist struggle (which he loves so much), about the calls to burn newspapers and books, about the hysterical demonstrations by the Ustasa movement "in the name of Croatia," about the public advocacy of doing away with "Serbs and communists," about the escalation of physical violence and terror against those who are politically objectionable.... In point of fact, the president prefers antifascist toasts!

One can easily recognize, in that choice, unacknowledged guilt but also something more. Tudjman's ceremonial antifascism, like a camouflage blanket, is supposed to cover reality as it truly is, a reality for which he can no longer refuse to accept a good deal of the author's rights. Traditionally, such ceremonies are used to legitimize what is happening behind the ceremonial stage. After all, couldn't the appointment of the committee to commemorate the victory over fascism have been settled via the president's favorite method: quietly and by directive? However, the sense of the pompously published letter has been fully depleted by having the ruler provide an interest-free "antifascist" loan at a carefully chosen moment—moreover, without the slightest establishment of a new corrective for the Croatian political public.

The national leader has strong enough reasons to expose his people to such hypocrisy. Believing in the lasting success of that method, however, means holding on to an illusion more than is consistent with the criteria of common sense. As long as he does not take a stand on the fascism that has sprung up from under his coattails, Franjo Tudjman, with his lavish ceremonial tendencies, will bear the fate of a grotesque Balkan "antifascist" who is racing after that distant "antifascist Europe" while trampling its "ideological principles" at every step.

Since the anniversary has already been brought up, it is not a bad idea to recall that Zvonimir Sekulin, the editor of a Nazi newspaper, was the founder of the Vinkovac HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]; Velimir Bujanec, the head of the Croatian neofascist movement, was the founder of the HDZ Youth in Varazdinske Toplice; Ivo Rojnica, the writer of the racial decrees in the fascist NDH [Independent State of Croatia], was the president's ambassadorial acquisition.... These "Tudjman's babies" in Croatia did not fall from the skies, and now Croatia and its "antifascism" would welcome it if their father would at least not renounce them so quietly and secretively.

"Tudjman's antifascism," however—which ends with looking into the rearview mirror—is a conscious choice. It did not originate solely from the awareness of a statesman who will use occasional cosmetic interventions to portray reality as different from what it is, but rather—and this is much more important—different from what really suits him. That is why even as part of the "European antifascist coalition" of half a century ago, Croatia will wait for some time longer for the "historic moment" to possibly celebrate a victory over the fascism that has crept into its present reality.

That moment will be easy to recognize—for example when, after a historical recapitulation of the figure and career of Josip Broz, one of the city councils in Croatia will utter a public condemnation of one of the meetings at which, for the sake of decoration, "Franjo, Franjo" was chanted—with notoriously fascist messages. Or perhaps there have not been any like that?

Human Rights Activist's Fears of MUP

95BA0045B Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 14 Nov 94 p 12

[Article by Zoran Daskalovic: "They Want To Kill Me!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Dissatisfied with the decision by police authorities in Karlobag to release from jail the policeman who "broke into" his house, after a confession, a well-known Croatian fighter for human rights has demanded that that action be designated an act of terrorism, and is convinced that it was staged and aimed at him and his family.*

A policeman from the Karlobag Police Station, Alen Vignjevic, who on the night between October and November demolished the home in Karlobag of Slobodan Budak, a lawyer and deputy chairman of the Croatian Helsinki Committee, has been released, after confessing to the crime during the investigative procedure. Charges of damaging other people's property were filed against him with the municipal state attorney in Gospic, Boris Zdunic; he could have been sentenced for three months to five years, according to article 132, paragraph 2 of the Croatian Criminal Code.

Having learned about that outcome of the police investigation, Slobodan Budak, in a petition to the investigating judge of the Zupanija Court in Gospic, Pavo Rukavina, requested that as the victim, he be allowed to participate in the investigation and to exercise his legal rights. Specifically, on the basis of the results published so far from the police investigation and from what he has succeeded in learning himself, Budak suspects that the judicial investigating authorities, primarily the police authorities, for reasons as yet unknown, made a facile assumption that this was some sort of isolated action at his own initiative by a 27-year-old policeman, and moreover a person who probably knows nothing at all about Slobodan Budak, and the place, role, and reputation of the entire Budak family in Karlobag ("The school and one street bear the name of my father, the late Divko, a national hero, and the main square is named

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after my late brother Gvozden, not to mention my personal role in the Croatian Spring of 1971, and so forth"). On the other hand, Budak is convinced that this was an act of terrorism aimed at him and his family, and a staged action in which several people participated, and are still participating, and that the police proceedings should be aimed at identifying all the perpetrators, so that criminal proceedings can be started against them.

Constant Threats

Even while the operational police investigation was still under way, immediately after he inspected his demolished house, Budak expressed his suspicion that it was a criminal act of terrorism to the investigating operative of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP]. The reason for such an act of terrorism, in Budak's opinion, is his participation in the TV broadcast "Parliament," in which, among other things, he also spoke about the war crimes committed against seven Serbs in Karlobag, "who were taken from their homes in Karlobag toward the end of October 1991, never to return, while the corpses of at least two of them, found along the road, deep in Velebit, were identified, and buried in Gospic after the court carried out the legal procedures." He also added that he could not rule out the assumption that the real intention was actually to murder him and his family, since every year on the eve of All Saints' Day, almost without exception, they come to Karlobag in order to visit the family graves. This year, quite by accident, because of Slobodan Budak's obligations in the Croatian Helsinki Committee, they did not go to Karlobag those days and did not happen to be in the house on the night of its savage demolition.

The possibility of an intention of killing Budak is supported by the serious threats made against him since back in 1991, when he spoke for the first time about the crime against the seven Karlobag Serbs, but also now after he spoke again publicly about it on Croatian television. Furthermore, Budak has learned that the police have information about the individuals who took the seven Serbs out of their houses in Karlobag, and he also spoke about this during an official visit by a delegation from the Croatian Helsinki Committee to the Croatian MUP to Minister Ivan Jarnjak. He therefore also suspects that Officer Vignjevic is just "one of the last links in an organized criminal chain." He added, "The circumstance that just two or three days before the attack against my house the weekend cottage of Mr. Plavsic, a Croatian citizen of Serbian nationality, which is located in Karlobag (in the Plantaza development), was blown up, which has been kept from the public, and about which the police never informed the owner (who lives in Zagreb), just as in my case, gives grounds for my apprehension that certain powerful forces in our society are behind both events, forces which are able to block and prevent the legal work of police and judicial authorities, in order to protect themselves from being held responsible for crimes committed in the past, primarily war crimes."

"Invaded" Initials

Feeling that there is still a danger that he really will be killed and that with the suspect Alen Vignjevic being at large the traces and evidence about the participants in the "act of terrorism and/or the initiated but uncompleted crime of murdering me" may be destroyed or concealed, Slobodan Budak proposed to the investigating judge that Vignjevic be jailed immediately. He also requested that he be allowed to see the record of the course of the investigation to date, and that he be informed in the future of any investigative action, so that he or his authorized representative could attend it. In addition to having a legal right to this, Budak was also motivated by some controversial, to say the least, steps by the police investigative authorities: from concealing the fact that the perpetrator was a policeman at the Karlobag Police Station in a public communique, through the designation of the act as a "break-in" and not an act of terrorism, to the fact that Budak found out about the demolition of his house from an acquaintance and not from the police, and that the police questioned witnesses without his presence or the presence of persons trusted by him. Furthermore, the police did not inform the public whether it had taken any precautionary measures regarding Vignjevic, or which ones, on the basis of its own regulations, independently of the criminal proceedings. All of this leads Budak to doubt the outcome of the criminal proceedings.

Now the not so small number of threats, and the physical and similar danger to certain non-sympathizers of the current Croatian authorities, especially opponents of the actions and policy of the extremist part of them, which have been publicly recorded, and about which the police are either keeping silent or downplaying them, make Budak's fears seem persuasive. For example, recently FERAL's mention of two cases in which extremist members of the secret services settled scores with former members of the Zagreb Office for Protection of the Constitutional Order was refuted by the MUP in what was at least a dubious way. Without denying that one of them had been beaten and that the wife of the other experienced the same thing, the MUP, in cooperation with VECERNJI LIST, published their full names, even though FERAL had only used their initials, not wanting to endanger them further. That unusual action by the MUP, unusual because police forces in the world almost never publish the identities of former and present members of the secret services, suggests the conclusion that in that way it was deliberately exposing them to additional pressure, so that they would keep silent about everything that had happened to them. Since the two of them, like Officer Vignjevic, are from all indications only pawns in political and other clashes, and are probably aware of the possibility that everything might be blamed on them, it is not difficult to conclude that they will be as silent as the grave, fleeing from public speech like the devil from incense.

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Amnesty for the Criminal

In addition to these and similar actions by the police, the political atmosphere that is originating from the very highest authorities is intensifying not only Budak's suspicions. He himself emphasizes the recent address by President Tudjman to displaced persons in Karlovac, in which he attacked "all sorts of Helsinki committees which score points in the eyes of the world by allegedly fighting for a law-governed state." According to Budak, Tudjman himself is thus focusing "the displaced persons' anger and rage over their extremely difficult situation caused by the Greater-Serbian conquests and their exile from their homes against the Croatian Helsinki Committee, instead of against the Serbian aggressors." An even more drastic position was also previously uttered by Vladimir Seks, and the recent positions of Milan Vukovic, president of the Croatian Supreme Court, and Assembly deputy Drago Krpina that there were no war crimes and criminals on the Croatian side, and could not be, because Croatia was fighting a defensive war in which all means were supposedly allowed, are along the same lines. Budak's and others' positions and visions are completely different: One cannot answer a crime with a crime, and when that happens, it has to be cut off at the root, for the sake of Croatia itself.

Furthermore, for a long time now a campaign has been conducted against the most prominent participants in the Croatian Spring of 1971, among whom Slobodan Budak is also included. Thus, today, after he was exiled for about 20 years and mistreated by the communist authorities because in 1971 he refused to arrest and indict the "Springers," resigning as Zagreb prosecutor, he has been subjected to similar and more drastic tortures, perhaps because he is not renouncing his own and his family's antifascist and Partisan past. Even though he has made his own contribution to the achievement of Croatian national interests, Budak, as well as more and more people like him, has become a bone in the throat of the totalitarians in Croatian government and society, who are no longer shrinking from even the most drastic actions in their ambition to become the sacrosanct masters of Croatia.

Christian Democratic Orientation of HDZ Stressed

95BA0044B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 94 pp 18-20

[Interview with Zlatko Canjuga, chief secretary of the Croatian Democratic Union, by Gordan Nuhanovic; place and date not given: "The HDZ Will Be the Largest Christian Democratic Party in Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Until quite recently exclusively a "professional man," Zlatko Canjuga, 33-year-old history and philosophy teacher, left his job in Croatian schools in Germany to take up the post of chief secretary of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]. Following Pasalic and Radic, this young and still unmarried HDZ-ite who was born in Zagorje seems to have the hard-working enthusiasm the incumbent party needed to run successfully in the third multiparty election in Croatia.

[Nuhanovic] In taking up the post of chief secretary of the HDZ, you have also assumed responsibility in shaping the incumbent party's future. Statements following the Second General Conference of the HDZ notwithstanding, your party still has more the attributes of a movement than of a party in the West European sense.

[Canjuga] It is certainly in our interest to shape the party to suit its Christian Democratic origin, but with a populist emphasis. That is, the foundation of our development was sketched out at the HDZ Conference when consensus was reached that the HDZ is above all a national party unifying all segments of the Croatian population. And those segments include the Croatian peasant, worker, soldier, intellectual, pensioner.... It is natural in that context that members of the HDZ should include people of differing spiritual and political commitments, and it goes without saying that they do not all have the Christian Democratic orientation. In the context of our fight for every person, I think it is very important for us to build two parallel processes. That is, the essential thing is for us to continue to display the attributes of a movement, that is, for us to continue to unify the vital interests of the Croatian population, but to affirm ourselves in a political context as a modern European party. I must tell you that that is how we are perceived by the Union of European Christian Democrats. Yesterday, I was in Brussels at the Commission for Central and East Europe, where on the basis of a report on the situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, on our views of politics, it was established that the HDZ would very soon become a full-fledged member of that union. That is, of course, very important, because in that way we become part of European institutions. And because we are talking about the Christian Democratic orientation, this fact clearly shows that we really have accepted that orientation and want to build on it.

So—above all the Christian Democratic orientation, while at the same time preserving connotations that we represent the entire nation.

In global terms. That is, we must be realistic about it, that Christian Democratic orientation taps the historical source of the Croatian identity.

[Nuhanovic] Nevertheless, some have said that the door is thus being opened to clericalism.

[Canjuga] It is of course those political circles who do not like the HDZ that equate the Christian Democratic orientation with clericalism. As we know, the Radic tradition grew up on Christianity, but never on clericalism. At the same time, the HDZ cannot reject those who think differently, but who accept the HDZ program. We must conduct a real and pragmatic politics, and we

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cannot, nor do we wish to, reject certain Social-Democratic ideas, even liberal ideas, so that we can find a common language, so that we can all become part of a central current of the HDZ.

[Nuhanovic] Zarko Domljan declared at one time, and he was not alone, that there is nothing in the HDZ for someone who is not a Christian Democrat. What is your comment on that?

[Canjuga] If a party truly defines itself as exclusively a Christian Democratic party, I consider that a radicalization of the position. That kind of radicalization in the statements which you mentioned simply leaves people dubious about what will happen to them if they do not have the Christian Democratic orientation. Because we are a large party, we will simply have to reconcile those differences, and that, I admit, will not be an easy job. In the final analysis, that is why we are here.

[Nuhanovic] Your predecessor, Jure Radic, was criticized for not being sufficiently concerned with the party, its structure and organization, resulting in a partial disintegration of the party, that is, the departure of the Manolic-Mesic group to join a new party. A segment of the public has become convinced that the HDZ exists above all through the bodies of government, and that communication at the lower levels is poor and undeveloped.

[Canjuga] I think that in Croatia today that is a general question that can be put to all the parties. I consider it one of my most important duties to reorganize the HDZ Secretariat so that we are better prepared for elections within the party, for life within the party, but also, of course, for the national election. It is important that every member feel the activity of his party, know where the party's program is headed, have a feeling for what the leadership of the HDZ, headed by Dr. Tudjman, is advocating, and at the same time feel that it is getting down to work. It is my opinion that the other parties in Croatia do not exist at all at the level of local chapters, but come down to an elitist group that does more thinking about politics than actually engaging in it. I will be against any political arrogance of power, because the Croatian people will not tolerate that on the part of any government, including that of the HDZ.

[Nuhanovic] The results of other elections have shown that the HDZ has lost certain important cities, like Osijek, Split, and Rijeka, at the same time a segment of the public has referred to the approach of the HDZ to Istria as arrogant.

[Canjuga] First of all, I think there is no reason whatsoever for the HDZ not to get back the cities you have mentioned and that Istria, which I know fairly well, should not become HDZ territory very soon. Where the HDZ committed a lapse in a sense was that it did not show sufficient understanding for certain regional differences and was not sufficiently open. In saying that, I have in mind a still more significant opening up both to all Croatian institutions and also to people, especially young people, who will bring new ideas into the party. In that case, there will be no reason whatsoever for Split, Osijek, and especially Rijeka, and also Istria, not to become a part of the HDZ family.

[Nuhanovic] It seems that you will have to be very subtle....

[Canjuga] Certainly, but subtle in all other areas as well. We cannot play the universalist card, because it is utterly illusory for Dubrovnik, Istria, and Osijek, say, to see things with the same "eyes." It is our goal, then, to take into account all the specific features of Croatia's regions and to relate to them accordingly.

[Nuhanovic] Do you not think that the HDZ has confused those postulates of yours in its approach to the region of Istria?

[Canjuga] I do not think so. The HDZ approached Istria from the standpoint of the entire state, but then it turned out that in Istria there nevertheless are groupings which think of the Croatian state quite differently. We today have charges that up to now the HDZ has been conducting a centralist policy in Istria, which is nonsense, because that is not in the interest of the HDZ at all, that leads to disunity. It is in our interest to understand the particular features of the citizen of Istria, to understand what he wants from Croatia. I believe that it will soon turn out that the present leadership in Istria, supposedly offering some kind of separateness, is making use of political demagogy, because at the level of the state they are not able to solve some of the basic problems of the individual Istrian. Recently, the people in Istria have been paying very close attention to what the HDZ is offering, and this is really being taken into account.

[Nuhanovic] But it seems that the people there are also listening to their Italian neighbors.

[Canjuga] I would not say that. I think that the people of Istria have always been turned toward the Croatian idea, as shown by the history of Istria. But a part of the IDS [Istrian Democratic Conference], I would say, wants to turn the Istrian away from the Croatian state.

[Nuhanovic] How many members does the HDZ have today in Croatia?

[Canjuga] About 550,000.

[Nuhanovic] In view of the size of the population and the fact that in Germany, for instance, the two leading parties share approximately 1.8 million members, the number which you mention is pretty impressive.

[Canjuga] That is true, and it shows that the Croats are nevertheless politically active. When it becomes a member of the Union of European Christian Democrats, the HDZ, along with the Christian Democratic Union, will become the largest Christian Democratic party in Europe. And that will be very important.

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[Nuhanovic] A quite recent poll of 38 deputies of the HDZ in the Croatian Assembly on matters related to privatization has given rise to speculation that there will be a new round of the battle between the so-called technomanagers and radical circles within the HDZ. It has even been interpreted abroad that this is a kind of power play in the party.

[Canjuga] It is clear that even in Europe some people would like to see the HDZ swerve into some kind of right-wing position. The Second Conference of the HDZ showed that the immense majority of the party favors continuity of Croatian politics, but it also showed that there are elements of the so-called left, and even those who would solve certain problems by more radical methods. But I interpret this poll differently, as an indicator of the HDZ's seriousness on matters of privatization, and here there were no elements that would favor disunity of the party. But it should likewise be taken into account that all the Croats are not in the HDZ, so that if you want to impute to the HDZ amorality in the process of the transformation, this is altogether inappropriate, because how in that case are you to represent the situation in certain cities where the HDZ does not have a majority, or, for example, in Istria?

[Nuhanovic] What is the meaning of your recently stated assessment that "it is time for new people" in the HDZ? There were reactions to the effect that this is an overture to creation of a new stratum of malcontents.

[Canjuga] I was referring to the process of bringing in younger people, with no further implication than that. That people should come into the HDZ who are utterly free of any burden of the past, who will try to apply in Croatia the criteria of the living standard of West Europe. And then the elderly can serve us as advisers and as critics.

Reasons for HSS Members Joining HDZ

95BA0044A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 94 pp 16-17

[Article by Dr. Josip Stojanovic: "Why We Radicites Are Going Over to the HDZ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The familiar idea about national reconciliation of ustashi and partisans has been incorporated into the program of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]. How realizable is it?

Up until World War II the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party] was a political majority in Croatia. During the war, there was an ideological stratification of the HSS membership into the central and passive part and two wings, the ustasha and the partisan. The wings of the HSS fluttered away, each to its own flock. The larger passive segment abandoned political initiative entirely to the ustashi and partisans in the NDH [Independent State of Croatia].

If we have adopted the idea of national reconciliation of all Croats, which is essential to the state's survival (we need not kiss one another), then it is logical that Radicism in the HDZ should become a factor holding together the right-wingers and left-wingers. If we accept the views of Vinko Nikolic, who greatly doubts that it is possible to reconcile the two extremes of World War II, then the need for Radicism in the HDZ is clear in and of itself.

Can historical events be compared?

Just as beauty is beyond compare, so historical events cannot be compared either. It is not possible to compare the political atmosphere in the time of Starcevic, Radic, and Macek with that of Tudjman, much less set them in competition with one another. We all live in different economic, cultural, and historical atmospheres of our own times. Starcevic and Radic in theirs, Macek and Krnjevic in theirs, and Tudjman in ours. Our generation endured communist torture for 50 years, both during the war and after the war, and that is now behind us once and for all. Only its tag ends have remained, transformed into social democracy, but not the social democracy of the Western countries, but of the former countries of real socialism.

Those two social democracies cannot be equated, because we are dealing with quite different advocates of similar ideas, with fundamental political, economic, social, cultural, and other programs that have differing origin.

The traditional constitutional democracy in Croatia was victorious in 1990 in the first democratic multiparty elections.

There is no dispute that in Europe's altered overall political relations constitutional democracy will exist and will have an impact on Croatia's political program. That fundamental political program has been incorporated into the Croatian national identity.

What if...?

The 90-year continuity of the HSS should quite logically have been a guarantee to the Croatian people that communism would be removed from Croatia's political scene. But the fatigue of the biological and political "material" in the emigre community was obvious, and that is the real truth. We young HSS enthusiasts in the homeland did not know them, and we overestimated them. The old oak was left without branches or new shoots, it rotted, and it withered. But politics is not forgiving. A high price is paid for every mistake. The HSS made a historic mistake in the 1989/90 period—it did not gather the necessary strength for a decent renewal of the party in the homeland! Whoever is first wins, and that was Franjo Tudjman and his HDZ. Why deny them that? It is neither honest nor moral to deny them that victory. It is honest and moral to point to lapses, but also to obligations to correct the shortcomings and lapses that have occurred, to offer the best program that a democratic society and law-governed state can

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devise. It is base, immoral, and unfounded to throw mud on other people or parties. The unavoidable standards of civilized behavior are necessary if the game of politics is to be played fairly.

I joined the HDZ very advisedly and responsibly in order to assist the reaffirmation and nurturing of Radicism in the leading constitutional and democratic party of Croatia—the HDZ. Playing dirty and rabble-rousing without arguments are alien to my political and humanistic convictions. A contest of ideas and programs is always fruitful, and I support it. I am certain, therefore, that I will achieve in the HDZ everything I was unable to do in the HSS.

In the HSS, I was frustrated in various ways, from lack of comprehension and various prohibitions all the way to expulsion. The time of illusions, idealism, and sacrifice has been superseded in the time of democracy. That is why logically, then, after I was expelled from the party, I had to ask myself: What can a Croat do who is a patriot, a constitutionalist, a fighter for democracy and for economic, cultural, and national prosperity? Not what he wants, but what he is able to do. Further, I reflected, does Croatia have an abundance of creative people? Does it have a shortage of them? How are they to be identified and activated? What is Croatia's wealth in people, in fighters for the freedom, democracy, and independence of Croatia? Does wealth lie in the number of political parties and the instability of the political scene, or does our future lie in a convergence of political parties and their programs? Can we forgive one another, can we talk to one another, can we move closer together? Are we moving today toward the community of which Pope John Paul II has reminded us? Can we come to one another in the interest of a strong Croatia, man to man, party to party, region to region, and all of us to Croatia?

The time for national euphoria and creation of the state is behind us. We are now living in a time of realism and reason, careful and sober thought. We cannot go on indefinitely attacking a man, a party, or the president of the state, nor is that proper for a real patriot and fighter for a sovereign Croatia. We must all strive for democracy, for discourse, for renewal of true values, especially moral values.

In the democratic context, a society must not be taken in by frustrated political ambitions of individuals who have an opportunity to manipulate the masses.

I became acquainted with such people in the HSS. The style of their political activity, especially toward the incumbent party, gave evidence of intolerance and an apolitical attitude. The problems in the HSS are complicated, from those already mentioned, and then the lack of real programs and people to carry out the programs, to change and conflicts between generations. The oldest HSS-ites, contemporaries of Macek and Krnjevic, displayed an unforgivable naivete in their attempt to inaugurate the party's political icons as Croatia's lasting values for the present generation of HSS-ites. The young HSS-ites, who actually are somewhat bolder and impatient, realized how absurd it was to impose a nostalgia for historical icons, because we are living under altogether different historical circumstances. That conflict is not over in the HSS, and it will be very harmful to Croatia.

Drago Stipac, the president, bears the greatest responsibility for the situation that has come about in the party. It would be utterly irresponsible, then, to neglect to analyze his role in the HSS. The party's expansion during his three-year term is a fact. But how great are his objective accomplishments? Today, it is clear to many in the party that Drago Stipac's activity has been negative for both him and us. He did not object to the party being run by individuals thirsty for power for whom Radicism is not a goal, but a means of taking power. His ideas, like those about the change of political direction (to whose advantage?), about political space in Croatia being filled (but not conquered!) with unclear political views concerning Croatia's fateful moment (the question of Maslenica), and then his consent to the journalist's question ("... certainly a federation in Croatia for the Serbs..."), his two-year preoccupation with central Bosnia, without mentioning Baranja, Banija, and Slavonia during that time, his leaving the Croatian Assembly, and we need not go on, have been negative, and we are seeing the consequences today.

In the four years that have passed since Croatia became independent, since the HSS was revived in Croatia, the myth of Stjepan Radic has come alive once again. Unfortunately, Drago Stipac was not up to that greatness. He has not written anything of serious political import. He does not have his own patriotic, constitutional, economic, and cultural program. It has all been one great improvisation. Improvisation, voluntarism, amateurism, political passivity, peacemaking, and pacifism during Croatia's war, they have taken the party back to its inglorious history between 1941 and 1945. Stipac was not interested in the up-to-date organizational and political activity of the individual or of the body of the party. He was bothered by the intellectuals, but not by those members of the Presidium who advocated an open coalition with the left-wing opposition parties, hoping for a return to power. It is no surprise, then, that the HSS was among the first to support the regionalism of the Istrian Democratic Conference [IDS], and it would be of equal support to the regionalism of Dalmatia, Medjimurje, or Slavonia and Baranja. The shapers of that kind of policy in the HSS under the baton of Drago Stipac and his "worshipers until the first opportunity" are no secret. The naive members of the party have the role of "sheep to be fleeced." These people are making good use of that sincere love and devotion to the HSS, and the price is being collected.

Such a situation in the HSS is welcome to many people. We in the party who revived it had not learned the tricks of deceit, lies, and intrigues. We were unprotected and suitable for manipulation to maintain the power of

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individuals. If the party's rank and file had access to all the material evidence, for example, the way in which the party's convention was organized on 19 July of this year, they would have been horrified at the kind of democracy their leadership is building.

That is why it is utterly clear how disappointed I am not in the HSS, but actually in Drago Stipac and his closest collaborators, who are still out to get him. I proposed innovations in the party with full support of the Executive Committee. We wanted to facilitate a flow of new ideas in order to reaffirm the original principles of the doctrines of the Radic brothers to the rank and file. We wanted new programs to be adopted and the party to be brought up-to-date. Stipac was not interested in innovations and had no desire to carry them out. He was completely satisfied with the historical program that existed, he took the view that it should not be changed or updated. Overly proud of the election results of the HSS in 1939, he told Tudjman that he would never attain it. It was crystal clear to me that Stipac is living in a historical time and cannot live in the present. We are living in the present, in Tudjman's time. For those of us in the party who are somewhat younger in age, the basis of activity was reduced, and all of this in the name of some high politics which none of us in the expanded membership of the Executive Committee could accept or understand.

There is a sound constitutional core in the HSS, Radic's core. But, unfortunately, it is fluid and not organized for advancing itself through positions in the party. The political game is being run by well-organized individuals around the Bjelovar group, which has found even Stipac himself, until yesterday their protector, to be in the way. This group accepts the traditional HSS left. It is preoccupied with taking power from the HDZ, but the membership still does not know what kind of state it wants or what kind of power by whom. The threat to Croatia represented by the HDZ is emphasized by intrigues and outright insinuation.

I began an open, honest, and legitimate fight for the Croatian national interest in the HSS. The entire membership of the HSS, especially the creators of the dirty personnel games, will have to face the extremely unpleasant fact that they share some of the responsibility for the stratification and split within the HSS. Potentially, the richest party is in a disastrous financial state thanks to the disorder of the central headquarters, which is really absurd.

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Milosevic Proposes 'Inter-Balkan Federation'

AU0612175894 Skopje MIC in English 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The initiative of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic for the formation of an inter-Balkan federation, which would be made up of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Greece, in the first phase, received strong publicity in the Belgrade press yesterday.

The newspaper POLITIKA, according to MAKFAKS, dedicated the center spot on the first page to Milosevic's appeal, calling upon the writing of the Greek newspaper KATIMIRENI.

An inter-Balkan federation, according to POLITIKA, would not be an only state creation, but an international organization for economic and political cooperation, which would encompass "Bulgaria, and perhaps Romania" in the second phase.

Pointing out that the Skopje leadership did not take a concrete stand as regards this question, POLITIKA, calling upon KATIMERINI, writes that Milosevic is prepared to support Kiro Gligorov's stand in the dispute with Greece, not to change the name Macedonia.

Ethnic Parties, Interethnic Relations, Democracy

95BA0039A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 4 Nov 94 Special Supplement pp XV-XVI

[Article by Mirce Tomovski: "Minuet for Nationalism and Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The trouble caused by nationalism to the state is just as great as is the responsibility of respecting ethnic rights which is one of the most important features of a civil society*

We shall probably remember, in the large team of observers of the presidential and parliamentary elections, Mr. Lambert Kelstermans, member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Quite charmingly and quite unconventionally, he offered his congratulations for the successfully completed elections, saying that "after a single week I feel like a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. This means that a good atmosphere prevails in this country, political as well as social...." Kelstermans also greatly complimented the "splendid new democracy...," concluding by quoting Theodore Roosevelt: "Keep your eyes aimed at the stars but remember to keep your feet on the ground."

This statement is as much a support for the democratic traditions in Macedonia as it is useful to those who run the state. The most important point for the state and Macedonian democracy is that of the powerful passions related to religious feelings. That is why the recently concluded elections marked the beginning of great temptations for the ruling coalition—to shift the thrusts of nationalisms—Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, Serbian—within the new democratic features of coexistence, as a project of multinational democracy. The electoral platforms of the political parties indicated that nothing new is being demanded. However, it also confirmed the fact that nationalism is still believed to be a relevant ideology to be applied in everyday policy. As to the nationalistic option based on the view of "Macedonia for Macedonians" or the dreams of a "federalized Macedonia and a Greater Albania," these were not accepted by the people, by the citizens. This has left a bitter taste of nationalistic euphoria.

Also left was the impression that the formula for a united life, that was original and typical of Macedonian traditions, begins to appear inadequate if we merely cite it as an answer to the complex, stratified spectrum of circumstances and the expanded feelings and demands for national identity and recognition. Evidently, this policy is one of reconciling irrational nationalistic complaints. However, it also indicates the impossibility of politics of keeping these complaints away from daily politicization. That is why we face a major political challenge of the integral formulation of a project that would articulate the increased interests of the ethnic groups. In the course of the electoral campaign, obviously there was an avoidance of giving more radical answers to the problems that will increasingly pressure the overall political atmosphere in the state. Above all, the largest number of these problems made their way via the party electoral platforms and the speeches by party leaders, or else through the inevitable party contacts.

The constitutional view of Macedonia as a civil state earned the support of the voters despite the proposed concept about a national state. This erected a number of various obstacles. Real life is rich in circumstances in which it is necessary to assert Macedonian national dignity as a factor that calls for no compromise: simply, it is either accepted or rejected. The difficulty created by nationalism concerning the state is as great as the responsibility to respect ethnicity as one of the most important features of civil society. For example, there are many temptations triggered by the established climate according to which that which is of any value must advance. In other words, the political, scientific, cultural, and business values, regardless of the national coloring of the individuals supporting them, should lead toward universal values. Locking them within national boundaries and exclusivity blocks them. Another negative connotation is developed by limiting their expansion as a result of the ethnic affiliation of the participants.

Obviously, interethnic democracy under Macedonian conditions is particularly sensitive. It demands a degree of skill on the part of the state and political wisdom such as to ensure democracy and guarantee the rights of all citizens, including the ethnic groups—Albanians, Turks, Romanies [Gypsies], Vlachs, and Serbs. This will not be easy to develop as a daily practice, given the conditions

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of the burden imposed by the electoral campaign label of opposition as "national treason" to the current system, and the argument that the Macedonian should not feel superior to anyone else living in the state for the reason that he is a Macedonian and for citizens who are not Macedonians to feel less valuable for that same reason! Furthermore, we must always bear in mind the major dioptry of the nonparliamentary opposition and its "public" reaction.

The interethnic balance in Macedonia is exceptionally sensitive. Since the opposition has refused the parliament's institutional services, the parliament has now acquired a richer ethnic folklore. There even have developed nuances among the Albanian representatives—in addition to the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], we now have the NDP [People's Democratic Party] and the independents, headed by Arban Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci. The complex political and national baggage of the Albanian parties in Macedonia, with all its nuances, can now fit into the parliamentary vessel. We are now awaiting the fine play of balancing changes. First among them, for example, is the "scandal" of initiating a parliamentary session in Albanian. This "ploy" was already used by Hisni Sakiri, the representative from Kumanovo, who gained "historical glory" for this "brave deed." It was precisely this that marked the beginning of an entire series of demands aimed at establishing the "democratic position of the Albanians in Macedonia," starting with the use of language in the central political institution, the parliament, followed by all of its variables at the different levels of education, from "dissatisfaction with the scope of intellectual, cultural, scientific, and information space" to "representation in state mechanisms" and heavy political demands for the "state-building attribute of the Albanian people in Macedonia, the federalization of the Macedonian state, and its structuring on the basis of a multiethnic system." Whereas all such views are political aspects of the national involvement of Albanian parties in Macedonia and their representatives in parliament, something very concrete develops—the founding of an Albanian university in Tetovo, which cannot be satisfied with some kind of irrational answer consisting of general formulas. This requires a rational step, considering that after a few years the development of a pedagogical academy has now been completed. Also in this area is the conflict between the concept of using all means for the faster emancipation of ethnic groups and "lowered criteria" for their education and instruction, and the view that "no one should dare ignore them."

At least according to its leader, Erdogan Sarac, the Democratic Party of Turks did not expect to enter parliament because of the "resolutions included in the electoral law and the law of electoral districts." The fact that now there is a representative of the Turks in parliaments is considered "of great importance to the stability of the democratic development of the country." This is considered an opportunity for discussing the problems which interest the ethnic Turks. Although their volume does not meet that of the Albanians, nonetheless a remedy will have to be provided to the problems in the areas of education, culture, information, and economic underdevelopment of the areas inhabited by Turks, the practices of the state administration, and so on. Also included is the delicate problem earmarked at the Center Zupa—the instruction of the children of Macedonian Muslims in the Turkish language!

If Dragisa Miletic, the leader of the Serbs in Macedonia, were to become a member of parliament, he would very soon repeat what he said during the electoral campaign or in party announcements. Furthermore, the demands of the Democratic Party of Serbs are a reality that must be considered. This includes an overall dissatisfaction with the political position of the Serbs, the problems of education, cultural life, information, religious services in the Serbian language in "Serbian churches and monasteries," etc.

The electoral campaign also indicated a series of demands formulated by the other ethnic groups in Macedonia. According to public announcements, the League of Vlachs promoted its own interests in its contacts with the Alliance for Macedonia. The PCER [Party for the Full Emancipation of Romanies] raised in the campaign a number of specific demands related to the emancipation of the Romanies...; the same was done by the Bosnians and the Muslims....

Democracy in Macedonia is based above all on successfully passing the test in interethnic relations. Its stability will depend on the specific stipulations in that area of ethnic awareness. That is why several points are important to Macedonian national health. This has led to a search for the type of mechanisms to organize the area for the democratic utilization of national demands and for the most extreme nationalistic aspirations (understandably, this excludes those prohibited by law) and their possibility of resolution by the institutions of the system. It is expected that the Macedonian parliament will soon become such a place, for it has been confirmed that rigidity in an interethnic environment is fatal. Rejecting it in resolving ethnic problems provides conditions for the development of the standards of the dialogue, and "the cult of secular values, citizenship, tolerance, rationality, and developing of variety and consensus...." If this develops in daily practice there will be fewer chances that nationalism would lead to conflicts and wars, and an increase in the chances that nationalism would abandon the area of politics and find its place in the area of private and personal interests of individuals within our country.

[Box, p XVI]

Demands of the PDP, NDP, and the Thaci-Xhaferi Faction

Status of the Albanian people in Macedonia and their position as a state-forming people; structuring of Macedonia as a multiethnic state;

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Federalization of Macedonia, a two-chamber parliament; decentralization of power;

Dissatisfaction with the view adopted at all levels of education;

Establishment of an integral educational system in the Albanian language;

An Albanian university in Tetovo; organizing six departments for the new school year;

Dissatisfaction with representation in the administration of the state, the seniority system in the ARM [Army of the Republic of Macedonia], the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and in diplomacy;

Unsatisfactory cultural, scientific, intellectual, and information opportunities;

Lack of representation of Albanians in cultural manifestations and festivals;

A demand for autonomy and withdrawal from the institutions of the system;

An historical political treaty between Macedonians and Albanians.

[Box, p XVI]

Demands of the Democratic Party of Serbs

The parliament, the government, and the president of the Republic must amend the Constitution of Macedonia in order to resolve the legal status of the Serbs in Macedonia and their equality with the other ethnic groups;

Amending the electoral laws, thus enabling the Serbs to have their own representatives in parliament;

Establishing church communities in seven areas in Macedonia and church services in the Serbian language (regions and churches are specifically listed) and organizing in Skopje an archbishopric by the Serbian Orthodox Church;

Organizing a theater and a cultural and educational society in the Serbian language;

Establishing secondary schools for the children of Serbs;

Governmental aid in the publication of a weekly newspaper;

Television and radio programs in the Serbian language;

A Serbian reading room and libraries in Kumanovo and Skopje;

Setting up a foundation for the protection of monuments of culture and historical events of the Serbian people in the same areas and, especially, preservation of the Zebrenjak memorial.

[Box, p XVI]

Demands of the Democratic Party of Turks

Changes in the electoral laws enabling the Turkish ethnic group to have its representative in parliament;

Resolution of existing problems in terms of the education of the children of Turkish nationality—basic and secondary (increasing the number of classes and improving educational conditions in the schools);

Expansion of cultural, scientific, and information conditions for the promotion of the national identity of Turks in Macedonia (expanding the radio and television programs, converting BIRLIK into a daily...);

Personnel representation of Turks in state services and leading positions in public enterprises.

NBM Karic Bank Branch in Skopje Closes

95BA0042B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 21 Oct 94 p 8

[Article by V.M. Bozinovska: "Savings Account Holders Are a Depreciated Currency!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Despite the strong statements issued three months ago by responsible officials of the Karic company in Belgrade, the account holders have not only not been compensated, but the gates of the bank were closed substantially before the 31 December of this year, which was the extended date granted by the NBM [National Bank of Macedonia] for work by the Skopje branch*

The doors of the Karic Bank branch in Skopje are closed. For the past month the bank has not been in operation, and the only communication with those who deposited money in that bank is an announcement on the gate, which states that payments have been temporarily halted (no one knows for how long) and that, in addition to the problems of the bank concerning its notes due from the Macedonian economy, efforts are being made to see to it that the savings of the citizens be ignored instead of account holders becoming involved in dividing the balance between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, a matter which is to be resolved directly between the two.

Actually, what happened was something that was feared the most (despite the optimistic statements of the officials of the company in Belgrade that such a thing would not be allowed): The employees left and the account holders remained with their pockets empty.

Meaningless Statements

It was precisely some time last July, at the latest press conference held by that bank, when the information was provided by officials from the Karic company in Belgrade that by the end of the year all savings of citizens

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would be reimbursed and, naturally, not only the principal but also the interest. Since this was not done because of the impossibility of regularly transferring the money from the center to our country, it was said that it was expected that the National Bank of Macedonia would extend to the bank its work permit (Because of the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia, the Karic Bank was not given a new extension for reregistration. However, the NBM allowed it to work until the 31 December of this year), with a view to ensuring the total compensation for the deposits in that bank in Macedonia. Otherwise, it was reported that that branch would be able to transfer its obligations to another bank in Macedonia, with which some kind of contract would be signed. Meanwhile, until the end of the year, not a single account holder would be paid any less than 100 German marks, naturally in the equivalent denar value.

Unsettled Accounts

Based on the actual situation, however, all of this is only on paper, based on the vain hopes of the account holders, for not only are the 100 marks unavailable but even the doors of the branch closed ahead of time. Actually, what happened in the case of the Karic Bank in Macedonia? Why is the situation not developing the way it had been reported?

In trying to find an answer to this question and considering that for days literally no branch personnel have shown up, we turned to the proper authorities (or the authorities that should have been pertinent)—the National Bank of Macedonia and the Ministry of Finance. However, neither the former nor the latter know exactly what has happened with the branch of the Karic Bank in Macedonia. The first answer which we managed to obtain consisted of some unofficial and unconfirmed views of the central bank, according to which the Karic Bank stopped paying the account holders after being unable to receive the funds owed by our economy. More precisely, according to those views, the Skopje branch of the Karic Bank had invested in our economy, from savings accounts, about 4,300,000 German marks, plus another 1.3 million marks it owes to the account holder. This means that there is a net surplus from our economy, and after repaying those amounts, it would be able to repay the account holders. To this effect, according to unofficial data, the Karic Bank turned to our court to speed up payments. Meanwhile, in order to service the debt, it requested a loan from the National Bank and from one of our commercial banks. Since it obtained nothing from either of them, it decided to "pack its bags" and lock the door, leaving the account holders to their fate.

However, as the people at the central bank state, the accuracy of who owes what to whom and whether indeed the Karic Bank branch, according to its statements, invested their savings in our economy—these are questions which have yet to be considered by the responsible officials in the NBM, and after that, decisions will be made on taking proper measures and various steps.

While the respective authorities are so slow to react, all the account holders have is the hope of recovering the money they deposited and that the money will not follow the fate of the account holders of the Gajdeviler and Jugomarket savings institutions.

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Drnovsek Announces EFTA Membership Negotiations

AU0612165694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Report by Igor Juric from Budapest]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] At a well-attended news conference after the meeting, Dr. Janez Drnovsek primarily spoke of Italian-Slovene relations and his brief meeting with Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi. He also mentioned that Slovenia will start more intense negotiations about European Free Trade Association membership, which he discussed with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland.

Local Elections Make Coalition 'Less Favorable'

AU0612210494 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 6 Dec 94

[Commentary by Bojan Veselinovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] When everybody is pleased with something, then the object of animation must inevitably be subjected to a healthy suspicion. As all the party leaders are, according to their initial reactions, satisfied with the yield in the first round of Sunday local elections, we would, by applying the above maxim, be compelled to question the electoral results. However, we will do no such thing as it would not pay to question the expertise of the electoral commission in advance, although some parties, which even declared the elections irregular immediately after the proclamation of electoral results, are doing so.

True enough, it is politicians' role to please the members and volunteers of their parties with their post-electoral statements. It is also true that viewing of the outcome of local elections narrow-mindedly gives each party an opportunity to feel self- contained. This is also the case in Slovenia, where Jansa's party [the Social Democrats] won quite a lot in towns and in the country alike, where the LDS [the Liberal Democracy] and the United List can be pleased by control of industrial and urban centers, even the biggest ones such as Ljubljana and Maribor it seems, and where the Peoples' Party won the highest number of majors, albeit in small municipalities, in the first round of elections. Actually, the SKD [the Slovene Christian Democrats] can be pleased, too, as no attack from the left or the right could get through to their voters, nor could they be ruffled by all the party caucus meetings and the resignations of President Peterle. In terms of the network on the ground, whose author is former party secretary Stanic, the SKD is a textbook example for other parties.

Now that we have established why all party leaders have reason to be coming out with outbursts of satisfaction, we remind you that the electoral campaign continues.

Speaking about the party networks on the ground, it depends solely on its efficiency within the LDS to what extent Drnovsek will manage to improve his impression in the second round. The fact is that, for him and the government, the present moment is even less favorable for negotiations with the other two coalition parties than the time before the elections, as, now, in order to strike local agreements, he will have to give his partners concessions at the republican level.

At the republican level, the parliament is just about to vote on the budget, which the ruling coalition might survive or might not, because, as we have pointed out, the time for negotiations is not favorable.

The so-called independent candidates for mayors will also come under pressure as the parties will try to vest them in their logos. By mid-December, none of the parties will, of course, state what the taxes in individual municipalities will be, for example. However, we will witness canvassing by the municipal administration employees who, concerned for their employment, are already interpreting the partial results in their own way. We will not escape calls for early parliamentary elections, either. The representatives of local interests in the State Council might be declared controversial and new affairs will be fabricated, too. Unfortunately, all this will also happen with the help of the media, that is, those who cannot see the shortsightedness of support for one or another political option.

By the way, both of the most-recent affairs were like an electoral chewing-bone thrown to the public by the columnists of two papers.

Drnovsek To Negotiate With Italy, EU

95BA0031A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 4 Nov 94 p 2

[Interview with Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Marko Pecauer; place and date not given: "'The Aquilea Episode Is Over, and We Are Starting a New Round of Negotiations'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Slovenia will provide Italy a new proposed declaration; a meeting with Martoni here or in a third country, since Drnovsek is Berlusconi's counterpart; is the SKD [Slovene Christian Democrats] departure from the government political suicide?*

Ljubljana, 3 Nov—After Dr. Janez Drnovsek took over the office of foreign minister, we talked with him about further steps in regulating relations with Italy and about the situation in the coalition after the announced departure of the Christian Democrats.

[Pecauer] You took over the duties of foreign minister, and immediately announced a new round of negotiations with Italy. How, specifically, are you planning those negotiations, and how do you envision them?

[Drnovsek] Taking over the Foreign Ministry is only a transitional solution until the coalition situation is clarified and I can get a suitable candidate. Foreign policy problems cannot wait, of course, and it is obviously

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necessary to act immediately. We will provide Italy with our new proposal for a possible declaration, which would be the basis for regulating mutual relations. It will no longer be derived from the former Aquilea document, but will instead be the beginning of a new round of negotiations with them, since we think that the round to date has not yielded any results. We will provide that proposal to the Italian side in the next few days. The pace of diplomatic activities and possible summit meetings also depends on the Italians, and on their reaction to our proposal. They will probably now have a dilemma over how long to exploit the advantage that they created as a result of Aquilea and Rome, and try first to "sell" it throughout Europe. The question is how seriously they are prepared to regulate relations with us, and for us to arrive at some sort of serious basis for the future.

[Pecauer] The question is whether Italy will agree to the rejection of the Aquilea declaration.

[Drnovsek] The Aquilea declaration was never confirmed by our side. Italy is exploiting the fact that Ministers Peterle and Martino coordinated it jointly, and that they jointly arrived at a working draft; to be sure, the Italians keep giving it major significance and saying that it has been initialed and so it should not be changed afterward. Peterle, our foreign minister at that time, said that he only indicated that it would not be that final and that it was only a working draft. It is possible that the Italians will try to continue exploiting the fact that the ministers arrived at a coordinated draft, as they have already done so far within the framework of the EU. It is another fact, however, true and objective, that the Slovene Government never ratified it. Consequently, the Italian side cannot interpret it any differently. In spite of everything, it is only a sort of working draft that required subsequent ratification. It did not receive it. Nothing has been signed along those lines between Slovenia and Italy.

[Pecauer] In your role as foreign minister, your interlocutor will be Italian Foreign Minister Martino. What kind of interlocutor do you expect him to be, since recently rather sharp words have been exchanged?

[Drnovsek] We are not criticizing Martino; we are criticizing Peterle. Minister Martino, of course, is exploiting the situation that has arisen, which is natural on his part. I think, however, that as foreign minister he has the task of trying to solve problems that have arisen and not just exploiting situations which mean that the problem has not been solved and that it is possibly becoming even bigger. I think that Martino is a reasonable politician and diplomat, and that he will proceed from that fact. For our part, my position, of course, is somewhat unique. My counterpart on the other side is primarily Prime Minister Berlusconi. It is possible and expedient, of course, for me to meet with Martoni as well, especially if it is here or in some third state. Of course, a meeting with Berlusconi still remains "in reserve"; that would give a final seal to this phase of regulating relations between Slovenia and Italy.

[Pecauer] And in terms of time, when you expect that it will be possible to reach an agreement with Italy?

[Drnovsek] It is difficult to answer that question. In the coming days we will send our proposals to the Italian Government, so that this negotiating process can proceed and in order to try to resolve our relationship with the EU as soon as possible as well. The next meeting of the EU Council of Ministers at the end of November is the date by which we will try to do something. At this time, however, it is very difficult to say whether we will succeed in making any progress by then or not. That also depends on the Italians.

[Pecauer] The Christian Democrats are announcing that they will leave the coalition. If they carry out that intention, what will your reaction be like?

[Drnovsek] I have already said that I think that it will be a mistake if the Christian Democrats decide on that step. I think that our cooperation has nevertheless been based on several other assumptions and goals, and that in these almost two years we have done a great deal together, and that Slovenia is on a good course. This dispute over relations with Italy, over the Aquilea declaration, and, if we can call it that, over Minister Peterle's mistakes in that regard, is a dispute that can be easily settled. I do not know whether the Christian Democrats really will decide on that kind of political suicide; will they thus exacerbate that relationship and will they also go against the opinion of probably the majority of Slovenes and defend the Aquilea agreement and all the activities and statements by former Minister Peterle, which directly harmed Slovenia? I think that it would be bad for them and that it would be better for them to think soberly about all of it together and for us to determine jointly what the things are that we can work successfully on; I think that there are several of the latter. Doesn't that give them more weight and more prospects than this episode, which in my opinion is very unfortunate and regrettable?

[Pecauer] Nevertheless, if the Christian Democrats decide to leave the coalition, what steps will you take?

[Drnovsek] Then we will obviously continue working without them. Of course, in that case the leadership of the Liberal Democrats will also assess the situation that has arisen. We will talk with other potential partners, either with the parties or with groups of deputies, or individual deputies. It is possible to ensure at least a minimal majority in parliament without major difficulties. We will also study other possibilities, perhaps a minority LDS government in cooperation with some other parties and ministers from other parties. There are thus several possibilities available. I think that we can ensure the functioning of the government and parliament.

[Pecauer] You mentioned certain parties and deputies. Can you be more specific?

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[Drnovsek] At this time I would rather not be more specific, and leave it to the course of events. If necessary, there will be negotiations, which do not need to be announced now.

[Pecauer] You and Mr. Peterle exchanged rather sharp words recently, and also accusations. Isn't that a big obstacle to further cooperation between you, and between your party and the Christian Democrats?

[Drnovsek] I think that it is a problem, especially as far as Mr. Peterle is concerned. Recently he has made several statements that are unnecessary and improper, while still foreign minister and president of a coalition party, which is in violation of the coalition agreement and the law on the government. I myself, virtually until yesterday, withheld all statements and did not respond to his attacks, so that the government would function normally, so that we would outwardly work seriously, and so that the coalition would continue to function. There was just too much of all that, however, and completely mistaken impressions were created. Perhaps my mistake was that I "covered up for" Mr. Peterle too long, and thus saved the situation in both the government and the coalition. It seemed to me that this was in the interest of the functioning of the state. It was only when the Italian foreign minister started to quote and use Minister Peterle's statements and positions against our government that I thought things had gone beyond the limit of what is acceptable.

[Pecauer] On one hand, you are calling upon the Christian Democrats to think some more about leaving the coalition, but on the other hand you are asserting that relations with Mr. Peterle may represent an obstacle....

[Drnovsek] They will also have to talk about that themselves. What is it that they are protecting? In my opinion, Mr. Peterle's behavior has been completely against the state's interests. If the Christian Democrats stand behind it, if that is their policy, then it will be difficult for us to cooperate. If they get over this more or less clearly, since it is obviously some sort of unfortunate episode, a mistake, we can continue talking from that point, not about this and not in such a way that they as a party would back that mistake, which after all is against the state's interests. In that case it will also be difficult to cooperate with them. A great deal thus depends on them. As far as I am concerned, the Aquilea episode is over. We will start a new round of negotiations with both Italy and the EU. We will try to deal as little as possible with past events, and solve problems from this point on. It is up to the SKD what they will give priority to.

Draft Declaration on Relations With Italy, EU

95BA0037A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 9 Nov 94 p 10

[Text of draft State Assembly declaration: "Validity of Existing Treaties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are publishing the draft of a declaration on relations between Slovenia and Italy and the European Union that was adopted at yesterday's session by the State Assembly's Foreign Relations Committee. The State Assembly deputies will speak out on it at a special session announced for tomorrow.

1. The State Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia expresses deep regret and concern over the fact that neighboring Italy is repeatedly blocking Slovenia's closer relations with the EU. Recently, Italy has been exploiting its position to block the initiation of negotiations on Slovenia's associate membership in the EU.

2. The State Assembly emphasizes once again that relations between Slovenia and Italy have been internationally regulated. By succession, both states, on 31 July 1992, inherited the agreements that were in the joint interest of both states, including the Osimo Accords of 1975 and the so-called Rome Agreement of 1983.

In regard to the issue of the international legal regulation of relations between the two states, the Republic of Slovenia emphasizes its adherence to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* [treaties are to be respected].

The attempts to revise them partially or entirely in spite of this are not only dangerous to relations between Italy and Slovenia, but also constitute a dangerous precedent of an attempt to revise the postwar structure of Europe and the potential destabilization of our continent.

3. Italy obviously expects that we would change some of the agreements in effect, because of the allegedly changed historical circumstances, which were not taken into account when the agreements were adopted. The Italian demand for righting wrongs could open up the old questions about fascism and the harm done to Slovenes and the Slovene people during both wars and during the occupation (1041-1943) on part of Slovene territory.

4. Slovenia remains committed to developing the best possible political, economic, cultural, and other relations with its western neighbor. Consequently, on this occasion it particularly wants to call upon neighboring Italy to engage in higher forms of economic relations, joint ties in the area of trade, and joint approaches to third markets. Slovenia sees new opportunities for cooperation in the area of transportation and communications, banking cooperation, and in the area of science and technology, culture, and sports. Slovenia also wants to encourage closer cooperation on the regional level.

The autochthonous minorities—the Slovene one in Italy and the Italian one in Slovenia—should be a bridge between the two peoples, and their rights and status should be as great as possible and as comparable as possible.

5. The State Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia calls upon Italy to follow the good example of Slovenia in protecting the Italian minority on its territory and to regulate fairly and effectively the legal protection of the Slovene minority in Italy.

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In this regard, the State Assembly emphasizes:

—the principle that all the international agreements adopted to date, from the Peace Treaty with Italy to the Osimo Treaty, on the position of the respective minorities of both states remain completely valid;

—consideration and actual implementation of the European standards of protection, expressed in the Paris and Copenhagen documents and in the Council of Europe documents, in the bilateral regulation of this issue between the two states;

—the principle according to which the domestic legal regulation of the position of the respective minorities in the two states is conducted without discrimination and in accordance with the already existing domestic legal regulation of the position of all other minorities in the two states.

6. The present unilateral pressures, negotiations, and blockades by Italy in Slovenia's multilateral relations are unacceptable to our state, since they jeopardize not only relations with Slovenia but also threaten the fundamental values on which the project of European integration is based.

Slovenia hopes that Italy will follow a constructive policy, and thus gain allies and respect, and not suspicions and rejections.

7. Slovenia is preparing itself economically and politically, and remains interested in concluding a European Agreement with the Union on an equal basis, in regard to which it meets the criteria for the European Agreements concluded to date with the other Central European countries.

In this regard, the State Assembly emphasizes that Slovenia is not prepared to give in to the pressures of one member of the EU, and to open the door to a further escalation of demands. It notes with regret that the Italian demands to date, in addition to rejecting valid bilateral agreements, are ignoring the settlement in the European Agreements to date, and are even leading to the possibility of discrimination against different EU citizens in acquiring property on Slovene territory. In rejecting those demands, Slovenia counts on understanding and support in concluding an agreement based on equality.

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Federal

UN Envoy Criticizes Draft on Human Rights

LD0712010794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2347 GMT 6 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Dec. 6 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Ambassador to the U.N. Dragomir Djokic described the two resolutions under preparation as seething with untruths and inaccuracies.

In two letters he sent Tuesday to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, Djokic in this way assessed the resolution on the state of human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and in Serbia's Kosovo and Metohija province, all under preparation in the General Assembly's third committtee.

The resolutions were based on reports of U.N. human rights special rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

Presenting the Yugoslav Government stands, Djokic warned that in the draft resolution on human rights in Bosnia and Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was groundlessly being accused of involvement in the war in these former Yugoslav republics, and the Serbs the only ones blamed for human rights violations.

Warning that all three sides violated human rights in these territories, Djokic said the cause for these violations was forcible break-up of the former Yugoslavia, which, as he said, the international community, too, supported.

The letter said 250,000 Serbs were expelled from Croatia since its secession, while the situation in Bosnia was no better.

Djokic especially pointed out that Yugoslavia at one time hosted 700,000 refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that it still hosted about 500,000 of them, while the international community persistently closed its eyes to this fact.

Describing the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia's southern province, mostly populated by the Albanian minority, Djokic said ethnic Albanians enjoyed all the constitutionally-guaranteed rights just as other Yugoslav citizens, but that, under separatist influences, they chose to boycott public and political life.

A strong separatist movement of ethnic Albanians has been active in Kosovo and Metohija for decades. Their ultimate goal was to secede the province from Serbia and Yugoslavia and join it to neighboring Albania. To these ends, the separatists have organized in Kosovo and Metohija parallel, illegal, organs of authorities.

Separatist tendencies were receiving strong support from Albania, which in this way openly demonstrated territorial aspirations toward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, warned Djokic.

He said, the Yugoslav authorities were ready for political dialogue with leaders of the political parties of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija within legal institutions, but for such a dialogue to take place it was necessary for ethnic Albanians to observe the laws and Constitution of the country they lived in as a minority.

Belgrade To Back Serbs, Montenegrins in Albania

LD0612203094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1808 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 6 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Radoslav Bulajic said Tuesday that Yugoslavia would fully back ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins in Albania.

A government statement issued after the talks between Bulajic and a delegation of Yugoslav ethnic groups in Albania quoted Bulajic as saying ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins were loyal citizens of Albania and as such should be the link between the two neighboring countries.

The statement also said chairman and vice-chairman of the Shkoder-based Rozafa/Moraca Association, Burhan Culic and Milan Brajovic, informed Bulajic about the position of the Serb and Montenegrin ethnic groups in Albania.

Culic and Brajovic said the Serb and Montenegrin ethnic groups encountered a large number of problems in preserving their ethnic and cultural identity.

The delegation said Monday in the talks with Yugoslav Minister Without Portfolio Margit Savovic that Tirana denied ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins the right to education and information in their mother tongue.

The Rozafa/Moraca Association rallies about 12,000 ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins, regardless of their religion, living in Shkoder and elsewhere in Albania.

The association's goal is to preserve ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins' national and cultural identity and to promote links with Yugoslavia, their mother country.

General Explains Reasons for Army Resignations

AU0712083594 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 94 pp 6-7

[Interview with Major General Risto Matovic, deputy head of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, by Slavoljub Randjelovic and Sladjana Ristic; place and date not given: "The Professional Core Will Endure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The transformation of the Yugoslav Army, whose exceptionally complex nature is additionally complicated by the unfavorable conditions under which it is operating, is also being affected by the highly negative phenomenon of military personnel leaving. Experts of all kinds, especially highly qualified military professionals, are leaving the army. This can

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have negative consequences for the combat readiness and combat efficiency of Yugoslav Army units. We discussed with Major General Risto Matovic, deputy head of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, in charge of organization, mobilization, recruiting, and system issues, how new personnel are being recruited and why so many professionals are leaving.

[VOJSKA] The changes in the structure of the Yugoslav Army certainly required a change in the attitude to the personnel as one of its very important elements. What were the basic aims of the General Staff in selecting the personnel and how was the selection made?

[Matovic] The social changes in general, and especially the process of transformation of the army in almost all of its aspects, are reflected in personnel issues, that is among officers and NCO's and civilians employed by the Yugoslav Army. Radical changes in the army and the complex tasks that it has to perform in objectively unfavorable financial and social conditions have made a large number of army personnel leave it. On the other hand, the improved social framework of the army compared with that of the former state have had implications on the public's respect for the army and the popularity of the military profession.

Departing Officers Determine Personnel Policy

Despite the negative consequences of this unfavorable situation, the professional core of the army has been saved. All possible measures and activities are being taken to overcome the present situation.

We are not satisfied with the profile of the officers whom we now have, especially the commanders of troops. This problem has to be seen in the light of the obligations and tasks that the Yugoslav Army has under present conditions. It has to be pointed out, however, that the existing personnel have, generally speaking, succeeded in diminishing the problems owing to their quality and enhanced efforts, but we have to know that any further deterioration of the personnel situation could not be compensated for, no matter what efforts officers might make.

[VOJSKA] Does this mean that the officers who were ordered to leave the army have even further complicated the already complex personnel situation?

[Matovic] Exactly. Under conditions where we cannot get as many people as we need, with more people leaving the army than joining it, every early retirement means a deterioration in the personnel situation. We are confronted with the problem that too many officers are leaving the Yugoslav Army because they are forced to. If we view this problem in relation to the former Yugoslav People's Army, we can see that 10 times more people are being forced to leave the army now than before. During 1993 and the first eight months of 1994 the number of officers who left the army at their own request equalled the total number of newcomers. In some units, however, the number of officers leaving exceeded the number of new recruits.

Troop commanders are leaving as well as top professionals from institutes, so that important positions are vacant. I would like to mention some worrying examples. Twenty-three officers and 68 civilians in senior or research positions have left the Institute of Military Technology, 23 specialist physicians have left the Military Hospital, and eight experts have left the Military Institute of Applied Mathematics. The development of certain programs will be hampered without them; it will even be difficult to carry on the work at the present level in certain fields.

[VOJSKA] What is the average age and qualifications of those who leave at their own request?

[Matovic] I would like to point out that these are very young professionals, and this is what is especially worrying. Of the total number of officers who have resigned, 69 percent had the rank between sergeant to sergeant first class or second lieutenant to captain. And 67 percent of these were under 40. In other words, promising young people at the peak of their working and creative capabilities.

Resignations were received from 29 doctors of science, 70 masters of science, and 299 people with a bachelor's degree. Those mostly leaving the army are officers, NCO's in various positions, and professionals who can find jobs outside the army (lawyers, information scientists, physicians, and financial specialists).

[VOJSKA] What are the main reasons given by those leaving?

[Matovic] There are many and varied reasons. I will mention only some of them: Worse salaries than in civilian companies for the same qualifications, inadequate compensation for work and responsibility resulting from difficult working conditions in the military profession, evident financial drawbacks compared with employees in civilian companies, who, additionally, have no restrictions about taking an additional job, the impossibility of real scientific and research work and further development. As you can see, financial reasons prevail.

[VOJSKA] Do you know where these officers are being employed after they leave the army? Do they go abroad?

[Matovic] The Yugoslav Army does not have this information. Some things are known unofficially, however. Some of them are employed by public institutions such as banks, universities, or larger social institutions; a smaller number are employed by private companies. We have the information, too, that a certain number of experts (information scientists, electronics engineers) have gone abroad (to Canada, the United States, and New Zealand).

[VOJSKA] What concrete measures are being taken by the Yugoslav Army General Staff to prevent people from leaving?

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[Matovic] This problem has repeatedly been discussed by the Board of General Staff Heads and by the Supreme Defense Council. Solutions are being sought within the existing structures; in other words we have tried to solve this problem with the money that we have. The army's possibilities are very limited, though. We are making efforts in two directions. First, we are taking the appropriate measures to retain the personnel by offering them efficient forms of further training and specialization. Second, we are concentrating on improving the living and working conditions of the army members. We have achieved certain improvements in this field, especially regarding apartments for army members. The Supreme Defense Council has made the housing problem its top priority. There is already the initiative for a special federal law on financing 10,000 such apartments. The bill will be submitted to the Federal Government in February 1995.

It Is Expected That the Financial Situation in the Yugoslav Army Will Improve]

[Matovic, continued] Regarding the education of personnel, I can say that military schools and the military education system in general have been reorganized. The position of specialized centers has been redefined, an interdisciplinary secondary school has been founded and grants for secondary-school pupils have been introduced.

It is expected that the financial situation in the Yugoslav Army will improve so that it can be expected that these measures will bear fruit, too; in other words, we hope that they will contribute to the stabilization of the army personnel.

[VOJSKA] Would it be possible for the responsible social structures to participate in the measures taken to prevent people from leaving the army or to attract people to the army?

[Matovic] I told you that we have tried to motivate certain state institutions to help us solve this problem. We regularly inform the Supreme Defense Council on the situation with army personnel, since it is our direct command responsible for the situation in the Yugoslav Army. The Supreme Defense Council has taken concrete measures several times; it has intervened through the government to solve certain problems.

We are not only calling on institutions to help us. We have also offered solutions to our problems. We think that the Yugoslav Army should be exempt from paying communal fees and costs arising from the preparation of the land on which apartments will be built because these costs amount to 20 percent of the total costs that the Yugosalv Army has. Apart from that, the army should be exempt from other liabilities, too. If it is possible for the army to use the money that it earns by offering certain services or by trading with certain properties etc., it will have more money for the construction of apartments, for example.

It is clear that the state has its problems, too. We have understanding for these problems; the economic program has to be implemented. If we do not save the economic program, no effort will bear fruit. If we save our economy, if we protect it and create the conditions for its revival, if we make manufacturing possible, it can be expected that more money will be paid into the budget so that the Yugoslav Army will receive more money, too.

[box, p 7]

Sources of Army Members Recruitment]

[Matovic] It is our general tendency to offer the education of those military professions that cannot be educated in civilian schools. For all other professional positions we take civilians and specialize them for the profile that we need.

The personnel are recruited either by educating people for professions that we need, or by employing civilians and offering them further education or specialization. We have achieved various results so far, but we have also had problems. The interest is not equal in all military schools: Military high-schools and technical schools are popular, whereas military academies for certain branches or specialized education for non-commissioned officers are not very attractive.

That is the reason we have to make use of all possible sources when recruiting our personnel. We also try to find new sources. We have taken some concrete measures to improve the personnel situation in the army so that we shall have larger classes in military schools in the years to come to compensate for the present deficit in students. We have organized two entrance examinations for military academies in 1994 with the aim of attracting as many young people as possible to attend military schools. We shall do the same thing again if necessary. We have tried to select the best candidates for military high schools to have a sufficient number of good students. All these preparations have been made and a certain number of civilian school pupils selected for scholarships for the military academies.

Serbia

President Milosevic Meets With Owen, Stoltenberg

LD0612174294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1655 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 Dec (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received the cochairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, TANJUG has learned.

Owen and Stoltenberg arrived in Belgrade today. The talks were held this afternoon.

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Cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg are expected to make statements for journalists after the meeting with the Serbian president.

Cochairmen, Krajina Delegation Meet

LD0612183194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1742 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 Dec—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic this afternoon received the cochairmen of the Geneva conference on former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen, with aides, as well as [Croatian Serb] Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic. They held frank talks on current issues concerning the peace process.

According to a statement from the office of the Serbian president, Milosevic expressed satisfaction with the successful cooperation between the cochairmen and the Krajina delegation, headed by Borislav Mikelic, and said that the agreement on the normalization of economic relations between Knin and Zagreb gave a considerable impetus to a political solution of the crisis on Yugoslav territory. In connection with this, he stressed the great contribution made by cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg in preparing and negotiating the agreement.

They also discussed the present situation in the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the latest efforts directed toward a positive development of the peace process, in line with the international community's orientation to end the crisis in the region exclusively by political means.

Serbia, or rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is in favor of establishing a general cessation of hostilities between the warring parties in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and of relaunching the peace process, the statement says.

Comment on Talks

AU0612221894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic, Owen and Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the Conference on former Yugoslavia, gave statements for Radio Belgrade. Here is a report by Tamara Motrenko:

[Begin recording] [Motrenko] With Mr. Mikelic we discussed the agreement signed between Knin and Zagreb, while with President Milosevic we discussed a wider spectrum of topics referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the situation in general.

Regarding yesterday's visit by the representatives of the Serbian Republic parliament in Belgrade and their talks with President Milosevic, Owen put forward the following assessment:

We have always believed that a peaceful solution to the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is in the interest of the Serbs, and the more Serbs realize this the better. Evidently, the members of the assembly from Bosnia play an important role in this change and if they were to take a better and more thorough look at the Contact Group plan and especially at the statement from the last ministerial meeting in Brussels, they would realize that there is ample basis and framework for the acceptance of the Contact Group plan, which provides them with a basis for a mutual exchange of territories, since the Bosnian-Muslim government wishes to alter the maps as well as Pale, Lord Owen emphasized.

When asked when can further political agreements between Knin and Zagreb be expected, Lord Owen replied that these talks are constantly underway a little and that the cochairmen have set no final deadline for these talks.

Owen emphasized that the Knin-Zagreb agreement is being realized and promoted in phases, as this is actually a package of agreements. He said that, at this meeting, there was talk about the supply of electricity and water and about the [Zagreb-Belgrade] highway and oil pipeline. Owen emphasized that, in the future talks, they will discuss in detail pensions and humanitarian aid, the return of refugees, and all other aspects of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, because, as Lord Owen emphasized, there are many things that need to be done to make the conference a success. Owen then announced that [name indistinct], UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] representative and Mr. Mikelic had agreed on an exact number of forthcoming meetings that should be held and agreements that should be realized. He also said that the cochairmen hoped that these meetings will bring results, bearing in mind that it seems that months will pass before, as Lord Owen claims, the results would be visible on the ground.

It is a desire of the cochairmen, according to Lord Owen, to accomplish success as soon as possible and, for this reason, the two cochairmen and UNPROFOR delegation are returning in Zagreb for further talks.

Cochairman Stoltenberg then replied to a question about the nature of his talks with [Croatian Foreign Minister] Mate Granic in Geneva. Stoltenberg said that the subject of this meeting was the as rapid as possible implementation and finalization of the economic agreement between Knin and Zagreb, which should be accelerated. To our questions about the next steps in the realization of the peace process, particularly in light of the statement from the last meeting of the five Contact Group ministers in Brussels and especially regarding the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the new constitutional provisions, Stoltenberg replied that very lively consultations are currently underway and that this was discussed at CSCE meeting in Budapest on 5 December. This is a part of the process that, as cochairman Stoltenberg says, must be continued because it is mandatory that all sides sit down at the negotiating table as soon as possible.

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Regarding the continued stay of UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia, Stoltenberg replied that UNPROFOR is, for the time being, quite definitely staying on the ground.

Our question to Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic was the following: Has there been any progress and what new facts have you learned from the two cochairmen?

[Mikelic] [passage omitted] Speaking about the military escalation, I could say that they were doing this before the signing, probably. After the incident with the aircraft [not further specified], after what has happened in Bihac and the Bihac pocket, I believe that after the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army exceeded its framework, that counteroffensive took place. The first attack by the 5th Corps was not condemned and halted at the international level. I believe the first problem of the international community was that it did not react. Later, when the counteroffensive had taken place these reactions, which are definitely bigger now, occurred, bearing in mind the place and role of Bosnia-Herzegovina President Izetbegovic and the Muslim-Croatian federation [sentence as heard]. For these reasons, I believe that the problem of Bihac has grown more complicated and bigger as the situation was developing with the advancement of the Serbian forces.

[Motrenko] At the CSCE meeting, their proposal and that of Alija Izetbegovic to pass a declaration on the Bihac pocket did not pass?

[Mikelic] Such a declaration could not be passed as there are the forces of Fikret Abdic, the Peoples' Defense of Fikret Abdic, on the other side. This is actually a Muslim internal struggle, which suggests that it will not be the Serbs who will rule in western Bosnia, but probably the Muslims. However, we would like this to be Fikret Abdic, I guess, who pursues a normal and peaceful option. I believe that the Serbs from the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina absolutely can reach an agreement with him and that peace will again reign there if Fikret Abdic comes out at the head of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. [end recording]

No Reconsideration of Peace Plan Rejection

LD0612201494 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a visit by a delegation of the Club of Deputies of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic to President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, the executive board of the Serb Democratic Party of Serbian Lands [Srpska Demokratska Stranka Srpskih Zemalja—SDSSZ] has issued a statement, saying:

In recent days there have been frequent cases of individual people's deputies of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic being invited without authorization to the president of Serbia. In order to examine this phenomenon, a joint meeting has been held of the Club of Deputies of the people's assembly and the SDSSZ executive board. At this meeting a standpoint was adopted according to which all meetings should be held within the framework of relevant institutions.

The SDSSZ executive board and the Club of Deputies of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic have elected an official delegation, which will visit the president of Serbia, as opposed to individual and unauthorized visits, and inform him about the conclusions and obtain information about the latest diplomatic initiatives. The SDSSZ executive board and the Club of Deputies of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic have tasked the delegation with conveying to the president of Serbia the following conclusions adopted at their joint session:

1) One cannot draw a certain conclusion but there is a possibility of activities being carried out aiming at disuniting the people's assembly of the Srpska republic if self-initiated visits and consultations are to continue.

2) In order to avert any political manipulations in the future deputies should not act on their own accord.

3) Every initiative for restarting cooperation and talks with Serbia and Montenegro is welcomed, while it was suggested that the initiators should acquaint the people's assembly and the state and political leadership of the Srpska republic with their initiatives, because cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro is necessary and useful.

4) The SDSSZ executive board and the Club of Deputies of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic state once again that there is no need, or a possibility, to reexamine in any way whatsoever the decision of our people to reject the Contact Group's maps. All official contact and cooperation with Serbia's institution should, however, be supported, it is said in conclusion in the statement signed by Velibor Ostojic, the chairman of the SDSSZ executive board council.

Pankov Calls for Peaceful Settlement in Bosnia

LD0612214194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2023 GMT 6 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sid, Dec.6 (TANJUG)—A peaceful settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina through talks is the only alternative, a Serbian minister said.

By supporting the international Contact Group peace plan Yugoslavia has opted for peace and a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Bosnia, Radovan Pankov, the Serbian minister for relations with Serbs outside Serbia and head of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia for Vojvodina (Serbia's northern province) said.

Pankov said that Yugoslavia was urging a cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the settlement of

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the Serb issue in a peaceful way, through negotiations, taking into consideration the equal rights and equality of all parties in the conflict.

That is the only way to show that the sanctions imposed on us by the international community are unfounded and unjust, Pankov said.

We have proved to be right in demanding equal rights for the people in the Srpska republic and in the republic of Serb Krajina as those granted to other nations in former Yugoslavia, Pankov said.

Pellnas Claims Bosnian Border 'Satisfactory'

AU0612183594 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3-4 Dec 94 p 5

[Interview with Bo Pellnas, head of the civilian mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, by Aleksandar Djordjevic; place and date not given: "Third Report 'Essentially Positive'"; first paragraph is NEDELJNA BORBA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On Wednesday [30 November] I sent a new monthly report to the the cochairmen of the conference, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. They were supposed to submit it to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali on Thursday, or, if not then, on Friday, Bo Pellnas, head of the civilian mission of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia said at the beginning of his interview with BORBA.

[Djordjevic] Is this report as positive as the two earlier reports?

[Pellnas] It would be too simple to say that the reports are either negative or positive. You could say that the conclusions of my latest report are positive.

[Djordjevic] How many more reports still need to be submitted before a Security Council session on the future of the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia?

[Pellnas] Another report is due at the beginning of January. After that the matter is up to the Security Council, since the 100-day deadline expires on either 12 or 13 January 1995.

[Djordjevic] After your October report, the United States announced that they would scrutinize the question of further relaxing the sanctions because they have information that the blockade on the Drina River is being violated. How serious and frequent are such cases, and to what extent could they influence the Security Council decision?

Good Cooperation With Customs Officers

[Pellnas] I do not wish to comment on what the United States has said. We base our reports on what we see for ourselves and on information that we receive, and we can substantiate this with evidence.

The violations are of various types and extent, from minor matters, such as someone trying to smuggle in a few liters of gasoline, to the crossing of whole petrol tankers. In one of the most serious violations, we counted some five or six tankers crossing the border. There were several cases involving trucks, to mention some of the more serious incidents. Of course, you must take into account that there have been cases that we do not know about.

Generally speaking, there have not been many drastic violations of your government's decision. No more than we had expected.

You see, large sums of money are involved in this business. I think the best way to explain this would be to say that the more efficient we are, the greater the risk for the smugglers. The greater the risk, the greater the price of the merchandise for the risk to be worth taking. This is a question of a struggle between the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], its customs authorities, and the smugglers. I believe that for the time being the situation is satisfactory. The Yugoslav customs officials are becoming increasingly efficient each day.

[Djordjevic] Can you perhaps list one of the more recent examples?

[Pellnas] Perhaps it is not the most recent one, but one of the major incidents took place on 19 November when two tankers forcibly crossed the border at the Krstac border crossing. It is true, however, that there were no obstacles or ramps on the border crossing. [passage omitted]

[Djordjevic] In your experience so far, which part of the Yugoslav-Bosnian border is "most vulnerable" to violations of the blockade?

[Pellnas] At the beginning we had some major problems in Montenegro. Nowadays the situation there has improved because certain innovations have been introduced into operating procedures and the work is better organized. The situation, at least for the time being, is satisfactory. This question would be best answered by your customs authorities, because they have problems and are conducting an ongoing battle with the smugglers.

We are simply monitoring their struggle. We hope that in the future no part of the border will present a problem. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Serbs Arrest Opposition Leader; No Explanation

AU0712111394 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT 6 Dec 94 in English No 502

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sezair Shaipi, chairman of the Prizren-based Turkish People's Party, was reported arrested yesterday in Prizren. Today's Bujku reports that a dozen of Serb policemen searched Monday early in the

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morning Mr. Shaipi's home before arresting him. So far the Serbian police has not provided any explanation as to the motive for his arrest. Mr. Sezair Shaipi's party is supportive of the Kosova independence.

Conflict Viewed Among Ethnic Albanian Leadership

AU0612142494 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Nov 94 p 12

[Milan Laketic report: "The Ethnic Albanian Who Survived Goli Otok Leaves Rugova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 25 November— The political turmoil these days between the chairman of the Democratic Association of Kosovo [DSK] Ibrahim Rugova and the ethnic Albanian Union of Independent Trade Unions led by Hajrulah Gorani, has entered a bizarre phase, as usually happens. Mutual denunciations regarding the misuse of trade union funds have started appearing in the ethnic Albanian newspapers published in Pristina, which are reporting on the causes of the crisis there. Aziz Abrasi has not been able to explain to journalists how the money collected from ethnic Albanian workers disappeared from the account, and Gorani has stated in Zeri magazine that the issue actually concerns a political attack by Rugova, who is trying to place the trade union under his political patronage. True, as Gorani himself has conceded, in its work so far the ethnic Albanian trade union itself has been mostly engaged in political issues, rather than those of its own concern.

Unusual Biography

"All this has already been seen," Gorani stated to journalists, obviously satisfied that he has been reelected chairman, and that the escapade by Rugova's men failed to achieve the desired effect. According to their plan, the entire trade union leadership should have been replaced by Rugova's people, which would have been the most painless way of effecting a kind of political "perestroika.-"

However, local analysts believe that Gorani has won only the first round, although in the opinion of people loyal to Rugova he stands no chance against Rugova in this conflict. Behind this internal ethnic Albanian conflict hides competition among possible members of the team for talks with Belgrade. Gorani's biography is that of a political dissident, because in the 1950's he was accused of nationalism. He served his time in Goli Otok island. In the late 1980's he organized with Veton Suroji the so-called political alternative of Kosovo, and in 1991 he founded the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, which was the main political support for the activities of ethnic Albanian separatists. In Kosovo he was most reproached for organizing the mass ethnic Albanian strike on 3 April 1991, due to which a great number of ethnic Albanian workers were fired. He recognized that mistake himself, so last month he publicly stated several times that only a dialogue with Belgrade could ensure jobs for ethnic Albanian workers, and only work could revive production in Kosovo. His statement came in handy for Rugova's spokesmen, to present him to the local public as an ethnic Albanians who, although without the legitimacy of his own people, feels called on to lead future negotiations with Belgrade. However, the main cause of his confrontation with the so-called government of Kosovo in exile is his criticism of the practice of collecting taxes from ethnic Albanians who work abroad.

Airing of Dirty Linen in the Public

These polemics have uncovered many yet unknown details. The self-proclaimed prime minister of the nonexistent government, Bujar Bukosi, was collecting money from workers through a private bank account. The trade union did not want to end up with the short end of the stick, so it followed Bukosi's example. The Union also started raising funds through a private account in a Ljubljana bank. The ethnic Albanian press has gone even further in the public airing of other trade union officials' dirty linen, reminding readers that Burhan Kavaja owns 10 or so private bars in Pristina, a hotel in Albania, and several firms in Bulgaria. Other trade union leaders delegated by Rugova's DSK have rapidly acquired wealth as well (Abrasi owns two companies, one in Bulgaria and the other in Albania), so it is not hard to guess how the money collected from workers to help the unemployed ethnic Albanian families was spent.

Therefore in the attempt to oust Gorani and bring his own people into the trade union leadership, it is not difficult to recognize Rugova's intention aimed at placing under his control the enormous amount of money the trade union has collected so far, and postponing possible talks between the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians.

How this conflict will end is still uncertain, since Gorani has already received the first signs of support. Right after the public clash with the DSK, the parliamentary party of Kosovo expressed its support for him, something ethnic Albanian Social-Democrats did also. It is not difficult to suppose that he expects the support from Veton Suroji, with whom he most closely cooperates on political issues.

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